A CONTRIBUTION TO THE PREDICATE VIEW OF PROPER NAMES

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Abstract: While the predicate view of proper names is popular among linguists, it is not unanimous. This paper contributes to the discussion by considering some linguistic data exemplified by phrases such as “Operation Valkyrie” and “Operation Desert Storm”. These examples bring some clues about the structure of the phrases that help us understand the procedure involved in naming individuals. One is the gap between the first constituent (“operation”) and the second constituent (“Valkyrie”), which is filled by an abstract functional structure, as will be argued in this paper. These clues also lead us into two consequences: a) the difference between a definite description and a proper name is not so clear; b) the naming procedure is enabled by a complex syntactic-semantic mechanism within this gap. Our analysis shows that the predicate view provides accurate results for the data under analysis.

Keywords: proper names; definite description; predicate view.

1 INTRODUCTION

This paper aims to contribute to the predicate view of proper names, which will be defined in section 4 (BACH, 2015; FARA, 2015; GEURTS, 1997; GRAY, 2012; IZUMI,
Our arguments and analysis are based on expressions such as *Operação Valquiria* (Operation Valkyrie) and *Operação Tempestade no Deserto* (Operation Desert Storm), which we will term FULL-names\(^3\), where FULL can be filled, for example, by *Operação* (Operation) and name by the rest of the expression. The analysis of the structure of FULL-names begs some questions: what is the nature of the constitution of a FULL-name? What kind of relationship exists between the first and second constituents? What kind of “referential expression” (RE) is a FULL-name? We argue that the answers to these questions strengthen the argument for the predicate view. When analyzing the structure of FULL-names, we claim that its complexity offers interesting arguments in favor of the predicate view of proper names, as we will see in more detail below. There are a number of semantic and syntactic arguments that maintain that proper names are a special case of predication, differing, for instance, from definite descriptions, which are by default a kind of predication\(^5\). From our point of view, a FULL-name consists of a common noun and a second element, which can go beyond a lexical unit, as in the case of “Desert Storm”. Between the first unit and the second, there is a kind of syntactic gap, and it is precisely this gap that we will explore. We will use comparative data from English and Brazilian Portuguese. Sometimes, the order of the two constituents in the FULL-name is the same in these two languages, but there are also REs with differences in order, such as:

(01)  
a. Manhattan Project  
Projeto Manhattan  
b. Romeo and Juliet Law  
Lei Romeo e Julieta

Examples such as those in 1a and b are a kind of FULL-name, but they need to be studied further to explain why there are differences in the position of the NPs “law” and “project” in opposition to “operation”. In this paper, only FULL-names containing “operation” and similar are addressed.

Similar and contrasting patterns can be found in other languages, where the NP can appear in front of or after the nucleus of the naming phrase:

(02)  
Walkürehadművelet (Hungarian)  
Valkiriaoperazioa (Basque)  
MivtzaValkiri (Hebrew)  
OperatsyeValkire (Yiddish)  
ChiéndichValkyrie (Vietnamese)  
OperaceValkýra (Czech)  
Operacjawalkirii (Polish)

Additionally, it is worth noting that there are few studies which focus on FULL-names.

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\(^3\) All these researchers assume some version of the predicate view, understanding that the quotational view is also a predicate view. (However, Moltman, 2015, disagrees.) In this paper we therefore use the term “predicate view”.

\(^4\) We use the label “FULL-name” because it is a way of explaining a complete name, including its descriptive category. The idea is that by filling the space that supposedly would be null (FULL), we are complementing the expression, and therefore uttering a full name.

\(^5\) Before we proceed, it is important to make clear that we are not dealing with the predicate use of a prototypical proper name, as in: “This man is a Napoleon” (KLEIBER, 1994, esp. chapters 3 and 4). This kind of example can be considered a metonymic use of the proper name.
This paper is organized as follows: in section 2 we briefly present the semantic issue surrounding proper names; in section 3 we present our data and the problems they highlight; in section 4 we define the predicate view of proper names; in section 5 we present syntactic, semantic, and pragmatic arguments that corroborate the predicate view; and in section 6 we discuss the validity of the difference between proper names and definite descriptions. We conclude that while the differences between these two types of expression may not be structurally significant, they do seem to be pragmatically significant.

2. PROPER NAMES

Proper names offer several challenges, ranging from their conceptualization to how they work in conversations. Given the complexity of this topic, our goal is just to outline a general overview of some problems related to the semantics of proper names.

When we look at the nature of language, whether from the perspective of linguistics or from that of philosophy, we are faced with the problem of the meaning of proper names. The first clarification that needs to be made here is that a proper name is not synonymous with a proper noun. It is likely that the habit of using nouns like “Mary” and “John,” both prototypes of proper names and proper nouns, leads to confusion between the nouns used to name people, places, events, etc., and their use in an argument position. Similarly, it is common to take a definite description as a noun phrase (NP) that has a definite article in its structure, making it a determiner phrase (DP), an idea spread since Frege ([1892] 2009) published his famous article “On Sense and Reference.” Likewise, Russell (1905; ABBOTT, 2010), in his logical system, used the presence of the definite article to distinguish between proper names and definite descriptions.

Different thinkers propose different approaches to what proper names are and how they work. For example, Mill ([1843] cf. Abbott, 2010) has distinguished between the denotative and the connotative meanings of expressions. An expression denotes the extent (i.e., the denotation) of its meaning (e.g., “man” refers to all individuals who fulfill this condition), while the connotative meaning of an expression encompasses the properties that define that expression (e.g., “man” could be a biped, rational descendant of other humans). As Abbott (2010, p. 13) puts it, “a term connotes a set of necessary and sufficient conditions which together determine what it denotes.”

For his part, Frege (1882/2009) argues that each sign (meaning) that refers to an individual is a “proper name,” such as “Aristotle,” “Alexander’s teacher,” “him” (pointing to Aristotle), and so on. In this perspective, proper names are saturated expressions without predication. They behave like an item of the “entity” type and refer to a single entity. In this case, \( a = a \) has the same value as \( a = b \) if and only if “a” and “b” have the same reference. The fact that “Aristotle” refers to the same individual as “Alexander’s teacher” proves the validity of these two signs. Some researchers and scholars hold that Frege and Mill’s thinking follows the same principle: the descriptivism of the proper name. According to this perspective on proper names, in a relevant world, they associate

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6 From now on we will use the expressions “noun in proper use” or “noun in common use”, because linguistically they do not differ, as we will see later.

7 The meaning Mill attributes to “connotation” is different from how it is commonly understood nowadays. Mill considers proper names as special terms because they denote an entity without connotation, making it a name empty of meaning with just its denotation and thus the expression par excellence for occupying the argument position. For more information on his notion, see: Soames (2002), Campos (2004), Langendonck (2007), Coates (2009).

8 For this similarity, see García-Carpintero (2017).
some traits to the entities to which they refer, and such traits carry some information about
the entity, but this does not mean that this information changes the nature of the entity.

Kripke (1972) presented an approach that became extremely popular in which he
considered the rigidity of the proper name, in that it designates the same individual across
different possible worlds. He also proposed that a definite description works differently
than a proper name, meaning they can only incidentally be the same: “Alexander’s
teacher” might not be Aristotle, but “Aristotle” would always be the same in relevant
worlds, which implies that the proper name refers to the same individual in all worlds;
i.e., the properties that a given individual has in a given world are accidental to that world,
but not the identity of the individual, which will always be the same regardless of the
possible world considered. Not everyone agrees on this matter. Soames (2002) argues
against such rigidity, claiming, for instance the we can arbitrarily name individuals in
different worlds:

The key point here is the claim that the truth-value of the sentence Aristotle was a philosopher at
a world (state) always depends on whether or not the person we call Aristotle in the actual world
is a philosopher in w. Why do we think this? Couldn’t people in w have given the name Aristotle
to some other person, and thus taken the sentence to be about him? Of course they could; but that
is irrelevant. When we say that the sentence Aristotle was a philosopher is true at w, we are saying
that the sentence, as we actually understand it, is true when taken as a description of how things stand, according to w (SOAMES, 2002, p. 24).

In this paper, we understand that “rigidity” only holds in a given world; that is, if
an individual has the name of “John” for w, this implies that it will be employed only for
that individual, and that the same individual in another world may be renamed or
nicknamed.

3. THE DATA AND THE PROBLEM

Structures such as Operação Valquíria (Operation Valkyrie) or Operação Tempestade no Deserto (Operation Desert Storm) show a peculiar relationship between
the first constituent, “operation”, and the second component, which can be a single lexical
item or a complex phrase. In Operação Valquíria, we have two consecutive NPs, namely,
two lexically based constituents with the same grammatical category, which raises a
problem: how can operação and Valquíria be endowed with syntactically subordinative
relationships? How can they be maximum projections of their NP categories? Is it
possible that operação c-commands the second constituent? The relationship between
these two constituents does not involve modification of any nature, as would be the case
when an NPs modified by an AP. In Portuguese, such a relationship requires grammatical
agreement of gender, as in

(03)
   a. Meu amig-o escritor
   b. My.MALEfriend.MALE writer.MALE
      My writer friend.
   c. Minha amig-a escritor-a
   d. My.FEM friend.FEM writer.FEM
      My writer friend
“Friend” and “writer” could be NP or AP. The position in front of the noun allows the modification structure in English. In Portuguese, however, they can be before or after the noun, but agreement is required with an inflexion. There are words in Portuguese that do not require inflexion, like estudante (student):

(04)

a. Meu amig-o estudante
   My student friend.
b. My.MALE Efriend.MALE student
   My student friend.
c. Minha amig-a estudante
   My student friend.
d. My.FEM friend.FEM student
   My student friend.

The agreement gender is given by the determiner a or o (the.FEM or the.MALE) and the noun (amig-a/amig-o and so on). In these examples, the structure is the same:

(05)  [Meu [amigo[estudante/escritor]_AP ]_DP

   In the case of opéração, which is grammatically marked as feminine, the second constituent is completely independent of agreement, as in example 6

(06)

Operação Compass
Operation.FEM Compass.MALE
Operation Compass

So, the first and second constituents are independent NPs with no agreement relationship. The Portuguese compasso is a masculine word without inflexion in the feminine gender, while estudante (student) can have a determiner before the noun, which can be masculine or feminine. How can two items in the same phrase make sense without any syntactic dependency? Our hypothesis is that the occurrence of a FULL-name is only the visible part of a more complex predicate structure, which we intend to explore in detail.

Notice also that these structures can be made up of a single word like “operation” or a more complex phrase like “dust cloud,” as in “Godzilla Dust Cloud” (Nuvem de Poeira Godzilla, in Portuguese). The first and second components of the FULL-name sequence have different grammatical behavior:

(07) Portuguese

a. A Operação Valquíria foi um complô para matar Hitler. Infelizmente, the.FEM Operation Valkyrie was a plot for to kill Hitler. Unfortunately
   Operação falhou.
   Operation failed.

b. *Operação falhou
   Operation failed.

c. # (A) Valquíria falhou.
   (The.FEM) Valkyrie failed.

 9 This also happens in languages such as Basque, Greek, Polish, among others.
10 Grammatical gender is shown in the glosses.
d. Ela falhou.
*SHE* failed.

It failed.

(08) Portuguese


b. A Operação foi uma resposta à invasão do Kuwait pelo Iraque.
The.FEM Operation.FEM was an answer to invasion of Kuwait by Iraq.

c. *Operação foi uma resposta à invasão do Kuwait pelo Iraque.*
Operation was an answer to+THE invasion of Kuwait by Iraq.

d. # (A) Tempestade no Deserto foi uma resposta à invasão do Kuwait pelo Iraque.
(The.FEM) Storm at Desert was an answer to+THE invasion of Kuwait by Iraq.

e. Ela foi uma resposta à invasão do Kuwait pelo Iraque.
She(It) was an answer to+THE invasion of+THE Kuwait by Iraq.

(09) Portuguese

a. A Nuvem de Poeira Godzilla formou-se no Saara e atravessará o Atlântico.
The.FEM Cloud.FEM of Dust Godzilla was made at Sahara and cross.FUT the Atlantic.
**The Godzilla Dust Cloud was made at Sahara and will cross the Atlantic.**

b. A Nuvem de Poeira deve chegar em alguns dias.
The.FEM Cloud.FEM of Dust may arrive in some days.

c. A Nuvem deve chegar em alguns dias.
The.FEM Cloud.FEM may arrive in some days.

d. *Nuvem (de Poeira) deve chegar em alguns dias.*
Cloud (of Dust) may arrive in some days.

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11Third-person pronouns in the subject or object position also agree in gender and number: *ele* (he); *ela* (she), *eles* (he.PL), *elas* (she.PL). There is no neuter gender such as “it” or “they”.

12 It is important to clarify that in Portuguese there is a contraction of the preposition *em* (in, at) with the definite article that precedes the noun: *em* + o/the.MASC = no desert/MASC (desert); *em* (at) + a/the.FEM = na praia.FEM. The same applies to the preposition *de* (of). The preposition *per* (by, for) no longer exists in its non-contracted form, only in *pelo.MASC* and *pela.FEM*. The non-contracted form is *por*.

13“Godzilla” is masculine in Portuguese.
e. (A) Godzilla deve chegar em alguns dias.
(The.FEM) Godzilla may arrive in some days.

f. Ela deve chegar em alguns dias.
She.FEM(It) may arrive in some days.

(10) Portuguese

a. De que operação / nuvem (de poeira) vocês estão falando?
What operation/ cloud (of dust) you are talking?

b. # Operação / #Nuvem.
Operation / Cloud

The constituency and wh-movement tests demonstrate the constituents of a FULL-name have different grammatical restrictions, particularly with respect to anaphoric reference:

i) of an entire phrase (repetition, e.g., Valkyrie operation)
ii) of the first NP within the DP (e.g., The Operation)
iii) of the second constituent (e.g., Valkyrie)
iv) of the pronoun corresponding to the first phrase.

The condition in “i”, pure repetition, has no major implications. The condition in “ii” indicates a hyperonymic relationship, with the DP playing a key semantic role by indicating in that sentence the only relevant object for the context of the speakers. By itself, it cannot be a bare noun phrase.

The condition in “iii” shows that the second constituent can be referred to anaphorically independently of the first constituent, although sometimes this referenceresults in some oddness of a semantic, but not syntactic, nature. This is what demonstrates the independence between the two constituents of FULL-names. In the case of “ii” the anaphora is permitted for the “the operation”, which works hyperonymically, as we commented earlier; in “iii”, this is essentially the core of the name; and “iv” demonstrates the protagonism of the first phrase, as already observed.

These data, as we will present later, support the idea, from the point of view of their linguistic analysis, that proper names and definite descriptions are distinct. In the case of examples such as the opposition between “Aristotle” and ”the teacher of Alexander”, the presence of the definite article stands out, especially for speakers of languages that have definite articles in very specific positions, such as English. However, there is a diversity in the behavior of definite articles, ranging from languages without their presence (Latin, Ukrainian, Polish) to languages that have phrases with proprial\textsuperscript{14} articles or pronouns (in the pre- or post-proprial position). In this sense, simply associating a definite description with the presence of a definite article and the absence of one with a proper name is misleading, or else it demonstrates a view based only on a

\textsuperscript{14}For more about proprial structures, see Johannsen and Garbacz(2014), Kokkelmans(2018), Van Langendonck and Van de Velde (2009), and Wood (2009).
language or a group of languages where the article is excluded in cases of the proprial use of a noun. This seems to point to the inadequacy of the opposition between the two forms of RE.

In view of these possibilities, what is the nature of a name such as *A Operação Valquíria*? Is it a definite description because there is a definite article before the FULL-name? As we have claimed before, the presence of a definite article with NPs does not seem to be a good criterion. According to Longobardi (1994), some Romance languages (French being an exception) allow the definite article to be placed before the noun in proprial uses. Differently, in English, when the NP is in proprial use, the D of the DP is not uttered. Longobardi’s (1994) proposal involves a type of movement that languages like English adopt as a way to distinguish the noun in proprial use from its common use. Contrary to this perspective, Matushansky (2006, 2008) proposes that there is a definite article that is not uttered before the proprial use of an NP as a complementizer of a DP. Both arguments once again corroborate the idea that the simple presence of a definite article is not enough to differentiate between definite and non-definite NPs.

Another argument is that in languages that show the requirement, refusal, or free existence of a proprial article (see MATUSHANSKY, 2006, 2008; MUÑOZ, 2019), its use involves clear conditions, as we saw in examples 7 to 10. We consider the deletion of the definite article in languages such as English and French a way to identify the proprial use of nouns, while in languages such as Portuguese, in which the presence of a definite article in proprial uses is frequent, the distinction of common or proprial nouns is made in another way.

Returning to the example of Portuguese, it could be argued that FULL-names could be regarded as ambiguous, simultaneously a definite description and a proper name. Proper nouns behave like common nouns, and this is not a mere coincidence. Let us take the case of languages that supposedly do not accept determinants in front of a noun in proprial use, such as English:

(11) All the Jessicas I meet are nice girls.
(12) This Robert that I met is not the same.
(13) The Williams are not trustworthy.

It is apparent that “proper nouns” do not make up a special class of nouns; from a linguistic point of view, they have the same morpho-syntactical behavior as common nouns. What we have then, when we refer to proper nouns, is a specific list of phonetic segments belonging to a language/culture. Sometimes the list has items which have more than one use, as in the case of Rose and rose, Daisy and daisy, but NPs like Mary, John, Michel, etc. are mostly used to denominate human beings.

Notice also that the definite article before the noun in proprial use does not need agreement, except when one has the pragmatic knowledge that the individual is male or female. For example, the name “Madalena” in Portuguese is a markedly feminine noun, but we may have it in:

(14) O Madalena é um apresentador de rádio.

The.MASC Madalena.FEM is a.MASC host.MASC of radio

*Madalena is a radio host.*

Nouns in proprial use do not require agreement, but agreement seems to be called for when the noun is deleted, as we can see below:
(15) a. A Capitã Oliveira prendeu o assaltante. 
Captain Oliveira arrested the robber.

b. A Oliveira prendeu o assaltante. 
Oliveira arrested the robber.

(16) a. O Capitão Oliveira prendeu o assaltante. 
Captain Oliveira arrested the robber.

b. O Oliveira prendeu o assaltante. 
Oliveira arrested the robber.

So far, the data seem to indicate that: (a) different languages behave differently with respect to definite articles; (b) the existence of these specific behaviors seems to refute the distinction between proper name and definite description; (c) the structure of a FULL-name seems to have marked differences from other NPs because of its semantic and syntactic peculiarities, the lack of agreement between the parts being a problem to be solved later. Before proposing a solution, in the next section we will deal specifically with the predicate view of the proper name.

4. THE PREDICATE VIEW OF THE PROPER NAME

There is extensive literature on the predicate view of proper names (BACH, 2015; FARA, 2015; GEURTS, 1997; GRAY, 2012; IZUMI, 2012; KLEIBER, 1981, 1984, 1985, 1997; MATUSHANSKY, 2006, 2008), and in this paper our aim is only to delineate its main characteristics. The predicate view essentially takes “proper names” to be the result of some kind of predication. In its simplicity, this statement does not necessarily explain how this predication takes place.

Obviously, one of the first characteristics that we can find in this view is the relevance of naming verbs (to call, to baptize, to name etc.). For example, Kleiber (1981, 1984) argues that tests with naming verbs reveal clues about the nature of the act of naming in natural languages.

(17) a) Bernard is the name of the school principal.
   b) The school principal is called Bernard.
   c) # Bernard is called the school principal.

The examples in (17) demonstrate that there is no interchangeability between the proprial use of “Bernard” and the use of a definite description of “the school principal”. This example, while apparently corroborating the idea that definite descriptions and proper names are very distinct, also reveals that a naming verb has a peculiar status. Matushansky (2008), inspired by Geurts (1997), presented many examples of the complexity of the structure of proper nouns and of the predicational nature of naming verbs:

15There are some disagreements concerning the nomenclature. Moltman(2015) prefers “quotational,” while Schoubye(2016), with a predicate perspective, considers proper names as ambiguous semantic types (e and ⟨e,t⟩).
I argued, on the basis of the following cross-linguistic generalizations that verbs of naming (like verbs of nomination and other clearly ECM verbs) take a small clause complement:

- The definite article on the predicate proper name is dropped in naming constructions just as it is dropped with definite predicates.
- Case-marking of the proper name parallels that of a predicate (the predicative case or case agreement, depending on the language).
- Proper names can function as predicates without a naming verb (MATUSHANSKY, 2008, p. 590).

Matushansky (2008) also argues that naming verbs have specific syntactic characteristics and a bijective structure. The first argument in the structure is the individual of a set that carries a name (or a phonological sequence) (see example 18).

(18) John baptized one of his daughters (with the name) “Alice”.

The NP “Alice” is an argument of both the naming verb “baptize” and “one of his daughters,” its external argument being “John.” The phonological sequence /ˈæl.ɪs/ has no compositional sense as the argument “one of his daughters” would have, so from a semantic point of view, it is a sequence of sounds that may or may not receive cases. For instance, Hungarian, Finnish, Arabic, and Russian have case-marking (MATUSHANSKY, 2008, p. 583).

Due to semantic and syntactic operations, this phonological sequence is raised to the position of external argument in “Alice arrived.” How does this happen? Matushansky’s solution is to consider the name as an attribute with unpronounced structures in which the first nominal phrase is any property in a PRO position and the second internal argument is the phonological sequence, as shown in example 19.

(19) [Diagram]

Surely, FULL-names like “Operation Valkyrie” and “Operation Desert Storm” have the same function as proper names treated in the traditional perspective: this REidentifies a single entity in a given world. However, they are not constituted in the same way as the sequence “Alice.” This is because in “Alice” there is a structure which is not phonologically realized: part of the DP “Alice” is PRO – “the individual named Alice,” while in “operation NP” there is a pronounced part – “the Operation named Valkyrie.”

Interest in the predicate view is based on the fact that researchers have not focused on the phenomenon we are calling FULL-name. As will become clear, the syntactic and semantic characteristics of this nominal type corroborate the predicate view.

In this section, we showed that the predicate view adheres to a linguistic approach to proper names and that naming verbs play an import role in the constitution of FULL-
names. In the following section, we will describe more of the syntactic and semantic operations beneath the supposed simplicity of the proper name in a position of RE, and in doing so, we will describe better how a FULL-name comes about.

5. SYNTACTIC AND SEMANTIC ASPECTS OF THE PREDICATE VIEW AND FULL-NAMES

In this section, we discuss in more detail how naming verbs and the movements within FULL-names take complements, be they a common noun (Operation Compass), a phonological sequence (Operation Valkyrie) or a complex phrase (Operation Desert Storm). These examples and their syntactical analyses lead us to conjecture that definite descriptions are linguistically indistinct from proper names. We will observe specific syntactic behaviors of naming verbs to understand the semantic behavior of FULL-names.

According to Matushansky (2008, p. 576), “naming” and “nomination” have different behavior:

\[
\text{(20) } \quad \begin{align*}
\text{a. The king of all England was named Arthur.} & \quad \text{naming} \\
\text{b. Arthur was named the king of all England.} & \quad \text{nomination}
\end{align*}
\]

In 20.a, the naming verb does not assign “Arthur” the role of THEME or GOAL, while in 20.b, it does. According to Matushansky, this is important because the phonological sequence does not receive a case, given that it is a small clause (SC). We do not agree with the idea of a SC; rather, we assume it is a “relationship,” as described by Den Dikken (2006, p. 11), reproduced in example 21:

\[
\begin{tikzpicture}
  \node (RP) {RP};
  \node (XP) [below left of=RP] {XP};
  \node (R) [below of=XP] {R};
  \node (R') [below of=R] {R'};
  \node (YP) [below right of=RP] {YP};
  \path (RP) -- (XP);
  \path (RP) -- (YP);
  \path (XP) -- (R);
  \path (R') -- (R);
\end{tikzpicture}
\]

There is a difference between what we traditionally call an SC and a functional relational phrase (RP - RELATOR). Consider the examples in 22.:

\[
\text{(22) } \quad \begin{align*}
\text{a. John considers Mary smart.} \\
\text{b. John called his daughter Alice.}
\end{align*}
\]

In 22.a, one can claim that being “smart” is a property of “Mary,” but this is not the case in 22.b, where being “John's daughter” does not seem to be a property of “Alice.” We consider that the relationship between “John’s daughter” and “Alice” is arbitrary, imposed by the naming verb. This means there are two instances: the first is an R0 as a convention, according to Matushansky (2008), demanded by the abstract function CALL; the second, the abstract RELATOR (DIKKEN, 2006), is an operator that links an individual property to a phonological sequence or some other predication. The structure in example 24 represents Matushanksy's (2008) proposal; however, we simplify the DP...
from \( \langle e, t \rangle \), \( t \) to just \( e \), adding the relational structure instead of SC. Example 23 lets us observe a comparison between the structures in Portuguese and English.

(23)  
   a. A OperaçãoValquíria. (Portuguese)  
   b. OperationValkyrie. (English)

We must clarify that “n” is generally the representation of any noun form, in Matushansky’s view. This representative choice is explained by the fact that we do not only have any phonological strings like those represented by “Alice,” but we can also have more complex phrases such as “Desert Storm,” which has compositional content, unlike what occurs with a phonological string. Whether or not the phonological string is a word or a phrase, the \( n \)-position is of type \( e \), indicating uniqueness.

In our interpretation there are two abstract structures involved in the selections: a) an abstract CALL, which is a kind of predicate position that is not uttered and has three arguments (explained below); and b) RELATOR, as we explained above. In this structure, the RELATOR binds two individuals: an operation and something called Valkyrie.

PROx is the external argument of the abstract namingverbCALL: “x calls OPERATION y n”. We can then build a complete sentence in which the syntactic transformations can occupy the DP position and should be uttered, as in:

(24)  
   [The operation called Valkyrie by the rebel generals] has failed.> Operation Valkyrie has failed

On the surface of a well-formed sentence like this, we have the three arguments of a namingverb, that is \( \langle e, \langle e, \langle e, t \rangle \rangle \rangle \); “x called y n”. The syntactic movements that result in this surface structure are described in example 25.

(25)  
   a) \([D_1'] = \boxed{[D]}(([\text{NP}])
   b) \([D_1'] = \lambda F_{\langle e, t \rangle}, x[F'(x)] (\text{[operação]})
   c) \([D_1'] = \lambda x[\text{OPERAÇÃO}(x) = 1]
   d) \([DP_1] = \boxed{[D']}
   e) \([R] = \boxed{[\text{RELATOR}]} = \lambda f \in D_0[\lambda y[\lambda x [\text{RELATOR takes an individual x, takes an individual y and returns a new individual z}]]
   f) \([R'] = \lambda f \in D_0[\lambda y [\lambda x [\text{Valquíria}]]][D]
   g) \([DP]' = a \text{ Operação, Valkyria}]
   h) \([v] = [\text{CALL}] = \lambda f \in D_{\langle e,t \rangle} [\lambda z [\lambda y [\lambda x [\text{CALL y z}]]]]
i) $\lbrack v' \rbrack = \lbrack v \rbrack (\lbrack RP \rbrack) = \lambda x \in \mathcal{D} (\lbrack x \text{ CALL } \text{Operação Valquíria}\rbrack)$

j) $\lbrack vP \rbrack = \lbrack DP_2 \rbrack (\lbrack v' \rbrack ) = \text{PROx(CALL } \text{ a Operação Valquíria})$

k) $\lbrack DP_3 \rbrack = \lbrack D_3' \rbrack$

l) $\lbrack D_3' \rbrack = \lambda F \langle e,t \rangle \cdot \text{tx}(F'(x)) (\lbrack vP \rbrack) = \text{tx}[ \text{a CALL Operação Valquíria}$

m) $\lbrack D_3' \rbrack = \text{tx}[ \text{a OPERAÇÃOVALQUIRIA =1}]$

The derivation in example 25 aims to explain the compositionality of the FULL-names vis-a-vis two abstract operators (CALL and RELATOR). In the final line “n” we can consider the semantic form as: “there is a just one entity operação (operation) called Valquíria (Valkyrie)”. Let us consider more details.

The movement driven by the RELATOR is not necessarily a relationship between subject and predicate. According to Den Dikken (2006, p. 22), “one thing that should be immediately obvious from what I said about lexical heads in the previous section is that relator-heads are never lexical heads”. ARELATOR seems more adequate concept than an SC, mainly because the argument DP1 does not establish agreement with n- or s-type arguments, because it only puts them in relation, without traces of agreement.

The PROx position is assigned to the naming agent, which is not uttered, and the naming verb is also deleted. We can also extend the limits saying say that phrases such as “Professor Hawking” and “Sergeant Smith” are also FULL-names in that their NPs are uttered \langle e,t \rangle (professor, sergeant). The same structure happens in example 26: the relational phrase (RELATOR) results in one entity e.

(26) a. THE Professor \textbf{CALLED} Hawking,  
    b. THE Sargent \textbf{CALLED} Smith.

Following the idea of convention (cf. Matushansky’s formula 19), authorized by deletion, we can propose some rules for naming individuals:

(27) i) If two lexical items appear in a phrase and they have the same maximum encapsulated projection inside a DP, then there is a gap.

ii) This gap is filled by functional phrases.

iii) These functional phrases support the naming convention.

In the case of FULL-names, it is explicit that: a) there is no relation of modification between the first NP (“operation”) and the second NP (“Valkyrie”, “Desert Storm”); b) there are no SC copula, as we saw above; c) there are no ellipses, because items like “operation” and the abstract CALL were not pronounced in previous phrases. The deletion in example 28 gives a clue to the operation of the abstract CALL:

(28) a. The operation that was called Valkyrie failed.  
    b. The operation called Valkyrie failed.  
    c. Operation Valkyrie failed.

The verbs of the CALL group (baptize, call, nickname, etc.) in the naming sense have exactly the same semantic and syntactic behavior. Our hypothesis is that abstract CALL is a functional modality of the vP form deleted in FULL-names.

We should recall that proper and common nouns do not differ from a morphosyntactic and semantic point of view and that nouns in proprial use are not ambiguous in their semantic typology, being e and \langle e,t \rangle, because, in our line of thinking,
any noun in proprial use is basically a predicate shifting to type e (or in a different analysis, the DP may be seen as type \((e,t),t\)).

Let us consider the concept of “proper noun” in more depth. Imagine a person with the name/nickname “Axe”. Its morphosyntactic behavior will be the same as for Mary: it is no different for “Someone named Mary / Axe”\(^\text{16}\). The difference between proper nouns and common nouns is not due to the morphosyntax and semantic order. Morphosyntactically, we have seen examples proving the same nature. Semantically, the reference of a noun in proprial use must assume the predication “x calls y n”. What remain are cultural specificities, which are what establish what nouns will or will not be usual for denominating, bearing in mind that individuals can always be creative when denominating\(^\text{17}\).

As we have seen, the presence of a definite article does not make a definite description, which is why it is not a good criterion for differentiating from proper names. Some more data will prove this morphosyntactic point:

\begin{enumerate}
\item Portuguese
\begin{enumerate}
\item a. O machado é uma ferramenta. \\
\hspace{1em} axe.N.MASC is a.FEM.SING tool.N.FEM \\
\hspace{1em} Axe is a toll.
\item b. Machado é uma ferramenta. \\
\hspace{1em} Axe.N.MASC is a.FEM.SING tool.N.FEM \\
\hspace{1em} Axe is a toll.
\item c. Os machados são umas ferramentas. \\
\hspace{1em} axe.N.MASC.PLU are a.FEM.PLU tool.N.FEM.PLU \\
\hspace{1em} Axes are tools.
\item d. Machados são umas ferramentas. \\
\hspace{1em} axe.N.MASC.PLU are a.FEM.PLU tool.N.FEM.PLU. \\
\hspace{1em} Axes are tools.
\end{enumerate}
\end{enumerate}

The same paradigm serves for prototypical nouns in proprial use.

\begin{enumerate}
\item a. Marias chegaram. \\
\hspace{1em} Mary.PLU arrived.PL
\item b. As Marias chegaram. \\
\hspace{1em} The.FEM.PLU Mary.PLU arrived.PL
\item c. As são Marias confiáveis. \\
\hspace{1em} The.FEM.PLU are Mary.PLU reliable.PLU
\item d. Marias são confiáveis. \\
\hspace{1em} Mary.PLU are reliable.PLU
\end{enumerate}

\(^{16}\) In fact, all cultures have a list of nouns that are not translatable because they are actually phonological sequences. At most they are adapted to the phonology of languages: Juan /ˈhuan/, John /dʒɒn/, João /ʒoˈvɐ̃w/ (BACH, 2015).

\(^{17}\) Some countries, like Portugal, Germany, Sweden, China and Japan, have lists and laws that establish which nouns can be used to name people.
As mentioned above, “Alice” is a phonological sequence, but “Desert Storm” is a compositional structure. Could we use “Person Responsible for the Party” as the second internal argument of a FULL-Name? The data presented in section 3 show that we could; however, this does not happen because it seems that long sequences are unusual, occurring in very specific contextual issues with pragmatic interest.

6.1 FULL-names and pragmatics

One last fact that needs to be understood is the pragmatic conventions of uses. Every form of denomination depends on a non-linguistic motivation (homage, metonymy, analogy, media effects, etc.). Let us look at some tests:

(31) Operation Desert Storm would be successful if there were a desert storm.

The truth value of 31 refers to conditions under which such an operation would take place. However, as there is no causal relation between the name and the location of the operation, there is no prediction we would attribute to the success of Operation Desert Storm simply based on the present of /ˈdez.ərt/ in the name of the operation. The initial motivations are very contextual and uncertain. However, even as a FULL-name, it holds valid without having its reference modified:

(32) Operation Desert Storm was called this because there was a desert storm.
(33) Operation Desert Storm was called this because there was a general in charge.

These examples once again reinforce the predicate view that any individual can receive a phonological sequence or a phrase (the “n” group, as we call it above), regardless of a specific motivation. However, this does not preclude pragmatic effects on denomination or redenomination, as in the following example:

(34)

Stephen Hawking: Well, hello there.
Sheldon: Professor Hawking?
Stephen Hawking: Oh, brother, you should see the look on your faces.
Leonard: You really didn’t like our paper?
Stephen Hawking: I like your paper very much. The premise is intriguing.
Sheldon: Then why are you attacking us?
Stephen Hawking: If you were sitting in a chair for 40 years, you’d get bored, too. Anyway, got to go. I promised to help the neighbor kid with his math homework. Ciao.
Leonard: Stephen Hawking liked our paper. Said the premise is intriguing.

 (“The troll manifestation - Full transcript - Season 8, episode 14.”, [s.d.])

In example 34, “Mr. Stephen-Hawking-Liked-Our-Paper” and “Mr. Our-Premise-Is-Intriguing” are not structurally different from what happens in “Operation Valkyrie” and “Operation Desert Storm.” However, the first two examples could hardly extend their own use beyond the circumstance that are restricted to the “baptizing” situation: the
renowned physicist Stephen Hawking congratulated the characters Sheldon and Leonard, both physicists in fiction, on an article they had published together. The characters then create nicknames based on the greetings received by Professor Hawking. Specifically, in this case, the goal is just to create a humorous effect because obviously these names would not be usual; nonetheless, they were created, and this is enough to identify that this is the naming procedure foreseen in the general mechanism.

The data demonstrate that the categorization of entities such as “operation,” “project,” “program,” and “dust cloud” can be given by any noun for different purposes because they create names for sets and include individuals in them, i.e., each lexical item from the first NP selects a different set. Potentially, NPs have the power of predication, so that even unusual sequences can become names, like the names of some Salvador Dalí works, like *Galacidalacidesoxyribonucleicacid*\(^\text{18}\).

As we have seen so far, it seems that the act of naming is only authorized because there is a syntactic structure capable of assigning a phonological sequence or a phrase to an individual. There are social and cultural motivations for a given naming procedure, but the motivations do not interfere with the structure because they make use of them. Therefore, phrases such as “Operation Valkyrie” and “Operation Desert Storm” are also worth as much as “(the individual) Alice” and “Mr. Stephen-Hawking-Liked-Our-Paper”.

6. THE DIFFERENCES BETWEEN DEFINITE DESCRIPTION AND PROPER NAME ARE UNSUSTAINABLE

In this section, we make some necessary observations from a semantic point of view to support the predicate view. We have already seen that FULL-names lead us to understand that there is no difference between definite description and proper names from syntactic point of view. Is the opposition we are dealing with valid for logic and semantics? Faced with the facts, we tend to agree with Longobardi:

This domain of facts is likely to suggest that a crucial empirical property of the ontology supposed by the semantics of natural language is that, abstracting away from events and states, it contains only two types of entities: single individual objects (sometimes conceived of as consisting of stages or material subparts) and whole kinds, but no subsets of the extensions of such kinds. Therefore, the only entities that may be referred to by nominals are exactly these, producing the two basic cases of directly referential expressions: singular proper names and (some) generics (LONGOBARDI, 1994, p. 648).

Certainly, the reference to individuals is based on different grammatical resources: pronouns, proper nouns, definite descriptions. The problem is to identify the relevant difference between proper name and definite description if such a difference does not exist linguistically. As we have seen, for several researchers, REs that are made by nouns and figuring on proprial uses are a case of a complex phrase with a set of deletions:

(35) The individual called Alice left the room.

In this perspective, is abstract CALL the core of a definite description? As far as it seems, proper name and definite description are practically the same forms of RE. No matter the motivation, the underlying definite description structure brings us back to Frege’s considerations. For him, a proper name is just an RE that takes phrases as nouns in proprial use, definite descriptions, small clauses, pronouns; in short, every

\(^{18}\)For more about naming paintings, see Bosredon (1997).

Cad. Est. Ling., Campinas, v.64, p. 1-20, e022042, 2022
expression that refers to a single individual. This notion relates to the close relationship between the meaning given by expressions (meaning) and the individual entity (referent), which takes the form of an algebraic function.

The difference between “individual” and “type” is important here because a FULL-name makes reference to an individual within a typified set – i.e., a category – and is thus a case of predication. Therefore, Operation Valkyrie is an individual from a set of individuals identified as “operation” that “carries” the phonological sequence /ˈvælkəri/. Based in part on Muñoz (2019), we build the following explanation:

(36)  
a. e, t are type  
b. If σ is a type, then ⟨⟨v, e⟩, ⟨s, σ⟩⟩ is a type;  
c. If σ, τ are type, then ⟨σ, τ⟩ is a type;  
d. Nothing else is a type.

(37)  
a. Dv = \{x : x is an individual\}  
b. Dt = \{true, false\}  
c. Ds = \{w : w is possible world\}  
d. Dv = \{1, 2, 3… \}  
e. D⟨σ, τ⟩ = \{f : f is a partial function Dσ \rightarrow Dτ\}

Dv is the domain of referential indexes, so if we take a partial function like D ⟨v, e⟩, we have attributions that lead to the individual in a given w. Unlike Muñoz (2019), we consider the individual not as bearing the name, but as being assigned an N (here, a phonological sequence or a complex phrase). When uttering a FULL-name, we are making a set of referential operations based on Muñoz (2019):

(38)  
a. P are all existing categories and p’ is any single category for all worlds: ∀w (p ∈ P) ∧ (p’ ≠ p''), so we can, for example, select the function: \(P_{operation}\).  
b. One takes a set of assignments g (g' ≠ g'') from a given world g (w) to select an individual i in a world and assign to that i the belonging to p’, that is, there is an x with a set of assignments and those assignments in a given w includes it in a p’.  
c. There is a language segment n (phonological sequence or any phrase) to which all the possibilities of N belong and n’ is different from n” in a specific world, therefore w’ (n’ ∈ N) ∧ (n’ ≠ n”).

(39)  
\[ \langle \text{FULL-name} \rangle^w,g = \lambda p.(p’ ∈ P. ∀w) \land \lambda x_e (\forall g’ ∈ G (w’)) [[g’[i→ x] x ∈ p’] x \rightarrow n’] = the individual in the p’ category which is called n’ in w.\]

(40)  
\[ \langle \text{Valkyrie Operation} \rangle^w,g = \lambda p.(p’ ∈ P. ∀w) \land \lambda x_e (\forall g’ ∈ G (w’)) [[g’[i→ x] x ∈ p’] x \rightarrow n’] = operation called Valkyrie in w’.\]

So, the difference between “Alice” and “Operation Valkyrie,” in this analysis, would be that the category λp.(p’ ∈ P ∀w) is not uttered in the formal structure, in the first case. We can say that the predicate “being an individual” would be by default in “the individual called Alice.” So, the fact that the category is uttered does not change the nature of the denomination; it only makes the category explicit:

(41)  
a. Hawking has an interesting theory about the origin of the Universe.  
b. Doctor Hawking has an interesting theory about the origin of the Universe.  
c. Professor Hawking has an interesting theory about the origin of the Universe.
From a structural and abstract perspective, $\mathcal{P}$ is important for ensuring that any individual belongs to some category. Other features such as [+ human] versus [- human] (e.g., “teacher” versus “operation”) or [+ stationary] versus [- stationary] (e.g., “screen” versus “operation”) may be interesting research objects at another time. Here, “operation” and “professor” tend to be “rigid designators” when referring to the category; that is, apparently the predicted “professor” or “operation” is valid in any $w$, while $n$ may vary from one world to another. So, we can imagine that an individual who can belong to any category (senator, president) in one world may not belong to the same category and continue with their name in another: Senator Obama - President Obama. The concept of rigidity does not work according to the established literature (SOAMES, 2002). However, if we were to say that the predicate “senator” is an exact equivalent of the predicate “president,” we would have to make many adjustments in the background of the possible worlds. The same would be true if we were to say that the predicates such as “operation” and “project” are the same.

Table 1. Example of distribution

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>$\mathcal{P}$</th>
<th>$n$</th>
<th>$\mathcal{D}_v$</th>
<th>$\mathcal{D}_s$</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Senator</td>
<td>Obama</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>$w^1$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>President</td>
<td>Obama</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>$w^2$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Senator</td>
<td>Dunham$^{19}$</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>$w^1$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>President</td>
<td>Dunham</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>$w^4$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Operation</td>
<td>Valkyrie</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>$w^1$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Project</td>
<td>Valkyrie</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>$w^1$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Operation</td>
<td>Valkyrie</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>$w^2$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Project</td>
<td>Valkyrie</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>$w^2$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Operation</td>
<td>Killing Hitler</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>$w^1$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Project</td>
<td>Killing Hitler</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>$w^1$</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

From the table, we can see that the same individual can receive different names in different worlds, like “Obama” and “Dunham”. This is not the case with “operation” and “project” because in this case we would appear to be referring to different individuals (objects). We still do not have much clarity about this tendency to category rigidity, but it seems to be associated with the background. This indicates that rigidity is not in $\mathcal{N}$, but in $\mathcal{Ds}$, such that a certain $n$ attributed to an individual $i$ becomes rigid in a specific intensional domain, as demonstrated in the table above.

Considering that a noun with proprial use (whether or not there is a definite article in the maximum projection) refers to a single object in a given world and, considering that a definite description also refers to a single object in the world and that the noun with proprial use and the definite description only have distinct syntactic structures in the utterance, it seems reasonable that these phrases are in the same semantic category. In short, the semantic differences between the mare only superficial, for if we say “the 44th President of the United States,” we can also consider a world in which it would not be the individual called Barak Obama who filled this function; it could be Barak Dunham.

7. CONCLUSION

The arguments in favor of the predicate view of names are quite eloquent. The data from FULL-names show consistency in the tests, including some examples from

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$^{19}$This is the surname of the mother of former US president, Barak Obama.
non-Romance languages as seen at the beginning of this paper. Faced with the condition of nominal non-agreement between the category noun (e.g., Operation) and segment 𝑛 from within the phrase in languages that present agreement, as in the case of Portuguese, there is a “gap” between two supposed NPs that is filled by transformational issues. Such a process is very productive for all languages, allowing many naming forms to exist.

If we look at the categories and the individuals that will always belong to a category and assign them a phonological segment like /ˈæl.ɪs/ or a compositional linguistic structure like “Desert Storm,” we will be undertaking a human linguistic capacity of our own. The motivating or pragmatic conditions for such an undertaking may be diverse, but they only materialize because there is an abstract structure that permits it. What we call FULL-names is a case of denotation in which the category needs to be made explicit, and by doing this we can find the typical functioning of the proper name in the Fregean sense. This versatility of all natural languages demonstrates that they exist to speak about the world (including possible worlds) around them and not of themselves (KLEIBER, 1984). “Operation Valkyrie” and “Alice” have practically no distinction in their structures and uses except for deletions.

Finally, the use of phonological sequences such as /ˈæl.ɪs/ or /mˈfwa/ or a structure composed as a “desert storm” to identify an individual comes remarkably close to a very context-dependent use, to the point of it being possible to identify a particular individual only on the basis of their characteristics:

(52) A: After all, what John are you talking about?
    B: The one wearing the black hat. / That former student of yours who traveled to Japan.

Explanations based on linguistic data demonstrate a versatility of the naming system that philosophical approaches usually do not consider. The linguistic data support an understanding that the distinction between proper name and definite description is merely superficial. Haak (2002) uses an interesting metaphor to compare the descriptive approach and the causal approach of proper names:

In the theories I have sketched, two kinds of picture emerge of the connection between-names and the individuals named: the purely denotative, or ‘harpoon’, picture, and the descriptive, or ‘net’, picture. (I derive the useful metaphor from Fitzpatrick; but I've changed his ‘arrow’ to ‘harpoon’ to give a place to the role of the causal chain of naming in Kripke's account.) I’ve already suggested that ordinary proper names in natural languages are very various, and that they work against a background of shared, or partly shared, information, or misinformation (HAAK, 2002, p. 101).

However, this metaphor explains cognitive behavior for the background and not necessarily the linguistic constitution of a reference. The mistake of treating cognitive-associative behavior, philosophical motivations, and linguistic mechanisms of naming as synonyms needs to be undone.

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