Abstract
A neo-Kantian debate within analytic philosophy, in our reading, would evaluate the
value of the following question: how the codification of the elements of a representation (in
Kant: concepts and intuitions) creates spaces of identification to theorize the possibilities of
truth, in two fields, the analytical and in the synthetic? In the analytic, the theory involves the
ability to conceptually interpret relations of possibility and impossibility; in the synthetic, the
theory involves the extra-conceptual supplementation of the alignment with the verifiers,
providing a measure to encode the semantic contribution of both experience simpliciter and
experience with concepts, made by schemas, analogical systems, etc. We suggest revitalizing
the theory of a priori syntheses, dialoguing with Kantian aspects of Husserl’s Sixth
Investigation and confronting the orthodox semantics of empiricist inspiration (Carnap).
Although, in large part, a theory of judgments is equivalent to a dynamic production of models,
simplifications and analogies, the focus on the production of synthetic and a priori judgments
presents some independent problems, which, in our reading, would enrich the universe of
analytic philosophy and would facilitate the reading of the development of the pragmatic shift
phase, which took place in the second half of the 20th century.
Keywords: synthesis a priori; semantics; pragmatism.
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