The ‘New Kant’ on the fundamental value of rational nature

Abstract

This article examines the ‘New Kant’ claims that the fundamental value of rational nature rather than morally worthy action is the source of human dignity. The ‘New Kant’ argues that all persons have a dignity that must be respected unconditionally in virtue of the capacity to set ends or act for a reason, regardless of whether they disrespect humanity in their own person. It is believed that the ends of human beings cannot be given but are adopted because they have the power to legislate and to set unconditioned ends for themselves through the principle of willing. This article evaluates three popular theses of the ‘New Kant’: first, that dignity and respect-worthiness are independent of morality; second, that the moral duty to respect people is, on the one hand, the reason why we must respect others because dignity is a normative concept, and on the other hand, incompatible with the demand to always act on moral principles because dignity is possessed prior to morality; and third, that there is a moral command to always respect others, but not oneself.