Palavras-chave
Experiências autoconscientes
Autocompreensão
Como Citar
Dados de financiamento
Resumo
Kant nomeia suas proposições transcendentais como “princípios” em vez de “teoremas” matemáticos porque elas teriam a propriedade bastante peculiar de “tornar possível sua base de prova” (Beweisgrund), a saber, a experiência. Este artigo apresenta uma leitura original. É importante ressaltar que esta proposta não entra em conflito com leituras estabelecidas, uma vez que não aborda o foco central da primeira Crítica de Kant – examinar a possibilidade de cognição (Erkenntnis). A ênfase está no sentido antropológico contido na questão-chave de Kant: “O que é o homem?” A proposta sugere que a “experiência possível” pode ser entendida antropologicamente como a possibilidade de nos compreendermos como seres humanos. Nossa compreensão de nós mesmos dispensa conceitos feitos a priori, como os matemáticos e os formais. Em contraste, sem categorias (e, portanto, sem proposições transcendentais), não podemos compreender-nos como habitantes de um mundo de objetos e eventos persistentes que interagem causalmente no espaço e no tempo. De acordo com esta interpretação, uma “proposição sintética a priori”, na visão de Kant, é aquela cuja verdade depende do mundo, e não de relações conceituais. No entanto, é a priori num sentido bastante específico – é essencial para a nossa compreensão como seres humanos.
Referências
Allison, H. E. (2004). Kant’s transcendental idealism. An interpretation and defense. Yale University Press.
Allison, H. E. (2015). Kant’s Transcendental Deduction: An Analytical-Historical Commentary. OUP.
Bardon, A. (2005). Transcendental Arguments. Retrieved June 19, 2023, from http://www.iep.utm.edu/trans-ar
Bardon, A. (2006). The Aristotelian Prescription: Skepticism, Retortion, and Transcendental Arguments. International Philosophical Quarterly, 46(3), 263–276.
Bell, D. (1999). Transcendental arguments and non-naturalistic anti-realism. In R. Stern (Ed.), Transcendental Arguments: Problems and Prospects. Oxford University Press.
Bennett, J (1966). Kant’s Analytic. Cambridge. Cambridge University Press.
Brueckner, A. (1996). Modest Transcendental Arguments. Philosophical Perspectives, 10, 265–80.
Callanan, J. (2006). Kant’s transcendental strategy. The Philosophical Quarterly, 56, 360–381.
Callanan, J. (2011). Making sense of doubt: Strawson’s anti-scepticism. Theoria, 77, 261–78.
Caranti, L. (2017). Kant and the Scandal of Philosophy. University of Toronto Press.
Cassam, Q. (1999). Self-directed Transcendental Arguments. In R. Stern (Ed.), Transcendental Arguments: Problems and Prospects. Oxford University Press.
Chang, H. (2008). Contingent transcendental arguments for metaphysical principles. In M. Massimi (Ed.), Kant and philosophy of science. Cambridge University Press.
D’Oro, G. (2019). Between ontological hubris and epistemic humility: Collingwood, Kant and the role of transcendental arguments. British Journal for the History of Philosophy, 27, 336–357.
Dicker, G. (2008). Kant’s Refutation of Idealism. Noûs, 42(1), 80–108.
Finnis, J. (2011). Scepticism’s self-refutation. In J. Finnis, Reason in action: collected essays (Vol. 1). Oxford University Press.
Franks, P. (2005). Transcendental arguments, reason, and scepticism: contemporary debates and the origins of post-Kantianism. In R. Stern (Ed.), Transcendental arguments: problems and prospects. Oxford University Press.
Giladi, P. (2016). New directions for transcendental claims. Grazer philosophische Studien, 93, 212–231.
Glock, H. J. (2003). Strawson and analytic Kantianism. In H-J. Glock (Ed.), Strawson and Kant. Oxford University Press.
Grundmann, T., & Misselhorn, C. (2003). Transcendental arguments and realism. In H–J. Glock (Ed.), Strawson and Kant. Oxford University Press.
Houlgate, S. (2015). Is Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit an essay in transcendental argument? In S. Gardner and M. Grist (Eds.), The Transcendental Turn. Oxford University Press.
Henrich, D. (1969). The proof-structure of Kant’s transcendental deduction. Review of metaphysics, 22(4), 640–659.
Heidegger, M. (2001) Sein und Zeit. Max Niemeyer Verlag.
Husserl, E. (1976). Die Krisis der europäischen Wissenschaften und die transzendentale Phänomenologie. Eine Einleitung in die phänomenologische Philosophie. In E. Husserl, Husserliana: Edmund Husserl, Gesammelte Werke (W. Biemel, Hrsg.; Band 6, pp. S. 314–348). (Originalwerk veröffentlicht 1954)
Kant, I. (as usual, citations are taken from the Prussian Academy of Berlin: Gesammelte Schriften, herausgegeben von der Königlich Preussischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, 29 vols. (Berlin: 1902–1983; 2nd ed., Berlin: De Gruyter, 1968, for vols. I–IX). They are indicated as follows: abbreviation of the work’s title, followed by volume and page. For the Critique of Pure Reason, the references are shortened, in keeping with current practice, to the pagination of the original edition, indicated by A for the 1781 edition and B for the 1787 edition. , while the Critique of Pure Reason (KrV) is from the First Edition A and the Second Edition B, Felix Meiner Hamburg, 1956).
Kant, I. (1977). Prolegomena zu einer jeden künftigen Metaphysik, die als Wissenschaft wird auftreten können [Prolegomena to any Future Metaphysics] (J. Ellington, Trans.). Hackett.
Kant, I. (1992). Jäsche Logik [Jäsche Logic]. In I. Kant, Lectures on Logic (J. M. Young, Ed. and Trans.; pp. 521–640). Cambridge University Press.
Kant, I. (1998). Kritik der reinen Vernunft (KrV) [Critique of Pure Reason] (P. Guyer and Allen W. Wood, Ed. and Trans.).
Kant, I. (2005). Notes and Fragments (C. Bowman, P. Guyer, and F. Rauscher, Trans.). Cambridge University Press.
Lockie, R. (2018). Free will and epistemology: A defence of the transcendental argument for freedom. Bloomsbury.
McDowell, J. (2006). The disjunctive conception of experience as material for a transcendental argument. Teorema, 25, 19–33 (Reprinted in The engaged intellect: Philosophical essays, pp. 225–242, 2009, Harvard University Press).
Mizrahi, M. (2017). Transcendental arguments, conceivability, and global vs local skepticism. Philosophia, 45, 735–749.
Peacocke, C. (1989). Transcendental arguments in the theory of content. Oxford University Press.
Rähme, B. (2017). Transcendental arguments, epistemically constrained truth, and moral discourse. In G. Gava & R. Stern (Eds.), Pragmatism, Kant, and transcendental philosophy. Abingdon: Routledge.
Rockmore, T., & Breazeale, D. (Eds.). (2014). Fichte and transcendental philosophy. Palgrave Macmillan.
Russell, M., & Reynolds, J. (2011). Transcendental arguments about other minds and intersubjectivity. Philosophy Compass, 6, 300–311.
Stern, R. (Ed.). (1999). Transcendental Arguments: Problems and Prospects. Oxford University Press.
Stern, R. (2007). Transcendental Arguments: A Plea for Modesty. Grazer Philosophische Studien, 47, 143–161 (Reprinted in Philosophical knowledge: Its possibility and scope, by C. Beyer & A. Burri, Eds., Rodopi).
Strawson, P. F. (1959). Individuals: An Essay in Descriptive Metaphysics. Methuen.
Strawson, P. F. (1966). The bounds of sense. Methuen.
Stroud, B. (1968). Transcendental Arguments. Journal of Philosophy, 65, 241–56.
Stroud, B. (1999). The Goal of Transcendental Arguments. In R. Stern (Ed.), Transcendental Arguments: Problems and Prospects (pp. 155–172). Oxford University Press.
Vahid, H. (2011). Skepticism and varieties of transcendental argument. Logos and Episteme, 2, 395–411.
Wang, J. (2012). Radical skepticism, how-possible questions, and modest transcendental arguments. International Journal of Philosophical Studies, 25, 210–226.
Westphal, K. (2004). Epistemic Reflection and Transcendental Proof. In Hans-Johann Glock (Ed.), Strawson and Kant. Oxford University Press.
Este trabalho está licenciado sob uma licença Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License.
Copyright (c) 2023 Roberto Horácio de Sá Pereira
Downloads
