


UNRAVELING THE ANTHROPOLOGICAL-EXISTENTIAL SIGNIFICANCE OF TRANSCENDENTAL PROPOSITIONS

Desvendando o significado antropológico-existencial das proposições transcendentais

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Abstract: Kant labels his transcendental propositions as “principles” instead of mathematical “theorems” because they have the quite peculiar property of “making possible their ground of proof (*Beweisgrund*), namely experience”. The paper introduces an original reading. Importantly, this reading does not conflict with established interpretations, as it does not touch on the core focus of Kant's first *Critique*—examining the possibility of cognition (*Erkenntnis*). The emphasis is on the anthropological sense of Kant's key question: “What is man?” The proposal suggests that “possible experience” can be anthropologically understood as the possibility of understanding ourselves as human beings. Our understanding of ourselves dispenses with concepts made a priori, such as mathematical and formal ones. In contrast, without categories (and thus without transcendental propositions), we cannot comprehend ourselves as inhabitants of a world of persistent objects and events that interact causally in space and time. According to this interpretation, a “synthetic a priori proposition”, in Kant's view, is one whose truth depends on the world, not conceptual relations. Nonetheless, it is a priori in a quite specific sense—it is essential for our understanding as human beings.

Keywords: Transcendental propositions; Self-consciousness experience; Self-comprehension.

Resumo: Kant nomeia suas proposições transcendentais como “princípios” em vez de “teoremas” matemáticos porque elas teriam a propriedade bastante peculiar de “tornar possível sua base de prova” (*Beweisgrund*), a saber, a experiência. Este artigo apresenta uma leitura original. É importante ressaltar que esta proposta não entra em conflito com leituras estabelecidas, uma vez que não aborda o foco central da primeira *Crítica* de Kant – examinar a possibilidade de cognição (*Erkenntnis*). A ênfase está no sentido antropológico contido na questão-chave de Kant: “O que é o homem?” A proposta sugere que a “experiência possível” pode ser entendida antropológicamente como a possibilidade de nos compreendermos como seres humanos. Nossa compreensão de nós mesmos dispensa conceitos feitos a priori, como os matemáticos e os formais. Em contraste, sem categorias (e, portanto, sem proposições transcendentais), não podemos compreender-nos como habitantes de um mundo de objetos e eventos persistentes que interagem causalmente no espaço e no tempo. De acordo com esta interpretação, uma “proposição sintética a priori”, na visão de Kant, é aquela cuja verdade depende do mundo, e não de relações conceituais. No entanto, é a priori num sentido bastante específico – é essencial para a nossa compreensão como seres humanos.

Palavras-chave: Proposições transcendentais; Experiências autoconscientes; Autoconhecimento.

1. The problem of pure reason

The core focus of Kant's *Critique of Pure Reason* revolves around the problem of pure reason, which involves the assessment of synthetic a priori propositions across various domains, including natural science, mathematics, rational psychology, rational cosmology, and rational theology. In his “Transcendental Doctrine of Method”, Kant distinguishes

between the dogmatic and mathematical uses of pure reason. Additionally, he identifies two categories of synthetic *a priori* propositions: mathematical and metaphysical. While the synthetic *a priori* propositions of mathematics are “theorems” (*Lehrsätze*) whose proof is based on *a priori* or pure intuitions, the synthetic *a priori* propositions of metaphysics are called “principles” (*Grundsätze*) because they have the special property of making their ground of proof (*Beweisgrund*), namely experience, first possible and must always be presupposed in this” (see *KrV*, A737/B765).¹

Kant argues that in “dogmatic” metaphysics, metaphysical propositions are misunderstood because they are equated with mathematical theorems (*Lehrsätze*) that can be derived from axioms by *a priori* intuitions. In contrast, in his critical philosophy, metaphysical propositions are referred to as “principles” (*Grundsätze*), i.e., propositions with a unique proof method, namely the proof that such principles are necessary for possible experience. Regarding this, “transcendental” does not refer to any *a priori* or pure propositions whose truth is independent of experience but only to *a priori* propositions that make experience possible in the first place.

The idea of a special method of transcendental proof gave rise to decades of debate about the nature of so-called “transcendental arguments”. It begins with a single mention in Strawson’s (1959) book and Stroud’s (1968) renowned refutation. Since then, the argument has continued to be heated.² The discussion centers on multiple axes. The first question is whether the transcendental argument is a Kantian refutation of global skepticism. If this was Kant’s intent, the second question is what form of global skepticism he would have aimed for with his arguments if he had achieved his goal. If the alleged transcendental argument is indeed anti-skeptical, the new question is whether or not it is effective. In the nineties of the previous century, a consensus arose regarding the following thesis: “world-directed” or

¹ The same idea appears in several passages of the *Critique*. For example, Kant claims that without *a priori* concepts (of transcendental propositions), “nothing is possible as an *object of experience*. The objective validity of the categories as *a priori* concepts rests on the fact that through them alone is experience possible” (*KrV*, A93/B126, emphasis in original). “The *possibility of experience* is, therefore, what gives us all our cognitions *a priori* objective reality” (*KrV*, A156/B185, emphasis in original). “The conditions of *the possibility of experience*, in general, are at the same time the conditions of *the possibility of the objects of experience*, and on this account have objective reality in synthetic judgment *a priori*” (*KrV*, A158/B197, emphasis in original). “Through concepts of the understanding, however, it certainly erects secure principles, not directly from concepts, rather always indirectly through the relation of these concepts to something contingent, namely *possible experience*” (*KrV*, A737/B765, emphasis in original).

² Considering what was published in the twenty-first century, the literature is enormous. See Bardon 2005, 2006; Bell, 1999; Callanan, 2006, 2011; Caranti, 2017; Cassam, 2007; Chang, 2008; Dicker, 2008; D’Oro, 2019; Finnis, 2011; Franks, 2005; Giladi, 2016; Glock, 2003; Grundmann and Misselhorn, 2003; Houlgate, 2015; Lockie, 2018; McDowell, 2006; Mizrahi, 2012; Rähme, 2017; Rockmore & Breazeale, 2014; Russell & Reynolds, 2011; Stapleford, 2008; Stern, 2007; Vahid, 2011; Wang, 2012; Westphal, 2004.

“truth-directed” transcendental arguments are doomed to fail (see Peacocke, 1989, p. 4; and Cassam, 1999, p. 83).³ At most, transcendental arguments could establish the essential connections between our conceptual scheme’s primary concepts (see Strawson, 1984; Stroud, 1999; Stern, 2007). However, a minority still believes in the viability of world-directed transcendental proofs.

Indeed, there are connections between Kant’s special transcendental methods of proof and the transcendental proposition, as in several cases, we characterize a proposition by its method of proof, and as we shall see below, several readings of transcendental propositions rely on a prior understanding of “possible experience” as forms of transcendental argument. In any case, the present article is only concerned with such a “peculiar method” of proof to the extent that it facilitates comprehension of the transcendental proposition, which is the main topic. The multi-decade debate over the nature and efficacy of transcendental arguments is none of our business. We are interested in what Kant calls “transcendental propositions”. Kant referred to these propositions as synthetic a priori transcendental propositions. What are they exactly?

There are several well-established interpretations of this. The paper introduces a completely original reading. Importantly, this reading does not conflict with established interpretations, as it does not touch on the core focus of Kant’s first Critique—examining the possibility of cognition (*Erkenntnis*). The emphasis is on the anthropological sense of Kant’s key question: “What is man?” (*Log*, 9: 25). The proposal suggests that “possible experience” can be anthropologically understood as the possibility of understanding ourselves as human beings. Our understanding of ourselves dispenses with concepts made a priori, such as mathematical and formal ones. In contrast, without categories (and thus without transcendental propositions), we cannot comprehend ourselves as inhabitants of a world of persistent objects and events that interact causally in space and time. According to this interpretation, a “synthetic a priori proposition”, in Kant’s view, is one whose truth depends on the world, not conceptual relations. Nonetheless, it is a priori in a quite specific sense—it is essential for our understanding as human beings.

This paper is organized as follows: In the section following this brief introduction, we will appreciate Kant’s view on the *tertium* connecting the concept predicate with the

³ The idea of a modest belief-directed transcendental argument has become, by and large, the prevailing view: see Callanan, 2011; D’Oro, 2018; Giladi, 2016; Grundmann & Misselhorn, 2003; Mizrahi, 2012; Stern, 2007; Wang, 2012, etc. Perhaps the only dissenting voice was Brueckner (1996).

conceptual subject in the case of synthetic *a priori* propositions, especially transcendental ones. After discarding several possible readings, we reach an aporetic conclusion: what Kant calls a *tertium* cries out for interpretation.

In the third section, we appreciate the mainstream reading of “possible experience” as the possibility of objectively representing objects. We argue that this reading finds no support in Kant’s writings and is at odds with what makes transcendental deduction inevitable for Kant, namely, the metaphysical fact that we can already represent objects without categories or transcendental propositions through our senses alone. The reading that best fits Kant’s transcendental deduction is to assume that “possible experience” means the possibility of recognizing that what we represent through our senses exists objectively as a precondition for Newtonian mechanics.

In the fourth and final section, we present our alternative existential reading. This reading is not meant to exclude any other. It is compatible with the two interpretations considered last. It is based on Kant’s distinction between concepts *made a priori* and concepts *given a priori*. The claim is that transcendental propositions are indispensable for understanding ourselves as human beings, i.e., as inhabitants of a world of persistent objects and events that interact causally in space and time.

2. On the supreme principle of all synthetic judgments

Given that for Kant, all propositions have a categorical form, namely, a predicate concept is predicated of whatever a subject concept represents, then all synthetic propositions require a *tertium* that connects the two main concepts of a synthetic proposition. What is this *tertium* in the particular case of transcendental propositions? We can rule out a priori three possible readings without much thinking. The first considers this *tertium* as an *empirical or a posteriori sensory intuition* representing something particular. A particular empirical intuition cannot be the required *tertium* because Kant talks about *a priori* and not *a posteriori* propositions. Empirical intuitions are the basis for justifying *a posteriori* proposition. Empirical intuitions are excluded a priori.

For equally obvious reasons, the *tertium* cannot be an *a priori* or a pure intuition, for as we have seen, a transcendental proposition is not an *a priori* mathematical theorem whose proof rests on axioms, which in turn rest on a priori intuitions (construction of concepts). They are principles (which first make experience possible).

Let us now take stock and consider what Kant says in the section entitled “On the supreme principle of all synthetic judgments” (*KrV*, A114/B193). Kant names three candidates for the conditions of “possible experience:”

If it is thus conceded that [in the case of synthetic *a priori* propositions] one must go beyond a given concept in order to compare it synthetically with another, a third thing is necessary in which alone the synthesis of two concepts can originate. But now, what is this third thing, as the medium of all synthetic judgments? There is only one totality in which all of our representations are contained, namely *inner sense* and its *a priori* form, time. *The synthesis of representations* rests on the imagination, but their synthetic unity (which is a requisite of the judgment) on *the unity of apperception*. (*KrV*, A155/B194, emphasis added)

When the synthetic proposition is *a posteriori*, the *tertium* becomes an empirical sensory intuition of an object. But when the synthetic proposition is *a priori* mathematical, the *tertium* takes the form of “pure intuition”. When, however, the synthetic proposition is *a priori* but transcendental, this *tertium* finally takes the enigmatic form of a “possible experience.” Kant calls this *the inner sense*, the *synthesis of the imagination*, and the *unity of apperception* (a possible experience). Nonetheless, instead of clarifying the expression “possible experience,” Kant’s list cries out for interpretation.

Let us now consider a third untenable reading. For those who think that the idea of an “*a priori* synthetic proposition” is an oxymoron, there is no *tertium*. The entire *Critique* is a complex conceptual analysis of the central concept of “possible experience”. Kant calls *the inner sense*, *the synthesis of the imagination*, and *the unity of apperception* only “partial concepts” (*Merkmale*) of the concept of possible experience. However, one may wonder why Kant speaks of an “*a priori* synthetic proposition” and not an analytic proposition. The usual answer is that Kant had a somewhat restrictive conception of analyticity, namely one whose negation reveals a self-contradiction or whose predicate concept is already contained in the subject concept (see Bennett, 1966). Suppose, however, that one can free oneself from Kant’s restrictive understanding of analyticity. In that case, it is easy to see that what he calls synthetic *a priori* are just highly complex analytic propositions. However, we need not waste our time refuting this possible reading of Kant’s transcendental proposition since it finds no textual support in Kant’s writings.

In the literature, there are different interpretations of the three conditions. I will discuss only the three most plausible interpretations. The first considers possible experience as “possible perception”, where “perception” is understood as conscious intuition. In this interpretation, the truth of the transcendental proposition rests on the fact that they allow

introspection of our mental states in the inner sense, the synthesis of the imagination, and the unity of perception. This reading is closely related to the idea of a transcendental argument that seeks to show that perception presupposes transcendental propositions. I will explain and reject this reading in the remainder of this section.

In his *Prolegomena*, Kant gives two exclusionary meanings for experience in the same paragraph: “When I claim that experience teaches us something, I am thinking only of the perception it contains. On the contrary, experience is produced by the attribution of an intellectual concept to perception” (*Prolegomena*, 4: 305). According to the first meaning, “experience” is nothing other than “perception,” namely, something essentially subjective, the consciousness of my sensory state. We find this to be the result of apprehension in the A-deduction. As a perception, experience requires only “running through [this manifold] and then taking it together” (*KrV*, A99).

The problem is how it is possible, by starting from perception as a subjective synthesis of apprehension, to justify transcendental objective propositions such as Newtonian mechanics (conservation of mass, inertia, and equality of action and reaction). The original gap between sensible intuition and transcendental propositions remains. Worse, the scholar faces the following dilemma: On the one hand, the more you side with “possible experience,” the more you make the synthetic proposition “quasi-analytic”. On the other hand, the less you side with “possible experience”, the more you widen the gap between “possible experience” and the transcendental propositions.

3. The mainstream reading

A third interpretation aligns with the mainstream viewpoint. This interpretation explains “possible experience” as the ability to create a representation of an object based on one’s sensory input. Essentially, our sensory perception initially presents us with a disorganized sensory experience. But by using a priori concepts of synthesis called categories, we can construct a clear representation of an object from this chaotic sensory variety. Transcendental propositions play a crucial role in making this possible. They involve the inner sense, the synthesis of the imagination, and the unity of perception. This interpretation is closely related to Strawson’s idea of a transcendental argument against the skepticism of sense data (Strawson, 1966). To assess this mainstream interpretation, examining these passages in §13 is essential:

Objects can indeed appear to us *without necessarily having to be related to functions of the understanding*. (*KrV*, A89/B122. Emphasis added)

Appearances would nonetheless offer objects to our intuition, *for intuition by no means requires the function of thinking*. (*KrV*, A90–1/B122–3. Emphasis added)

According to the prevailing reading, the term “possible experience” in Kant’s work refers to the ability to represent an object through the senses. Based on this interpretation, the quoted passage suggests that Kant is considering “skeptical scenarios”. These scenarios challenge the idea that objects can only be represented through categories. Kant’s deduction aims to refute this skeptical challenge by proving that objects can only appear through categories. Therefore, the skeptical hypotheses are flawed.

Following Strawson (1966) and Henrich (1969), Allison suggests that Kant entertains a radical skeptical scenario in A89/B122 and A90-1/B122-3 that is to be refuted at the end of the deduction (Allison, 2015, p. 54). His primary assumption is that our experience would be utterly disordered and haphazard without the categories. Allison believes that our understanding plays a vital role in synthesizing and organizing the sensory information our senses receive into coherent objects of perception. Understanding not only serves to comprehend what we represent by our senses, but it is also a creative force that structures the sensory input, resulting in our representations of objects.

Within the deduction, there are only a limited number of passages that, if misinterpreted, could imply the skeptical scenario proposed by Allison. One such passage is Kant’s assertion in *Critique* that inner perception is empirical and eternally variable (see *KrV*, A107). However, this statement does not imply that our self-knowledge derived from introspection is a disordered hodgepodge of sense impressions without apperception and categories. Nonetheless, the most misleading and misinterpreted passage is found in A-Deduction. There Kant claims that without a transcendental ground of unity, “a swarm of appearance” could fill up our souls, suggesting that without categories, our sense experience would be senseless (see *KrV*, A111).

Upon careful examination, Kant’s concept of a “swarm of appearances” is not synonymous with disordered, meaningless, manifest sensory experiences. To be sure, Kant assumes that a multitude of appearances can populate our consciousness, suggesting that objects can reveal themselves to our senses independently of experience or cognition. However, the mainstream mistakenly treats experience and cognition as mere representations of objects. Instead, experience and cognition should be understood as technical terms. They do not mean the representation of objects or the representation of objective particulars.

Instead, they involve recognizing that what we perceive nonconceptually through our senses has an objective existence.

4. The most plausible reading

The most compelling interpretation of Kant's statements in *KrV*, A89/B122 and *KrV*, A90-1/B122-3 suggests that he is considering a genuine possibility, not just a skeptical scenario. In this reading, it is plausible to argue that we can represent what objectively appears to us without using categories. The role of the transcendental propositions becomes clear in explaining the process by which we experience or have cognitive awareness that what we already represent through our senses objectively exists.

The alternative reading can be supported by examining its compatibility with the metaphysical interpretation of the statements in *KrV*, A89/B122 and *KrV*, A90-1/B122-3 and by addressing the putative gap that motivates the transcendental deduction (that underlies the mainstream reading). Under the assumption that we can objectively represent what appears to us without categories, there is no gap motivating the transcendental deduction. The reason is that through categories, we acquire cognition that what we represent through our senses already exists objectively. This aligns with the abovementioned statements and underscores the alternative interpretation's coherence. By accounting for the role of categories in enabling our cognitive awareness of the objective existence of our sensory representations, the alternative reading removes the false impression of the gap that putatively motivates the transcendental deduction and maintains coherence with the metaphysical interpretation of Kant's statements.

Kant's statement in *KrV*, B161, where he asserts that "the categories are conditions of the possibility of experience and are thus also valid a priori of all objects of experience", indicates that the categories play a crucial role in our ability to cognize or recognize the objective existence of what we have already represented through our senses. In this context, the categories, which can be understood as transcendental propositions, serve as the necessary conditions for our capacity to recognize the objective existence of objects. According to this interpretation, the categories are not required for the initial representation of objects but rather for the subsequent recognition or cognition of their objective existence. They provide the framework to understand and comprehend the objective reality already represented through our sensory experiences. Therefore, the alternative reading emphasizes that the categories function as conditions for our ability to experience and recognize the

existence of objects rather than as prerequisites for representing objects' existence objectively.

5. Our understanding as human beings

The epistemic grounding or justification for Kant's transcendental proposition regarding "possible experience" is rooted primarily in cognition (*Erkenntnis*). In particular, it relates to our cognitive awareness that what we represent as existing objectively in space and time exists objectively. This cognition serves as the basis for validating the transcendental proposition. Kant's transcendental propositions encompass several aspects, including the "Analogies of Experience" and the "Postulates of Empirical Thinking", to name a few. However, in exploring the meaning of "the possibility of experience", it is essential to go beyond the experience or cognition of what is represented as an object. It is insufficient to limit understanding to cognitive recognition.

Instead, there is an ontological (in the phenomenological sense of "ontological") or existential meaning that has been overlooked. This dimension extends the meaning of "the possibility of experience" beyond cognitive cognition. When we acknowledge this ontological meaning, we gain a fuller understanding of Kant's notion of the "possibility of experience" and its meaning within his transcendental framework.

In Kant's "Transcendental Doctrine of Method" and his books of Logic, he distinguishes between "given concepts" and "made concepts," highlighting that a priori given concepts cannot be defined (*KrV*, A728/B756). On the other hand, "made concepts" include a priori concepts of mathematics or Logic that are not acquired through experience (a posteriori intuitions), as well as concepts that refer to artifacts (*Sache der Kunst*) (*Refl*, 16: 581). The crucial feature of made concepts is that they can be defined either by an a priori intuition of their subject matter in the case of mathematics or by a functional analysis of their meaning in the case of artifacts. For instance, when considering the concept of a triangle, it can be defined as a polygon whose angles add up to 180 degrees. This definition provides a clear understanding of the nature of a triangle. Similarly, the concept of a shovel can be defined as an artifact created with the purpose of digging. This definition provides a functional analysis of the meaning of shovel meaning, elucidating its intended use. By contrasting given and created concepts, Kant emphasizes the distinction between concepts that cannot be defined and concepts that are constructed or associated with particular objects or functions, which provides clear definitions and analysis.

The concepts that are given a priori, such as the categories of understanding (e.g., “substance”, “causality”) and moral concepts (e.g., “right”, “equity”), cannot be defined in the same way as the made concepts. This is because of the lack of a functional analysis or a priori intuition of the relevant object. The given a priori concepts, including the categories of understanding, are not constructed or associated with specific objects or functions that allow them to be clearly defined. They are fundamental concepts that are universal and inherent. They are deeply ingrained in human understanding and have a timeless and universal validity. Kant argues that these concepts are given a priori because they are concepts that we have always understood in some way. They are not derived from experience but inherent in our cognitive structure. They provide the framework through which we make sense of the world and organize our experiences.

On the one hand, we can easily explain concepts created, such as “triangle” or “shovel”, by clear definitions. However, concepts given a priori, such as “substance”, present a different challenge. While everyone possesses these a priori concepts as part of human cognition, explaining them becomes more complex. It is an anthropological fact that not all humanity needs to understand concepts such as “triangle” or “shovel” because they refer to specific objects or functions that may not be universally relevant. In contrast, a priori concepts are deeply rooted in our cognitive framework and have universal validity. When explaining a priori concepts, Kant speaks of an “exposition”, a tentative explanation that the critic can accept to some degree while acknowledging possible limitations on its comprehensiveness. Herein lies the conundrum: Even if someone does not know a triangle, he can quickly grasp its meaning by a simple definition. However, a priori concepts like “substance”, “causality” are inherent in human cognition, and explaining them goes beyond any possible definition. Instead, we can give an explanation, a description, or an account of their meaning that can leave room for interpretation. In sum, the distinction between created concepts and concepts a priori clarifies that definitions can explain the former. At the same time, the latter, deeply ingrained in our cognitive structure, can only be conveyed through cautious expositions.

In summary, according to Kant, priori-given concepts play a fundamental role in shaping our understanding as human beings. While we can do without concepts such as “triangle” or “shovel”, concepts such as “substance”, “causality”, “right”, and “equity” are essential for our comprehension as human beings. This paper proposes an additional interpretation of “possible experience” that aligns with recognizing objects and encompasses

a broader meaning. It proposes that “possible experience” is indispensable for our understanding of ourselves as humans in an ontological-existential sense. This understanding is closely related to Husserl’s concept of “Lebenswelt” (1954/1976) and Heidegger’s notion of “menschlichen in-der-Welt-sein” (2001), which emphasizes human experience within the world.

But as we have seen in the Introduction, the meaning traces back to Kant’s key fourth question of *Metaphysics*: “Metaphysics answers the first question [What can I know?], morals the second [What I ought to do?], religion the third [What may I hope], and anthropology the fourth [*What is man?*]. *Fundamentally, however, we could reckon all of this as anthropology, because the first three questions relate to the last one*” (*Log*, 9: 25, emphasis added). The paper explores the profound role of priori-given concepts and argues for an expanded understanding of “possible experience” that encompasses our existential connection to the world as human beings.

In conclusion, our paper presents a core assertion regarding our alternative reading of Kant’s work. We propose that an a priori transcendental synthetic proposition, which relies on the world rather than conceptual relations, holds a crucial role in our understanding of ourselves as human beings. This proposition is a priori in that it is essential for our self-comprehension as humans, even though its truth depends on the world. Thus, our suggestion introduces a novel form of epistemic modality, emphasizing the indispensability of transcendental propositions for the possibility of self-conscious human experience and our overall self-understanding. By recognizing the significance of these propositions, we shed light on their profound impact on our existential relationship with the world.

Let us first consider Kant’s Transcendental Aesthetic. Kant argues that space and time are a priori nonconceptual representations that make possible every nonconceptual representation of anything that appears in space and time. Moreover, as everything in space is also in time, the representation (intuition) of time is not only pure or *a priori* but also transcendental. That said, the transcendental representation of time is an indispensable condition for understanding ourselves as beings that nonconceptually represents what appears to us as inhabitants of the spatiotemporal world.

The same reasoning applies to the Transcendental Deduction. Kant is supposed to prove that without the categories of understanding, no experience or cognition of objects would be possible. This means that transcendental propositions—which result from applying

categories to what appears to us—are an indispensable condition for us to understand ourselves as inhabitants of an objective world.

But Kant's refutation of idealism provides additional support. As we have seen, transcendental propositions are those whose truth is the condition for our ability to recognize what we represent with our senses as objects, that is, as something that exists objectively. In his refutation of idealism, Kant provides evidence that the empirically determined consciousness of *my existence* in time entails the consciousness of something that exists objectively in space as something persistent. Now, whether we consider Kant's refutation successful or not (that is beyond the scope of this paper), if the consciousness of something existing objectively in space is, according to all of Kant's accounts, a transcendental proposition—the First Analogy of Experience—that is an *a priori* proposition that enables us to be conscious of *our existence* as inhabitants of an objective, the spatiotemporal world of objects and events in causal interaction.

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