

PREFACE

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That from the earliest times *logic* has traveled this secure course can be seen from the fact that since the time of Aristotle it has not had to go a single step backwards KrV B VIII

The symposium on *Kant and the Philosophical Tradition—Kant Today* was the first international Brazilian-Italian-Portuguese Kant meeting, the result of an intense coordination among Kant scholars from both the Portuguese and the Italian speaking areas that started with the 10th International Kant Congress of São Paulo in 2005. The organizing committee was composed by Ubirajara Rancan de Azevedo Marques (Universidade Estadual Paulista), Leonel Ribeiro dos Santos (Universidade de Lisboa), Mario Longo (Università di Verona), Ferdinando L. Marcolungo (Università di Verona), and Riccardo Pozzo (Università di Verona). The symposium took place in two sessions that were held at the Università di Verona (January 22-23, 2008), and at the Università di Padova (January 24-25, 2008). Speakers and discussants spoke English, French, German, Italian, Portuguese, and Spanish, thus giving a concrete shape to Europe's intellectual identity, whose origin lies in the *translatio studiorum*, the transmission of a common heritage of learning from Antiquity to Modernity, which derives from classical Greek, classical and medieval Latin, and Arab and defines itself alongside with the individual *linguae vulgares* by setting up disciplinary lexica for all languages of Europe.

In fact, philosophers cannot afford to lose their linguistic variety. Languages are fundamental for Europeans wanting to work together, says Multilingualism Commissioner Leonard Orban. Opting for multilingualism is indeed an excellent way to bring citizens closer to each other. Languages are all especially necessary for pointing out the essence of Europe's intellectual identity as opposed to intellectual identities that have been shaped by the monolingual option, as it is case, e.g., with the United States, China, and India. While it is true there are no hegemonic languages, it is also true that no language belongs exclusively to an individual people: languages are a common good for all Europeans, whose identity is truly an *eccentric identity*—as Rémi Brague has defined it—but nonetheless an identity. For this reason, the *Accademia della Crusca* (Europe's very first institution devoted solely to the investigation of language) has renamed "Piazza delle Lingue d'Europa" the square of Florence on which lies its seat at the Villa Reale di Castello—on an inscription in twenty-three languages, which was posted on July 3, 2007. That some of the proceedings are nonetheless published herewith in English is obviously due to the

function English has taken of auxiliary international language—as Umberto Eco has put it—the *lingua franca* of our days.

The proceedings give a new perspective of Kant’s philosophy, which is due to both the fact that Brazil, Italy, and Portugal have a long-lasting and deep-rooted familiarity with the philosophical tradition of Aristotelianism, and the fact that current changes in academic teaching in these countries have provoked an epoch of extraordinary philosophical vitality. This explains the title chosen for this first meeting: “Kant and the Philosophical Tradition—Kant Today.” What is striking is the uniformity of approaches that generally make a large use of the methodologies of the history of the sources, of the history of ideas, of the history of concepts, of the history of problems, and of the history of traditions, which—as Norbert Hinske never tires to point out—may at some extent be overlapping, and nonetheless need to be carefully taken apart.

The meeting began with addresses by the chairs of the hosting Departments, namely Ferdinando L. Marcolungo (Università di Verona) and Giuseppe Micheli (Università di Padova), who were followed by Margit Ruffing (Johann-Gutenberg-Universität Mainz) on behalf of the *Kant-Gesellschaft*, and by Claudio la Rocca (Università di Genova), the president of the *Società Italiana di Studi Kantiani*.¹

Vera Cristina de Andrade Bueno (Pontificia Universidade Católica do Rio de Janeiro), in her systematic paper, “Reflecting Judgment and Metaphysics,” considers the changes Kant felt were necessary for dogmatic metaphysics, as regards its search for first principles against the objections of the skeptics that our mental faculties do not allow any claim to first principles as soon as they step beyond the domain of sense data. The core of the change is the introduction of the reflective power of judgment, which made it possible to mediate between the objective claim of validity of logical reasoning and the subjective character of representations and illusions. In the process of rearranging metaphysics—concludes de Andrade Bueno—reflecting judgments plays a pivotal role in fulfilling the need of a new natural foundation.

Giovanni Pietro Basile (Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München/Università di Padova) writes on “Idealismo e realismo empirico nella ricezione kantiana dell’*Opus postumum*,” with the aim of reconstructing the impact of Kant’s *Opus Postumum* among early Neokantians at the turn of the last century (1884-1929), starting with Hans Vaihinger, Erich Adickes, and Albert Görland, through Arthur Drews, Focko Lüpsen, Ferdinand Weinhandl, Albrecht Krause until Norman Kemp Smith. The central point of discussion focuses on the relationship between transcendental idealism and empirical realism in Kant’s late thought. Some Neokantians regard the final development of Kant’s philosophy as a radical form of idealism, either a *fictionalism* or a *scientific idealism*. Several interpreters attributed the theory of the so-called “double affection” (both a transcendent and an empirical affection of the subject) to the *Opus postumum*. Others, finally, tried to match transcendental idealism and empirical realism.

¹ See the report by Margit Ruffing, Report by Margit Ruffing, “Kant the Philosophical Tradition – Kant Today: Bericht zur Tagung in Verona und Padua von 22. bis 25. Januar 2008,” *Kant-Studien* 99 (2008), #3, 387-92.

Maria de Lourdes Borges (Universidade Federal de Santa Catarina) presents a paper on “Action and Emotion in Kant,” dedicated to the problem of whether we could act morally without being moved by sensible feelings. The answer is positive in the *Critique of Pure Reason*, the *Groundwork* and in the *Critique of Practical Reason*. In the *Metaphysics of Morals* and in the *Anthropology*, however, there is much more ambiguity. First and foremost, Kant claimed that there were some sensible conditions to the reception of the concept of duty: moral feeling, conscience, love of one’s neighbor, and respect for one self (self-esteem). A new “moral anthropology” ought to fill the task of showing the causal necessity of moral feelings, in order to figure out whether or not they are necessary sensible pre-conditions to moral actions.

Isabella Ferron (Università di Padova) looks into “La ricezione dell’antropologia kantiana nell’Italia del ’900,” tracing the reception of Kant’s *Anthropology* in twentieth-century Italy with special reference to Piero Martinetti and Mario Dal Prà, and last but not least all Italian scholars who have been in touch with Norbert Hinske. Ferron makes it clear that if the notion of a philosophical anthropology has gone through significant changes during the last decades, this has been caused by a renewed interest in the anthropological dimension of Kant’s thought.

Two further *rezeptionsgeschichtliche* papers are offered by Nazzareno Fioraso (Università di Verona) on “La prima ricezione di Kant in Spagna,” and Mario Longo (Università di Verona), on “Tradizione storiografiche a confronto: Sulla ricezione in Germania del *Geist der spekulativen Philosophie*,” who look into early post-kantian philosophical historiography.

The paper submitted by Zeljko Loparic (who is, to our feeling, Brazil’s most outstanding living philosopher), considers possibilities and limits of an innovative approach to Kant’s philosophy as a whole with the aim of pointing out the role critical philosophy has played for theories of human problem-solving, which—Loparic suggests—should be cultivated as a duty of virtue.

The influence Kant had on Fichte and Hölderlin is the subject of the very well documented paper by Laura Anna Macor (Università di Padova) on “L’accezione kantiana di *Bestimmung des Menschen* e la sua prima ricezione (1784–1793).” The perspective Kant chose in his essays on the philosophy of history introduced new elements into a wider debate, which had already begun in the middle of the eighteenth century, thus independently from Kant’s own transcendental setting. When Kant looked into the issue of the *Bestimmung des Menschen* he acted as interpreter of a concept that other, precritical philosophers had proposed. Macor shows the genesis of Kant’s elaboration of the *Bestimmung des Menschen* as well as its impact on authors, such as Fichte and Hölderlin, who were neither at the same moment nor in the same way interested in Kant’s transcendental philosophy.

Looking at texts ranging from the *Critique of Pure Reason* to the *Anthropology*, Ubirajara Rancan de Azevedo Marques (Universidade Estadual Paulista) writes “A proposito del genio come ‘innata disposizione d’animo (*ingenium*),” in which he proposes an original interpretation of Kant’s use of the couple of concepts *innate* and of *originally acquired*, by means of which Rancan

de Azevedo Marques suggests an *Urerkenntnis* that function as the foundation of every kind of *Erkenntnis*.

Intervening on “Kant on Sovereignty,” Alessandro Pinzani (Universidade Federal de Santa Catarina) considers Hobbes and Rousseau as Kant’s sources in political philosophy with the aim of establishing arguments in Kant’s *Doctrine of Right* in favor of both republicanization and political progress. Given Kant’s claim that sovereignty belong solely to the united will of the people, there is a discrepancy with his wish not to let the people intervene directly in the process of decision making. For this reason, Pinzani proposes to distinguish between *real* and *actual* sovereignty, which are respectively the people and the head of state, as well as between a *synchronic* and a *diachronic* understanding of the “united will” and “the people”. In the end, Kant claims every republic be necessarily a representative political system.

Focused on the tension between the *Doctrine of Right* and the *Doctrine of Virtue*, Alice Ponchio’s paper (Università di Padova) “Sul diritto dell’umanità, tra etica e diritto,” aims at highlighting the role played by the right of humanity as a limitative condition of freedom. In fact, law and ethics originate from the acknowledgment and the defence of the inalienable dignity that everyone has in virtue of his being a rational free agent. Humanity is then a value which transcends the distinction between ethics and right and founds them. Not only Kantian second ethics—concluded Ponchio—but also Kantian politics refers to contexts of values, notwithstanding Kant’s refusal of values in the *Critique of Practical Reason*.

Lucia Procuranti (Università di Verona) considers “Kant e il problema delle idee chiare e confuse” bringing about the difference between Kant and the tradition of Descartes, Leibniz, Wolff, Baumgarten, and Meier on consciousness with reference to both the *Reflexionen zur Logik* and the *Logik* edited by Gottlieb Benjamin Jäsche. The crucial point—suggests Procuranti—does not simply lie in finding the spot on which Kant draws a line, it lies instead in the genesis of the notion of beauty.

In his fascinating paper on the necessitating character of Kantian metaphysics, Valerio Rohden claims the practical aspects of Kantian metaphysics are intertwined with all parts of the three Critiques and are thus the key for understanding the whole of Critical Philosophy.

Marco Sgarbi (Università di Verona) writes on “Kant’s Ethics as a part of Metaphysics through Spontaneity,” delving into Kant’s use of the notion of spontaneity, while arguing that his classification of ethics as a part of metaphysics is a philosophical necessity triggered by the genesis of Kant’s understanding of spontaneity. Sgarbi focuses his attention on Kant’s early writings of ethics, the systematic justification of Kant’s insertion of ethics within metaphysics, the historical debate on soul-body’s relationship.

Tommaso Tuppini (Università di Verona) intervenes on “The Form of the Law: Jacques Lacan, Deleuze and Nancy interpreters of Kant,” arguing that Kant and Lacan have one point in common, namely that the moral Law generates the broken structure of desire. Jean-Luc Nancy added the argument that in the categorical character of the imperative comes to light a structure of

being-addressed which deconstructs from the inside the self-centered rational and autonomous subject. On the ground of different arguments, Lacan and Nancy agreed that Kant's understanding of the formality of the law bring about the deprivation of the (Cartesian) subject of its self-referentiality, of its mastery of itself.

On behalf of the organizing committee, we thank Zeljko Loparic for having kindly agreed to host the publication of these proceedings on the electronic journal he is editing, *Kant e-prints*.

We are indeed looking forward to the second Brazilian-Italian-Portuguese Kant Symposium. It shall take place in 2009 in Lisbon under the title, "Was ist der Mensch?" under the auspices of Leonel Ribeiro dos Santos (Universidade de Lisboa) together with Irene Borges-Duarte and Olivier Feron (both Universidade de Évora) and shall be followed by a third meeting to be held in San Salvador de Bahia in 2010 under the direction of Daniel Tourinho Peres (Universidade Federal da Bahia).

In 2010, by the way, Kant scholars of all the world will gather on the occasion of the 11th International Kant Congress during the Whitsundtide week-end in Pisa.