Abstract
The aim of this paper is to expound how Kant applied a more abstract cognitive structure to objects of experience. It is possible to observe, from an example in concreto, the application of the principles of pure understanding, developed and structured in the Critique of Pure Reason, to the objects of experience, in this case, the empirical propositions of Newtonian mechanics. Thus, we present the configuration of the Kantian arguments, sustaining that there is an explicit relationship between the principles of pure understanding, and the metaphysical principles of natural science, these developed in the work of the same name – Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science – and we show that this relationship takes place through an argumentative structure in which the general and abstract principles of the first Critique are premises for the applied metaphysical principles of the Metaphysical Foundations. We seek, therefore, to prove that the structure of the Kantian philosophy of science is given, mainly, through the two works mentioned above, and it is a theory that has as its main objective, philosophically substantiating Newtonian mechanics, in order to explain how an objectively valid knowledge of the phenomena of the world is possible.
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