A liberdade no "Cânon da Razão Pura": uma interpretação alternativa

Abstract

It is often argued that while Kant grounds practical freedom in the idea of transcendental or absolute freedom in the Dialectic of the First Critique, he would have explicitly dissociated these concepts in the Canon. For, in contradiction with the Dialectic, Kant claims in the Canon that through experience we know practical freedom to be one of the natural causes and that the transcendental freedom could be left aside as irrelevant. These claims are usually interpreted in the light of the socalled “patchwork theory” as evidence of an inconsistency between the two sections of the First Critique and of a defense of a mere comparative, compatibilistic or even psychological concept of freedom by Kant in the Canon. In contradistinction to this widespread interpretation, I intend to provide an alternative interpretation of the Canon by showing that the concept of practical freedom contained in it is a genuinely incompatibilistic one and that this section can be reconciled with the Dialectic. Moreover, I intend to show that Henry Allison’s allegedly alternative interpretation is entirely misguided.