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Sensed knowledge[1]

Saber sentido

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ABSTRACT
The epistemic rupture that brought modern science into being delegitimized other kinds of knowledge. That secular epistemological act yet disqualified the arts, which contemporarily, in their turn, are so strongly present in certain scientific territories. The so called rational thinking is, therefore, also made of the exercise of feeling and experimenting the world. Every kind of knowledge is a sensed knowledge, insofar as one senses-think to come into being.
Keywords: Knowledge. Art. Science.

RESUMO
A ruptura epistemológica que fez a ciência moderna existir deslegitimou os demais saberes. Esse ato epistemológico secular ainda desqualificou as artes que, por sua vez, na contemporaneidade, estão fortemente presentes em determinados territórios da ciência. O denominado pensamento racional, portanto, é também feito do exercício de sentir e de experimentar o mundo. Todo saber é sentido, na medida em que se sente-pensa para se fazer.
Palavras-chave: Conhecimento. Arte. Ciência.

1.
Translator's note: In the original text, there is a distinction between two concepts which in English are both translated as "knowledge" (conhecimento and saber). So, in other to create such distinction it is been used: "scientific knowledge" for the one which belonging to the dominant scientific paradigm and "other kinds of knowledge", for the one which is not scientific.

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In many circumstances, what may be understood as the end of things not always is and often times it is not confined to the full stop. The closure of things is presented, implicitly or explicitly in various circumstances, as openings to the world, as portals turned to the *exterior of the deed* - which is always incomplete -, for the continuity, and even in other words, for what was presented as finished. Even when we are not conscious of that, there are very strong indications that we carry with ourselves, since the beginning of the creative processes, experiences and experimentations of the world, besides various closure possibilities; such possibilities which simultaneously represent the opening and the passage, the traverse – even in the sense proposed by João Guimarães Rosa (1976 [1956]) and by other authors and thinkers who deal with the theme literarily, philosophically and/or theoretically or who relate to it in a fruitful way.[4] That means, in many circumstances, we have already been carrying with us much of the history we construct for ourselves and, with that, many possibilities of outcomes, which, in turn, are openings, traverses. All those possibilities may be understood as belonging to the subjects, actors and authors of what is done. It should be however considered that the subjects are immersed in contexts which influence their practices and, in turn, may reproduce or question the given contexts.

That does not mean the *end of history*, but mainly the indication that among so many possibilities we construct along our individualized lives, some of them may be surprising and creative, raised to the rarity status; nevertheless, they are certainly articulated to *collective subjectivities*. Therefore, the beginning may frequently be at the end; and that beginning, as we have emphasized, would be manifested through openings for the future of what is being done or of what has been done. That will be applied, for instance, for academic researches, no matter the field of scientific knowledge, such as under graduation monograph, theses and dissertations. Yet, it will be strongly applicable to all arts, and what matters the least is whether they were developed inside or outside the academia: dance and cinema, music, theater, photography, drawing and painting, literature and philosophy, science and every scientific discipline and, finally everything that characterizes the art of producing other kinds knowledge through readings and practices that create what we are. What really matters is that at closure, there is enough opening for intellectual airing - as well as for the motivation for reflection and critical and creative thinking; in addition that there is wisdom to support the other kinds of knowledge.

Science and other kinds of knowledge: there are some who are not able to distinguish both terms, who are unable to differentiate their meanings and, mostly the meanings constructed throughout

4. Check, for example, among some of the work of Italo Calvino (1994, 1995, 2009 [1980]), Jacques Rancière (2009), Walter Benjamin (2006), Henri Lefebvre (1969 [1962], 1991 [1968], 2008 [1972]), Boaventura de Sousa Santos (1989, 2001, 2006), Edgar Morin (1999), Paul Valéry (1998 [1894]). In all of them there are valuable possibilities of reflection and comprehension regarding the insinuating presence of passages and traverses in their diverse natures and of de passages and traverses through worlds of different origins.

the history of practice. And here there is no reference to terminologies, etymologies, but particularly to history and to processes which are active in the world which in turn lead distinct senses to the given practices: the ones of science — more precisely of scientific disciplines — and the ones of other kinds of knowledge. Furthermore, the opposite should also be considered: practices and their basis are not referenced by the same epistemological constructs. What makes science — and the scientific disciplines — is not what other kinds of knowledge do. However, there are some evidences — more than indications — showing that distinction. In the scope of other kinds of knowledge, practices and narratives about practices and yet, the narratives in themselves — if it is possible to create such abstraction — are not there to keep a promise, neither do they have the purpose of becoming linear. On the other hand, the validation of other kinds of knowledge could never come from the same source as the one validating scientific practices, or yet it could never belong to the same field of values from which the scientific knowledge is validated. Still about the validation and the epistemological construction of modern science, Hilton Japiassu (1981B, p. viii) says: "[...] science and its derivatives occupy an especial place. To the point of excluding from the true knowledge domain everything which not exclusively based in the scientific rationality."[5] What would be the reasons for other kinds of knowledge, including arts, want for themselves the same foundation values of modern science and the same rigorous validation criteria inherent to the knowledge produced scientifically? Hilton Japiassu (1981A, p. 7), among many other philosophers and scientists who are not aligned with the dominant paradigm, tells us what matters to that question: "[...] science does not constitute an autonomous and rational reality, but a socially conditioned reality, manifesting a relative rationality."[6]

Then, it is not an intriguing question anymore, because it is related to every practice — including the religious ones — wishing to incorporate value in order to, progressively, find *more market value*. Does art wish to follow this path? From the moment art's validation criteria become the same as the ones of modern science — already strongly bound to market values —, art would not only lose value, but mostly wisdom; it is evident that such path can also serve for the validation of science itself, which progressively is submitted to the loss of wisdom and to the world's emptying. In face of that, some questions emerge to reflection. How could science validate knowledge it defines as non-scientific? What would other kinds of knowledge seek in science so they can be validated as so? Is it a political motivation, which especially is also attached to the

5.
Our translation for: "[...] a ciência e seus derivados ocupam um lugar todo especial.A ponto de excluírem do domínio do saber verdadeiro todo conhecimento que não se basear única exclusivamente na racionalidade científica." (JAPIASSU, 1981B, p. viii)

6.
Our translation for: "[...] a ciência não constitui uma realidade autônoma e racional, mas uma realidade socialmente condicionada, manifestando uma racionalidade relativa." (JAPIASSU, 1981A, p. 7)

market? Why do some kinds of knowledge seek their own validation through approaching scientific practices, including scientific methodologies? Which epistemological authority would science have — to validate itself in order to exist as valid knowledge — in the processes of validation of other kinds of knowledge which, as a matter of principle, are disqualified and invalidate as scientific?

The science discourse, and particularly the modern science's, points to the image of the existence of a method: the scientific one (DESCARTES, 1984 [1637]). In the conventional science discourse, method is confused with methodology. However, in a close dialogue with paradigms, methods refer to the scientific-philosophical conception guiding the production of scientific knowledge. In turn, methodology deals with the most varied ways of doing, in a close dialogue with techniques. There are various *ways of doing*, including scientific practices (HISSA, 2013). Those ways of doing — methodologies, techniques — do not stem from science, but from all kinds of doing, including science. Furthermore, the exercise of doing on its own can be sufficiently rich to the point of creating ways of doing by itself. But, there is a point noteworthy and which can motivate deep reflections about the subject's presence in the act of doing: "you do not use a methodology. You are the methodology you use"[7](TAVARES, 2006, p. 62). Certainly it is also be applied to science — although *technical-science* may refuse to accept what serves, in general, to all kinds of practices. Then, methodologies and techniques are appropriated, transformed, reconstructed, *trans created*. It will always be, therefore, unjustified the adoption of a renowned scientific methodology exclusively to validate or legitimate other kinds of knowledge, because, moreover, it would lose its value as it is.

In the scope of the university foremost, certain fields wish for the validation they supposedly do not have. One of the most common ways are expressed through the desire for precision in the most varied practices, stemming from the erroneous assumption that precision belongs exclusively to science. About such misconception, we could think as Gonçalo M. Tavares (2006, p. 17) who addresses a bright idea, made of a metaphor, to *tell science* and, with that, implicitly, to tell it from what *is not science*: "To be accurate in science is to be mistaken with a firmer tone of voice than others. Said in another way: you hold the target with both hands and shoot its center against the head of the arrow. That is the scientific accuracy."[8] A forged precision? A caricature that maybe, in certain circumstances, is stronger than it should. But a caricature without essential details— as the most careful ones — which follow well the roles of representing its referent object, in this case the

7. Our translation for: "tu não usas uma metodologia. Tu és a metodologia que usas" (TAVARES, 2006, p. 62)

8. Our translation for: "Ser exacto em ciência é errar num tom de voz mais firme que os outros. Dito de outro modo: pegas no alvo com as tuas duas mãos e atiras o seu centro contra a lâmina da flecha. Eis a exactidão científica." (TAVARES, 2006, p. 17)

nature of conventional and conservative technical-scientific production, referenced by the hegemonic scientific paradigm. What matters for us, however, is to emphasize the reflection stemming from the question: what is the nature of the desire for validation, by the conventional science, of the most diverse forms of scientific knowledge, other kinds of knowledge and practices?

Other kinds of knowledge are made of sensing, thinking, experimenting, rethinking and overall, of moving towards the permanent transformation of what is being done. But mainly, it is made of the desire of transforming itself, exposing itself to the risk of being transformed: such displacement — the emotion — which is happens to thinking, is understood, in the most varied circumstances, as the rational thinking. António Damásio (1996, p. 12) says: "[...] emotion [is] an integral component of the reasons machinery."[9]

That is how we finally approach to the opening — which could be as well in the end of this text — through which we initiate the present reflection. According to António Damásio (1996, p. 12-13): "I limit myself to suggest that certain aspects of the process of emotion and feeling are indispensable for rationality."[10] Nevertheless, two remarks must be made. First: we do not wish with that the validation of emotion deprived from rationality, simply because such condition is nonexistent. Second: we do not wish to affirm the existence of a pure rationality, because such condition is also nonexistent for the same reasons. As a whole, we suggest that the existence and, consequently, every practice articulated to it are tributary to intersected processes and that they mutually feed one another: sensing and thinking. Every *other kind of knowledge is a sensed knowledge,* however what makes other kinds of knowledge is not only the feeling: that innate or acquired disposition to sense, perceive, understand; that attitude present in the act which belongs to the actor and/or author; that world that hosts intuition, instinct and improvisation capacity. Every *other kind of knowledge is a sensed knowledge* as one *senses-think* to come into being. So, that is the purpose of the present text, considering the most varied limits that are imposed: through diverse ways we aim to reflect over the nature of what is denominated here as *sensed knowledge*. Thus, we approach questions and themes which in their turn are articulated to the central idea.

9. Our translation for: "[...] a emoção [é] um componente integral da maquinaria da razão." (DAMASIO, 1996, p. 12)

10. Our translation for: "limito-me a sugerir que certos aspectos do processo da emoção e do sentimento são indispensáveis para a racionalidade." (DAMASIO, 1996, p. 12-13)

Haste and precision

We may start the section with the present question: would the existence reference in the modern university be the *haste paradigm*?

Timeframes, deadlines, academic competitiveness, productivity: words which point to the sense that the Brazilian university world seems to be leading to, mainly, from the 1990's on. In the mid-90's and ten years later Boaventura de Sousa Santos (2004, p. 29) refers to guidelines of the market constructing a new paradigm for the university: the "[...] university institutional [paradigm was forced to be] substituted by the business paradigm to which both public and private universities should be subjected [...]."[11] That is because education and research have constituted a great market tending to progressive expansion, contradictorily without compensation in terms of their quality or of their democratization. The reference, therefore, is the market's one; and then, in the scope of the university market, it prevails one of the fundamental concepts of market economy — the productivity — which in turn affects the most varied actions of the academic production. Productivity and alienation. The image of Charles Chaplin (1889-1977) in *Modern Times* (1936) comes up to us. The scenes starts with the image of a clock setting the time, then it shows the acquired operational dexterity[12], the image of the sheep in analogy to the workers arriving at the factory, the acceleration of the production and the progressive introduction of new technology aiming at the productivity expansion.[13]

The reflection about the productivity nature in the context of academic production will certainly lead us to another reflexive path: the one referring to cognitive polices operated in the university scope. Do polices referring to the scientific knowledge have the same nature as the ones concerning other kinds of knowledge? With that, we also intend to highlight again the issue which for some is not so important in contrast to what others think: the distinction between the scientific knowledge and other kinds of knowledge. Policies oriented to the scientific knowledge may very often disregard other kinds of knowledge[14] also produced in modern universities — that territory where the modern science's power is installed.

For all intents and purposes, here we consider policies of macro scope and on the other hand those approached as of micro scope. The first may be understood as the ones originated from a higher bureaucratic level that interfere in curricular formats, in didactics and yet in what is expected from teaching. It is, for instance, policies and conduct regulations of development agencies — CNPq, CAPES, FAPEMIG, FAPESP etc. In addition, they refer to professors and researchers — and even to technical and administrative assistants — heavy resolutions incompatible to what is expected from universities and their body, devoid of a minimum capacity

11. Our translation for: "[...] institucional da universidade [foi forçado a ser] substituído por um paradigma empresarial a que devem estar sujeitas tanto as universidades públicas, como as privadas [...]." (SANTOS, 2004, p. 29)

12. In analogy, Marilena Chauí (2001) refers to the *operational-university* and Cássio Hissa (2013) to the *university-factory*.

13. For further deepening, cf. André Gorz (1968). Yet about this topic, for critical and comparative studies invoking the social science's classics and mainly the economical sciences, cf. Adam Smith (1983 [1776]) and Karl Marx (1975 [1867]).

14. Here we refer to every creative process that is detached from technical-science, from *the conventional and modeled way of doing* which has practically been done and such processes, in addition to arts, include *other kinds of knowledge-science* crossed by the art of interpreting the world.

for operationalization. However, in the package imagined here, there is not even a signal of how to behave in face of impossibilities, given the lack of orientation via the same means, manuals or *survival modes*.

Polices of micro dimension, in their turn, would be in the scope of relationships and exchanges between academic subjects, i.e. in the *intimacy of the academic practice*. Such *academic practice* is a complex exercise on own its own and there would be a lot to say about it (HISSA, 2013). Exchanges and relationships in the university scope are very difficult. Here, in the aforesaid scope, we would work, for instance, with very diversified interests; with particular causes that, by nature or any other motive, refuse the collective treatment; with very personalized projects; with very vigorous internal competitiveness — apparently unrelated to the university world —; with *rankings* of all kinds, scores, vanities etc. Nevertheless, we may attain to difficulties which originate from higher bureaucratic levels. Will it seem very obvious to affirm that the given policies cross over each other in order to create a set? A system is constituted, this way, working in the society's patterns, that is, a system governed by market policies which overvalue the production for immediate consumption, despite the expanded time to cultivate ideas that some or many practices demand. The academic market has imposed its norms — the modern science's ones — and attached the value of creation to the criteria and values originated from the market itself: the productivity is the most evident.

Then, *the creation* becomes *production* and that, in its turn, is assessed according to the productivity levels no matter if it is technical or if it is other kinds of knowledge's: velocity and quantity. Given the political indications, they have already presented susceptibility to transformation and further on they have metamorphosed into operational processes that, many times, are punitive: annual teaching reports assessment, teaching accreditation in postgraduate programs, approval in public tenders and in processes of horizontal and vertical progression. A further step and the developments acquire a higher speed inherent to the process, apparently without any collective political interference and argumentation of those concerned. From then on, the speed is already haste. From then on, production has become a desire for publication in complete absence of the work. Finally, it is inevitable to disconsider quality on behalf of the quantity needed. It means that the academic existence has been regulated by the production and volume and its higher meaning is the publication, different from what it should be. The creative

processes are the ones that should be the regulatory framework of the aforesaid existence.

In the universities, mainly in the Brazilians ones, the existence of subjects is practically conditioned to the production which, in turn, is defined by a kind of logic very closely related to the industrial production logic, to the serial production that follows the guidance and requirements of a determined minimum score. In those terms, we may affirm that the university is not only oriented to the market logic. It has become a market itself: a specific market with some particularities that, taken to conservative radical limits, questions the own idea of university. The given serial production finds in journals — which are also presented in the form of *rankings* — an important demand which, in turn, is certainly not always met for the motives discussed here, considering the quality expected from the texts and reflections. The publication in journals well rated by organs and commissions politically constituted to assess will yield a better score for the author and the postgraduate programs to which he/she is linked. In the backstage of the productive academic market, it should still be emphasized the insinuating presence of notable voices questioning, almost secretly and many times confidentially, the definition criteria of the journals' *rankings* and the *rankings* in which the own postgraduate programs are framed. In the business world — and it is a business questioning the academic decency — there is a kind of gear in which the power game cannot be disregarded. But the power game under discussion cannot be confused with politics. It is corruption which, when not reported, is suitable to the ones that are served by it. After all, that is also a career — calculated by scores — which many denominate as the academic career.

As a result of the mercantile paradigm that has oriented the academic production, there has been an enormous raise in the number of journals in almost every field of knowledge — and here we refer to the *scientific knowledge* more emphatically than to *other kinds of knowledge*. Nevertheless, there is no wish to depreciate journals and articles in general. That also means the existence of exceptional journals and at the same time of excellent articles. However, unfortunately, we are highlighting the exception that in its turn really belongs to the rule. Contemporarily, in the world regulated by the market, the exceptions serve as references to the construction of decency and quality in every sector of life. Production — in the terms it occurs — and productivity could never be the reference to creative processes. The reference should be their quality and their capacity to make people think, question and reflect about the world and themselves. That is one

of the cognitive market's logic — and here again, we refer to the scientific knowledge's market in which art and all the other kinds of knowledge present in the academia seem to try to escape from and, contradictorily and simultaneously, assert their own place.

Patience and caution steamed from a permanently amplified, consistent and critical formation — not restricted to the academic formation — also end up being reference to the creative exercise which is not hasty. Its mark is precision and time is needed to be precise, direct, clear and to generate mobility and displacements. The haste bound to the market orientation is motivated by productivity and by its increasing amplification: to produce more in less time. In those terms, it is opposed to slowness, that will be misunderstood — as it frequently is — as a manifestation of tardiness, of laxity, immobility, of a hesitating exercise, of weakness. Slowness is a way of expressing caution that yet it may be the manifestation of quickness articulated to a deeper formation. As it is known, velocity is not haste. Velocity is quickness manifested through *sensing-thinking* carefully prepared: by the subjects' history — of experiences and diverse practices, of the world experimentations, of uninterrupted studies , besides the active presence in the academic life — vivified by permanently perfected technique, by the theoretical mastery of practices that, as a whole, motivate the surrender to the risk, to creativity, to the unexpected improvisation that surprises.

Therefore, in the terms that this reflection is led, haste should be understood as an expression of the wish to produce more. And moreover, not intentionally as we expect, it should also be understood that the lack of care and neatness interfere negatively in the high quality of the production. Neatness and care belong to the world of creation, they are originated from the formation obstinate aimed at the perfection of oneself.

On the other hand, when it does not succumb to the market's *modus operandis*, art is more related to the outflow, the draft, the slowness, the dispersion, the blot, to the pause. Velocity interests if it is understood as Italo Calvino (1994) does, as mobility, agility, resourcefulness related to the rhythm. A velocity that does not quantify, that does not lend itself to a utility obtained from it, because it is a *quickness of the body* and, therefore, body-*mind* quickness. In the terms here discussed, slowness is understood as the possibility — and, in many circumstances, the motivated inevitability by the desire and by the uncontrollable pleasure — of taking a carefully halt over something, and consequently, deepen the study, more than as acting in *slow speed*, with tardiness. Art in the academia must assert its slow space-time associated

to Calvino's velocity to keep operating against dichotomies and dualist scissions and to get respect over the particular production time of the art subjects. It is Orhan Pamuk's (2007, p. 14) the excerpt we collected and that helps us a lot in constructing, for the given reflection, an image compatible to what is said here: "The writer's secret is not inspiration [as many would think] — because it is never clear where it comes from —, but his/her obstinacy, patience. The lovely Turkish expression "to dig a well with a needle" seems to be created thinking of writers."[15] But it is not only for writers that the expression conveys well the obstinacy of the creative processes. It suits every creative practice in which there is an obstinate, almost obsessive, desire of doing the best and to be precise in what is being done. It is also from such a perfectionist presence that the enthusiasm and the patience to, with the neatest care, make *that move* and *step*, or inserting that word which precisely substitutes many others perceived as expendable and that do no more than weakening the ways of saying is taken. Thus, time is needed to mature what is done. According to Gonçalo Tavares (2011, p. 135): "Time makes ideas lose their weaker parts and in that, there is a *densification of stronger parts*."[16] The result of such densification is what we can call precision.

15. Our translation for: "O segredo do escritor não é a inspiração [como muitos pensam] — pois nunca fica claro de onde ela vem —, mas a sua teimosia, a sua paciência. A adorável expressão turca "cavar um poço com uma agulha" me parece ter sido criada pensando nos escritores." (PAMUK, 2007, p. 14)

16. Our translation for: "O tempo faz com que as ideias deixem cair as suas partes mais fracas e há, com isso, um *adensamento de partes mais fortes*." (TAVARES, 2011, p. 135)

Epistemologies

When Boaventura de Sousa Santos (1989), in his work entitled *Introduction to a postmodern science*, tells us about the *first epistemological rupture* in the XVII century, he is already outlining what he denominates the *second epistemological rupture* which, in turn, is compatible with the visible opening of the canon. The first rupture is the one that makes common sense a topic distant from scientific knowledge and, moreover, that conducts art to the margins which probably peeks out at place in the epistemological field in vigor. On the other hand, art's desire to conquer a space in that field will always seem to be an indication of the recognition necessity and of its singularities inside the epistemological debate. Would that necessity be really necessary? The scientific knowledge taken as legit, from that moment on, would be the one operated by the supposed *pure rationality* in non literary discourses, deprived from metaphors and any other figures of speech. The relationship I/you would be substituted by the separation between subject and object. Rigor in the scientific knowledge's scope would be associated to what is called objectivity and not to the sensitive precision texts demand. Technique would be praised and, as Ilya Prigogine

and Isabele Stengers (1984, p.205) remind us in *The new alliance*, knowing the outside would be "[...] identified as knowing how to manipulate."[17] Manipulate world's things and subjects, use the world. It is very different from sensing the world, experimenting it, live it to feel it and then, to be able to amplify the capacity of thinking the world.

The epistemological rupture — identified as the first by the Portuguese thinker — in turn, would not only lead the common sense knowledge to the margins, disqualifying it, but would also construct a hierarchy between the knowledge understood as scientific. Therefore, the construction of science would not only be developed *against* the other kinds of knowledge, but would also motivate a debate leading to the relative disqualification of certain fields of knowledge and, certainly, to a questionable hierarchy inside modern science. Boaventura de Sousa Santos (1989, p. 31) observes that the epistemological acts needed for the construction of scientific discourse are "[...] of harder application [in social sciences]"[18], opposite from what happens in natural sciences. Boaventura de Sousa Santos (1989, p. 31-32) points some motives for such difficulty:

> On one hand, because social sciences have as a real object an object that speaks, that uses the same base language used by science and that has an opinion and assumes to understand what science seeks to know. As Piaget says, sociology, as psychology has "the sad privilege of dealing with topics everyone judges to be competent to deal" (PIAGET, 1967, p. 24). On the other hand, because the own social scientist easily succumbs to spontaneous sociology confusing investigation results with opinions resulting from his/her familiarity with the social universe. Consequently, the epistemological rupture is more often professed than achieved [...] and, for that, "sociology is a science with the particularity of having a particular difficulty of becoming a science as any other" (BOURDIEU, 1982).[19][20]

Boaventura de Sousa Santos' outline of the second rupture makes use of what is visible in the world of sciences, but it is also impelled by the transforming desire of the scientific knowledge and other kinds of knowledge, including the original one of common sense. That is how introductorily and in general terms he summarizes it: "once epistemological rupture takes place, the most important epistemological act is the rupture with the epistemological rupture."[21] (SANTOS, 1989, p. 36). We see now how the author thinks of the second epistemological rupture, considering the moment he thinks about it and, likewise the future of the thought "[...] it is inevitable to conclude that we are moving towards a new relationship between

17. Our translation for: "[...] identificado com saber manipular." (PRIGOGINE & STENGERS, 1984, p.205)

18. Our translation for: "[...] de aplicação mais difícil [nas ciências sociais]" (SANTOS, 1989, p. 31)

19. Our translation for: "Por um lado, porque as ciências sociais têm por objeto real um objeto que fala, que usa a mesma linguagem de base de que se socorre a ciência e que tem uma opinião e julga conhecer o que a ciência se propõe a conhecer. Como diz Piaget, a sociologia, tal como a psicologia tem "o triste privilégio de tratar de matérias de que todos se julgam competentes" (PIAGET, 1967, p. 24). Por outro lado, porque o próprio cientista social sucumbe facilmente à sociologia espontânea, confundindo resultados de investigação com opiniões resultantes da sua familiaridade com o universo social. Consequentemente, a ruptura epistemológica é mais professada do que realizada [...] e, por isso, "a sociologia é uma ciência que tem como particularidade a dificuldade particular em se tornar uma ciência como as outras" (BOURDIEU, 1982). (SANTOS, 1989, p. 31-32)

20. Boaventura de Sousa Santos, in this excerpt refers to the following work: PIAGET, Jean. *Logique et connaissance scientifique*. Paris: Gallimard, 1967; BOURDIEU, Pierre. *Leçon sur la leçon*. Paris: Minuit, 1982.

21. Our translation for: "uma vez feita a ruptura epistemológica, o ato epistemológico mais importante é a ruptura com a ruptura epistemológica." (SANTOS, 1989, p. 36).

science and common sense, a relationship in which any of those *is made* of the other and both *make* something new"[22] (SANTOS, 1989, p. 40). It is from that new relationship established between the scientific knowledge — fuller of the world, more practical — and all the other kinds of knowledge — more critical, more thoughtful — which it would arise that *something new*. Boaventura de Sousa Santos' theoretical framework, constituted by the double epistemological rupture, also contributes, further on, to the construction of what he denominates *ecology of other kinds of knowledge*. In addition, mainly in the scope of humanities, it is created an image of overcoming the epistemological singularity.

"The hierarchies of other kinds of knowledge's cannot be defined based on the epistemic sovereignty of one kind of knowledge options or on one instance 'external' to the other kinds of knowledge, but in a pragmatic way, that is, inseparable from the practices situated in the production of other kinds of knowledge"[23] (NUNES, 2010, p. 284). We are here in 2010, with the excerpt from João Arriscado Nunes and therefore a bit more than twenty years after the Boaventura de Sousa Santos's (1989) text original publication, dealing with the double epistemological rupture. In that case, for various reasons, it is not about a later reverberation, but a case of clarification which happens progressively collective, of ratification of the canon opening, of the reflexive amplification of science, and mainly of social sciences. The criticism to the epistemological hegemony is also a manifestation of the integral opening to the recognition of the most diverse kinds of epistemologies. Still in that case, the text of the sociologist and thinker João Arriscado Nunes is present on the book organized by Boaventura de Sousa Santos and Maria Paula Meneses, that indicatively is entitled as *Epistemologies from the South*. In a dialogue with Boaventura de Sousa Santos's reflexive project, the richness of João Arriscado Nunes' text (2010, p. 281-282) is perceived:

> If epistemology is a hegemonic project imposing an epistemic sovereignty, inseparable from modern science, how can an alternative project that retrieves the own idea of epistemology to positively characterize the diversity of scientific knowledge existent in the world and its validity conditions be understood? [Boaventura de Sousa Santos] points to two answer keys for this apparent paradox. [The first] is the characterization of the epistemology from the South as a general epistemology of the impossibility of a general epistemology. That conception is immensurable against an epistemology that defines epistemic sovereignty that attributes to a form of scientific knowledge the power of defining the existence and the validity of all the other ways of knowledge. The second is the formulation of a research program which implicates in reexamining the dominant epistemology from new perspectives anchored in historical and emerging experiences from the South.[24]

22. Our translation for: "[...] forçoso é concluir que caminhamos para uma nova relação entre a ciência e o senso comum, uma relação em que qualquer deles é feito do outro e ambos *fazem* algo de novo" (SANTOS, 1989, p. 40).

23. Our translation for: "As hierarquias dos saberes não podem ser definidas a partir da soberania epistêmica de um modo de saber ou de uma instância 'externa' aos saberes, mas de forma pragmática, isto é, indissociável das práticas situadas de produção dos saberes" (NUNES, 2010, p. 284).

24. Our translation for: Se a epistemologia é um projeto hegemônico, de imposição de uma soberania epistêmica, indissociável da ciência moderna, como entender um projeto alternativo que retoma a própria ideia de epistemologia para caracterizar de maneira positiva a diversidade das formas de conhecimento existentes no mundo e as condições de sua validade? [Boaventura de Sousa Santos] aponta duas chaves que permitem responder a este aparente paradoxo. [A primeira] é a caracterização da epistemologia do Sul como uma epistemologia geral da impossibilidade de uma epistemologia geral. Esta concepção é incomensurável com a de uma epistemologia que define a soberania epistêmica, que atribui a uma forma de conhecimento o poder de definir a existência e a validade de todos os outros modos de conhecimento. O segundo é a formulação de um programa de pesquisa que implica reexaminar a epistemologia dominante a partir dos olhares novos ancorados nas experiências históricas e emergentes do Sul. (NUNES, 2010, p. 281-282)

Hence, we also consider as more appropriate the use of the plural form — *epistemologies*; the plural interrogates the existence of a sole and general epistemology — it reiterates the need of experiencing a *boundary epistemology* that surpassed the limits of modern science, as well as the modern university ones, and of valuing the dialogue between art, other kinds of knowledge and all other fields of knowledge. However, such dialogue will only make sense for all other kinds of knowledge and for art — we refer to the insubordinate art and not that subordinated to market regulation — only if other areas, or a significant part of them, are also referred by the paradigms that make *science-knowledge* (HISSA, 2007; 2013). Otherwise, it would be a difficult and contradictory dialogue, whose communicative criteria would be constructed from what is produced under market references.

Through a dialogue practice that transforms everyone, it is possible — and that is something fostered by those who construct territories of creative resistance in the universities — to strengthen the fertile traffic between art and science so there is art in science, and more than that, in a way there is *science-art* or *science-knowledge* (HISSA, 2013). In that case, we would be talking about science in its *sensu lato*, science that would dialogue with art and given its Latin root *scientia* is related to human knowledge. The presence of art in sciences is part of what is rare, once it demands dialogues and interchanges which are not conventionally provided by academia's subjects. But here, in this reflection, we want to think about the possibility of considering art in dialogue with the world and being crossed by other kinds of knowledge — certainly including the science which is permanently eager to incorporate wisdom —, an art mobilized by everything the human being can do.

Final considerations: art, sensed knowledge, science-knowledge

Art transits in *pathos*; it expresses itself through metaphors and analogies, constructing its own in the territory of sensitiveness. Attached to emotions, to the body, to passions, it was only supposedly undressed from rationality and, then, from the possibility of operating cognitively, that is, of performing in the construction of a singular king of scientific knowledge. Art, related to emotions and, erroneously, to a body dissociated from the mind, should occupy a place in the entertainment practices. Without the rigor, without the possibility of validation and verification, it simply was not interesting in the logic of the cognitive formation of citizens. As cognition was associated to reason and dissociated to affection,

art was considered a purely subjective topic. It is important to highlight that the subjectivity, that reveals the existence of the *experience subject*, breaks off any attempt of neutrality/objectiveness in the construction of knowledge. Thus, it could not be considered an inherent part of the cognitive processes.

Art is, from that point on, considered a practice not only affective, but also cognitive, with proposals as Jaques-Dalcroze's. Pedagogue and composer, Dalcroze proposed a system of exercises — *Rhythmic Jaques-Dalcroze* — privileging the work with the students' attention and memory. In addition, he embodied reason-emotion imbrications when investigating meter and rhythm associating the first to the reason and the second to the emotions. We may say that when Susane Langer (1942) and Nelson Goodman (1968) included the aesthetic experience as one of the symbolization modes, the presence of cognitive processes in the artistic practices progressively started being recognized. The artistic kind of knowledge, then, is now contemplated as scientific knowledge in the academia. Of course history is simplified here, once a lot has been done concerning educational policies for the understanding of art as a practice that constructs knowledge. We may say that, currently, art is considered a curricular component in schools indicating an alleged equalization with the sciences regarding its teaching-learning. However, any reform in learning threatens its permanence in the curriculum revealing that it does not have the same *status* as the other scientific knowledge in the cognitive economy. Additionally, art in the universities, even though has gained its space — small and without considerable repercussions — is always making an effort to be recognized and valued. About the observation, we have some questions to be addressed for reflection. The first of them is a criticism to the aforesaid effort, because art is indispensable and moreover in the academic world hegemonically made of *technical science*. It is more than indispensable; it is a kind of airing and of survival in that territory that surrenders itself to the market. The second is tributary to the first: art is the presence in what is denominated *science-knowledge* (HISSA, 2013) and, in its absence — or, using the same words, in its surrender to mercantile values contrary to its existence as art —, science which permanently wishes to transform itself loses one of its basic references.

The artistic kind of knowledge is different from the conventional scientific knowledge when it assumes it is constructed by subjects who weave experiences in the world. It is, therefore, a kind of knowledge full of world and of wisdom that gathers with social practices and traditions. A other kind of knowledge not

necessarily institutionalized, singular, local, contextualized and which acts through the relationship between I/you, in which there is no refusal to proximity and, in turn, generates meetings between artist, work and audience. The meeting operates as a place for exchanges and sharing, a place for the creation of senses. We could think of the artistic kind of knowledge as one produced by dialogues in borderlines. A *trans* kind of knowledge originally mixed whose border's permeability points to a place of exchanges. In that, it is the subject's truth that is shaped into work in dialogue with the other, recalling with Agamben (2009) that such subject is the being in a relationship, more than a subjectified individual; it is the being in a relationship enabling subjectification processes and recognized by its singularities. A *sensed knowledge* motivating transformations. A disturbing *sensed knowledge* present yet as an enclave in the most diverse territories of the modern university.

About the nature of what is here denominated *sensed knowledge*, there are some reflections. As a principle, nouns — and here, in this reflection, we refer to scientific knowledge, to other kinds of knowledge and to practices — do not need any adjectival cooperation to convey the *substance* which makes *the thing exists*. However, here the choice of the adjective is due the necessity of adding a certain quality in face of conservative transformations in vigor in the modern university, which, in turn, leads the *technical-science* to a greater inflexibility. In face of words' and concepts' capture by the conservative way of thinking the world, a simple contraposition between *scientific knowledge* and *other kinds of knowledge* seems to exhaust itself — contradictorily, even without a deep comprehension of the given contraposition regarding the distinction between *scientific knowledge* and *other kinds of knowledge*. Thus, other kinds of knowledge, using a qualified term, are already assumedly sensed without the adjective has emphatically embody the distinct meaning from scientific knowledge and, particularly, that one processed under the references of the dominant paradigm. Which kinds of knowledge would not be sensed? Another question, apparently different, would explicit the same issue: which scientific knowledge could exist if there were no *sensed scientific knowledge*? The referred questions, in turn, would not only reinforce the nature of other kinds of knowledge but, mainly would interrogate the scientific knowledge and the researching subject. About the scientific knowledge, it would be said that it erroneously and supposedly is devoid of what makes us imagine that there is as a scientific product beyond the other kinds of knowledge: emotion, love for the world being read, desire, the permanently amplified capacity of sensing oneself and the world

while it is being created. About the scientific knowledge's subject, it could also be said that the desire for negating oneself in one's own work will always be the manifestation of the impossibility of subtracting oneself from the world's reading; and the given desire is the naive manifestation of impartiality which is already overcome the art and by *science-knowledge*. Thus, *sensed knowledge* could even constitute a synonym to *sensed scientific knowledge*, since it were, for instance, the result of the double rupture signaled by Boaventura de Sousa Santos.

Sensed knowledge is susceptible; and the susceptibleness is the one of other kinds of knowledge's subject who transfers to what he/she creates in his/her sensitive part. In turn, the sensitive object created — interpretation or reading, representation, gestural, text, image, movement — transfers to the other, different perspectives of sensing; and those happen as appreciation, comprehension and evaluation faculties. Besides of what it is, because it is soaked with feeling and reason, *sensed knowledge* is also *forefelt*. It is compassionate. The object originated from it and confused with it, is likewise the bearer of the generous virtue: it is marked by subtlety, clearness, salience and delicacy, and it is distinguished for allowing the perception: touching, pregnant with thoughts and wisdom. Precise. Direct. Delicate. It is the manifestation of wisdom.

The *sensed knowledge* allows a peep of the arts in the traditions, sciences and philosophies. Referring to *sensed knowledge* is a way of reiterating the essential presence of the sensitiveness perception as part of valuing the subjects' singularities. With Muniz Sodré (2006, p. 27), we remind that the sensitivity is configured as the "propriety of receiving impressions and excitements, reacting to them with operations distinct from intellectual processes."[25] Sodré seems to underline processes that follow feelings as a perception of what happens to us, of our experience with ourselves and with the world. In this kind of knowledge there is a predominance of the corporal feeling. The idea of feeling was amplified by Damásio when he makes us notice the existence of emotions' feelings, deep emotions' feelings, and corporal feelings. Feeling as a perception of the body affected by emotions, movements, the subject's relationships with and in the world. Feeling and sensibility. To those thoughts, imagination are associated. Constituents of the *sensed knowledge* nature, those processes are in the core of the artistic creation.

In *sensed knowledge* there is a policy of sharing. The other kinds of knowledge in the arts of the body happens in a convivial situation, in which subjects are in relationship in the artistic work

25. Our translation for: "lembramos que a sensibilidade configura-se como "propriedade de acolher impressões e excitações, a elas reagindo com operações distintas dos processos intelectuais." (MUNIZ SODRÉ, 2006, p. 27),

construction. Yet aware of such singularities, there is a sensing with the other. The attentive cultivation of the body, in presence, in the social interaction and in the exchanges between subjects in the artistic experience enhances the other kinds of knowledge. In addition, it is a kind of knowledge translated into doing.

In *sensed knowledge*'s construction, it is possible to perceive a relationship net of the objects of scientific knowledge and then, the possibility of continuing what was generated in the sensitive experience. The perception of those relationships makes emerge the consciousness of a landscape of the body modified by affections, the subject's presentification — of the testimony of oneself in attentive existence. The *subject-body*, mobilized by its own subjectivity and by the exchange with the other, is in the center of the operation and there is no possibility for separation between subject and object, and the relationship I/you in the learning process is what matters. Other kinds of knowledge are constructed through and in the *subject-body* in artistic action in the world. The body carries the sensed knowledge that makes the artist body and such condition will also count for the *science-knowledge*.

The *sensed knowledge* presupposes an action not restricted to body movements in the space-time, but it comprehends the materiality of the movement generating thoughts images. Practices of dancing, practices of thinking. Both are praxis, carrying theory. There is theory in the work. It is possible to *see through* the theory of the dancing body, recalling Manoel de Barros (2004). It matters, patiently, as if we had a needle digging a well, opening passages so the theory tells the body what it is made of, likewise it matters the opening for the permanent transforming dialogue from which everyone constructs an open space for sharing. That happens while art is made to interrogate the territory where there is no time for thinking.

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