

ON THE COMPOSITION OF WORDS, NOMINATION AND CHANGE OF MEANING: ROZWADOWSKI'S LAW OF LANGUAGE

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RESUMO: Este artigo apresenta uma análise da obra do lingüista Jan Michal Rozwadowski, considerado o iniciador dos estudos em Lingüística na Polônia. Examinando a crítica que Rozwadowski faz a Wundt, a autora assinala a sua vontade de simplificação do modelo de Wundt, relacionada a valores da Lingüística contemporânea de Rozwadowski, e, por outro lado, chama a atenção para a atualidade de algumas de suas formulações.

ABSTRACT: This paper presents an analysis of the work of linguist Jan Michal Rozwadowski, considered the starter of the studies in Linguistics in Poland. Examining the critique that Rozwadowski makes on Wundt, the author points out his will of simplification of Wundt's model, related to values of the Linguistics contemporary to Rozwadowski and, on the other hand, calls attention to the up-to-date character of some of his pronouncements.

1. Introduction

Jan Michał Rozwadowski (1867–1935), who is generally considered to have laid the foundations for the study of linguistics (as opposed to philology) in Poland, studied classics at Cracow and comparative linguistics at Leipzig. His subsequent scholarly activities were divided between the University of Cracow¹ and the Polish Academy of Science. His main areas of interest were Polish, Indo-European and general linguistics. In the course of his career he proposed three general laws of language: the law of binary composition of linguistic units (1903), the quantitative law (1909), and the law of disautomation (1922). It is the first of these which is the topic of the present paper.

2. The law

The law of binarity is known from two works of around 100 pages each (Rozwadowski 1903 and 1904). The former, published in Polish,² is first and foremost a detailed critique of the chapter on meaning change in Wundt's *Die Sprache*. The latter, originally published in German, also takes Wundt as its point of departure, but is, in essence, a presentation of Rozwadowski's own views. It is this latter essay that is normally referred to in (Polish) linguistic historiography;³ in the following, I shall draw on both.

To start with, Rozwadowski (1903: 6) praises Wundt (1900) as the single most important work devoted to the budding discipline of semasiology, surpassing both Paul (1880) and Bréal (1897). In the same breath, he adds that Wundt's position needs to be modified in important respects. After all, Rozwadowski says, Wundt is a psychologist, not an expert in Indo-European linguistics, and thus may be excused for not being fully up to date with the latest findings of the discipline.

Several things seem to be wrong with Wundt's analysis of the process of naming, including the superfluous distinction between primary and secondary nomination, or the lack of a proper distinction between the beginnings of human language on the one hand and the construct known as Proto-Indo-European on the other. But the most important problem is the very core of Wundt's theory, which relies on the postulated fundamental properties of apperception, viz. its unity and narrowness. The unity of apperception guarantees that the contents of consciousness apperceived at any given moment are uniform, i.e. form one and only one representation. Due to the narrowness of apperception, we only apperceive clearly a certain portion of the elements of a representation. In other words, while the whole of every new phenomenon is grasped at once, attention is always focused on a single attribute of the phenomenon in question. Consequently, the name of an object is the result of one strictly limited component part of the representation – called the dominant feature – i.e. that part which at the moment of apperception stands in the focus of attention:

Jede Benennung von Gegenständen, mag sie eine primäre oder eine sekundäre sein, pflegt nun nach *einem einzelnen Merkmal*⁴ zu geschehen. (Wundt 1904[1900]: 494)

To the dominant feature (') corresponds a phonetic representation (*n*), which merges into one whole with it. All the other component parts of the representation, both constant (*A*) and variable (*X*), are apperceived less clearly. The resulting complex is summarised in the formula *n' (A.X)*. Once created, the name (*n*) becomes the relatively most stable part of the intricate psychological complex which is apperceived each

time the name is uttered. Due to the ever-changing conditions of apperception, the dominant feature (\prime), which originally belonged to either A or X , may, and usually does, retreat among the less distinct components, so that all that remains is the constant association between n and the fluctuating (A, X).

According to Rozwadowski, in formulating this essentially psychological theory, Wundt completely disregards language; in particular, he forgets about the existence of the formative element of words. The vast majority of names of objects in Indo-European are composed of a root plus formative element (suffix); those nouns which do not at present have a suffix will usually have had one at some earlier stage. This would suggest that not one, but two features are always involved in nomination:

Sprachliche Tatsachen belehren uns nämlich ganz deutlich da² bei einer Benennung *nicht nur das dominierende Merkmal sondern noch etwas anderes* zum Ausdruck kommt. Denn das erstere ist ja doch nur in dem *Grundelement* des Wortes enthalten, und das Wort hat noch ein sogenanntes *formatives Element*. (...) Besteht also eine Benennung aus zwei deutlich unterscheidbaren (...) Wortbestandteilen, so mu² diesem formalsprachlichen Verhältnis ein analoges sinnsprachliches, das hei²t psychisches, entsprechen. (Rozwadowski 1904: 5)

Rozwadowski calls the two features, respectively, the differentiating (corresponding to Wundt's dominant) and the identifying one, and illustrates his argument with an example from Polish. The word *pstrg* "trout" falls into two parts: *pstr-* "multicoloured", which is an exponent of the dominant feature, and *-g*, an exponent of the grammatical category (noun). At the time the name was first created the second element must have had a concrete meaning (something like "fish", "animal", or the like). The name is thus binary or bipartite: both the object and its dominant feature are brought out in the process of naming. Consequently, the following formula is proposed (Rozwadowski 1903: 39):

$$(n + P) (\prime + A),$$

where, as in Wundt, \prime is the dominant feature and n is its linguistic exponent, but A here stands for the whole concept (without distinguishing between constant and variable components), P is the linguistic exponent of A , and $+$ marks the divisions between components.

While the immediate stimulus for the above conceptualisation comes from strictly linguistic considerations, in particular from (Indo-European) word-formational morphology (including the assumption that suffixes were originally independent words, i.e. that each IE name of an object was originally a *compositum*), Rozwadowski also attempts an argument from

psychology. Apperception, he notes, consists in relating what is new to what is already known:

Jede neu apperzipierte Vorstellung wird eben dadurch, da² sie auf eine frühere oder eine Reihe früherer bezogen wird, gegliedert, und zwar ist es Zweigliedrigkeit, die wir auch von diesem Gesichtspunkt aus konstatieren. Das eine glied nennen wir das identifizierende, das andere das unterscheidende.

Nun fragt es sich, welches Glied bei diesen Vorgängen dominiert, d.h. zuerts in den Blickpunkt der Aufmerksamkeit tritt. Selbstverständlich das identifizierende; denn sonst könnte ja eine solche beziehende Apperzeption gar nicht stattfinden. (Rozwadowski 1904: 27f.)

A name consisting from the outset of a single element would only be possible if the phenomenon named were entirely new, i.e. if it lacked any property one could hang on to as an identifying feature; this is hardly ever the case (Rozwadowski 1904: 37).

Although most of the time the talk is about names of objects (nouns), the binarity claim is said to be equally valid for names of properties and states – take, e.g., adjectives such as Pol. *niebieski* “blue” from *niebo* “sky”, or verbs such as Pol. *nocowa* “spend the night” from *noc* “night” (Rozwadowski 1903: 42f.).

The binarity hypothesis states further that the more complex a unit, the more levels of binarity there are, so that, e.g., a word with a case ending is doubly binary, consisting as it does of an ending attached to a stem which is itself composed of two parts. Rozwadowski insists that his hypothesis is not invalidated by the existence of words which are not easily divisible into the two parts corresponding to the two aspects of psychological apperception. Two factors supposedly account for all such cases: either the binary composition of a given word has been obscured in the course of its history, or the word is analogical in origin. Naturally, the rise of analogical formations is also based on the principle of binary composition: such formations would not be possible were it not for the prior existence of words in which formatives originate in the way sketched above, i.e. as fully motivated members of binary constructions.

This much is assumed to be valid for all of Indo-European; details vary from language to language. In Polish, it is typically the root which is the linguistic expression of the differentiating feature, while in German it is the first part of a compound. The difference is superficial, since the second part of a compound and the suffix are merely two different manifestations – or developmental stages – of the same thing. This does

not mean that each suffixed word must once have been a compound: a certain number of compounds whose second elements have lost their primary meanings provide the basis for the ‘suffixal type’, making it possible for new words to arise analogically, as mentioned above. Suffixes themselves may arise in a secondary way, as did, for example, the *-rei* in words like *Schweineri* “dirty trick”. Such words were formed on the pattern of *Schreiberei*, which was reinterpreted as having the suffix *-rei*, whereas in fact it derives from *Schreiber* (Rozwadowski 1904: 11).

A true, unitary word comes into being when the order: identifying element + differentiating element is reversed, as when the German *Wasser zum Trinken* changes into *Trinkwasser*, or the Polish *góra lodowa* “iceberg” (literally: “mountain_N + ice_{Adj}”) becomes *lodowiec*. What this means in psychological terms is that at first our attention focuses on that part of any group which is to be more precisely defined, before moving on to the defining part itself. The fact that in a compound we find the order: differentiating feature + identifying feature, means that by that stage the psychological counterparts of the two linguistic elements must have come closer together, merging into one concept. Nonetheless, given the properties of compounds, both features of the phenomenon named must still be apperceived equally clearly: linguistically, the first element is only dominant in the sense of being initial and strongly accented (cf. *Trinkwasser*). At the next stage, i.e. at the stage corresponding to a simplex (root + suffix), the second element – insofar as it can be thought of as a separate element at all – is no longer apperceived in its original, concrete meaning, but merely as an exponent of a relation or kind; in other words, it is *perceived*, rather than *apperceived*⁵ (Rozwadowski 1904: 10).

Barring analogical formations of the type mentioned above, a seemingly one-element form usually derives from a simplex, which usually goes back to a compound, which, in turn, is usually the outcome of a phrase. The reverse does not hold, since the development may be arrested – for an indefinite time – at any of the stages. The one-element stage may also arise directly from a compound or phrase whose other element disappears, causing a *compression of meaning* (*Verdichtung*). The element that disappears is usually the one corresponding to the identifying feature (e.g. *daily paper* > *daily*); occasionally, it is the element expressing the differentiating feature, as in Ger. *Schreibfeder* > *Feder*, or Pol. *pióro do pisania* (literally: “feather for writing”) > *pióro* (“pen”).

As I have argued elsewhere (Adamska-Salaciak 1993), Rozwadowski’s law is hardly that – rather, like most so-called laws of language, it is a mere tendency statement. All the same, it has interesting implications for viewing the relation between nomination and change of meaning, as well as the very nature of the latter. These issues are examined in the following section.

3. Change of meaning

For Rozwadowski, like for Wundt, the basis for all meaning change is psychological. To say that the meaning of a word has changed is tantamount to saying that a change has occurred in the mental representation associated with the phonetic sequence making up the word. That is, the general reason for meaning change is the changeability of representations:

Hierbei ist noch wohl zu beachten, da² die Vorstellungen im allgemeinen flie²ende Gebilde sind, indem ihre Elemente durch die verschiedensten Assoziationen ununterbrochenen Verschiebungen ausgesetzt sind. Da nun (...) die Aufmerksamkeit bald auf jene, bald auf andere Bestandteile der Vorstellung sich richtet, bzw. sich richten kann, so können selbst die konstantesten Merkmale in dem Wechsel der Apperzeption gegen andere, die sich nur vorübergehend aus der ganzen Verbindung erheben, zurücktreten. Darauf beruht die Tatsache, da² der Gegenstand oft nach einem variablen, unwesentlichen merkmal und in verschiedenen Zeiten und Orten nach verschieden merkmalen benennt wird. (Rozwadowski 1904: 4)

Given enough time, the originally dominating feature of the mental representation will, more often than not, give way to some other feature(s); what remains constant is the association of the sound image with the concept as a whole.⁶

The validity of almost everything else Wundt says about meaning change is seriously questioned. Most importantly, Wundt neither explicitly equates *Benennung* and *Bedeutungswandel* nor makes a clear distinction between the two. For instance, while he frequently gives the same examples in the chapter on nomination and then again in the chapter on meaning change, he never discusses the reasons behind this practice. On the rare occasions when he does attempt to make a distinction, there is no real basis for it; witness developments such as Eng. *copper* (β *aes cyprium*), Lat. *moneta* (β *Juno Moneta*) or Ger. *Berlinerblau*, which he treats as instances of naming (due to a singular association of an object with its place of origin), as opposed to developments such as Ger. *Elektrizität* (β Lat. *electrum*, Gr. Ⓜμ^oÁÁ¿½) or Ger. *Brille* (β *Beryll*), which are for him instances of singular transfer of meaning (due to association of a phenomenon with the object that exhibits it).

Rozwadowski states emphatically that semantic change is essentially parallel to nomination. His model of the way words come into being is at the same time a model of the way word meanings change:

(...) each apperceived representation linked at a given moment with a word as its exponent (while speaking or, in the reverse order, while listening) is at that moment ‘named’ and at the very same moment, unless the apperception refers to the same object, a ‘change of meaning’, albeit incipient, takes place. Thus, the notions of nomination and meaning change are, from the point of view of the relation of the word to the apperceived representation, identical. (Rozwadowski 1903: 47)

Partly as a result of not recognising the essential unity of naming and change of meaning, Wundt proposes a number of redundant distinctions, multiplying the types of meaning change. Among such unnecessary distinctions is the one between regular and singular change of meaning, supposedly exemplified by the development of Lat. *pecunia* as opposed to that of Lat. *moneta*. Wundt’s *regulärer Bedeutungswandel* involves a splitting of meaning; it is gradual, necessary and involuntary; he dubs it “history of the concept”. Wundt’s *singulärer Bedeutungswandel* is a one-off transfer of meaning, without the old meaning disappearing; it is sudden, voluntary and conscious; he calls it “history of the word”. For Rozwadowski, the alleged distinction is merely a matter of degree. Both *pecunia* and *moneta* acquired their meanings due to special external conditions, which in the case of *moneta* were more restricted locally, but not categorically different.

Wundt’s regular meaning changes fall into: assimilative, complicative and those due to the influence of emotions. Within the assimilative category, there are two further subtypes, depending on whether what actually changes is the dominant representation or the remaining part of the concept. For Rozwadowski (1903: 48), Wundt’s “assimilative change with a stable dominant feature” (exemplified by the rise of forms such as *Fu² eines Tisches/Berges* etc) is nothing but an early stage in the creation of a concept, while Wundt’s nomination (*Benennung*) represents the stage of an independently constituted concept. Apart from these two, one should distinguish an embryo stage. When we call the leg of a table a *leg* (due to the association of features with a human/animal leg), and the table referred to happens to be perceived at the moment of utterance, we can say *leg* alone (*the leg is broken*, etc); this is the embryo stage of the creation of the concept “leg of a table”. Polish is still at this stage, while in German, next to the embryo stage, we also have the transitional stage (*Bein*, but also *Tischbein*, *Stuhlbein*). The stage of an independently constituted concept can be exemplified by the German and Polish words for “thimble”, respectively, *Fingerhut* (*Finger* “finger” + *Hut* “hat”) and *naparstek* (*na* **prst* = “on finger” + *ek*, a formative suffix).

In a different scenario, a two-element name is used frequently in the same kind of situation, until finally one of the elements is dropped and the

remaining one takes on its function. Thus, e.g., Pol. *kraj* “country” developed from the meaning “edge, border” (Lat. “fines”) through being repeatedly used in such combinations as *kraj ziemi* “edge of the land” or *kraj polski/niemiecki etc* “Polish/German etc border”. Wundt discusses similar cases separately, treating them as instances of *Verdichtung*. This is unnecessary, since they do not form a distinct category, but are merely extreme manifestations of assimilative meaning change (or assimilative nomination).

Offering his own model as an alternative to Wundt’s, Rozwadowski characterizes its psychological basis as follows:

The apperception of a new representation on the basis of common dominant features, immediate as well as reproduced, is inextricably, necessarily connected with apperceiving also immediate or reproduced features which are not common.

Depending on the latter’s [degree of] dominance, their number and quality (...), on whether they are apperceived simultaneously or successively, the segmentation of the representation into those two component parts, common and not common, takes place to different degrees and in different phases, and is manifested externally through different degrees and phases of the two-part makeup of a name. The end points, which may be either the result of development from intermediate stages or the result of the immediate type of apperception, are characterized exclusively by names which consist of a) two elements, b) one element.

The newly apperceived concept, through its dominant features, either appears as roughly *identical* with the older one, and then it is named with the same word that expresses that older representation, or it appears as *non-identical* and then, next to the word expressing the older representation, there comes a word expressing the *different* dominant feature. These are the end points. (Rozwadowski 1903: 51f.)

(...) all changes of word meaning consist in the fundamental fact that the use of a word as an exponent of the apperceived representation is always the result of the segmentation of that representation against the collective representation (sentence) of which it is a part; the segmentation may be described as a successive coming to the fore of consciousness of features: at first, features shared with an earlier representation, then features which are different.

Two different scenarios are possible here: either the representation, by virtue of a common dominant feature, is apperceived as mostly identical with an earlier representation and is named with the word signifying that

earlier representation, and the differentiating feature is not articulated (...) – this is thus predominantly identifying, synthetic segmentation, or dependent, relative binarity; or the representation, by virtue of its different dominant feature, is apperceived as non-identical with the earlier one, is understood after a prior identification based on a common feature, and then next to the word signifying that earlier representation we name also the new dominant feature peculiar to it. This is predominantly differentiating, analytic segmentation; it is independent binarity; the concept is isolated completely and at once. E.g. *kraj*, *Korn*, but *pstrg*, *Fingerhut*. (...) there are also intermediate cases of different degrees: on one occasion I say *pióro*, *Feder*, on another – *pióro do pisania*, *Schreibfeder*, apperceiving the same object on both occasions, but differently, depending on the temporary dominance of the new, non-identical dominant feature. (Rozwadowski 1903: 71)

The weakness of Wundt's approach becomes evident when, despite trying hard, he is unable to show either the identity of the semantic changes in the German words *Feder* and *Korn* (both treated as assimilative changes, with a change of the dominant feature under the influence of association) or the differences between them. The reason the attempt is bound to fail is that the very distinction between changes with a stable dominant feature versus those with a changing dominant feature is spurious:

(...) dominant features fluctuate, they keep changing all the time, there can be no talk of constancy here, except very broadly, so that we can in no way draw an absolute boundary between "remaining unchanged" and "changing". All these divisions and distinctions follow from the fact that Wundt falsely perceives the phenomenon of apperception and the related naming of representations. What he fails to see is the fact that sometimes it is the common features that dominate, sometimes the different ones. (Rozwadowski 1903: 53)

Accordingly, in the development of *Feder* the change of the dominant feature, or the change of the whole representation in apperception, reflects a real change in the object. The important thing, anyway, is that it is impossible to draw even an approximate distinction between constant and changeable dominant features. The meaning changes observable in the development of *Korn* ("cereal grain" > "grain in general" > "cereal crops in general", or "dominant cereal crop in the region") are not only different from, but in fact opposite to, the meaning changes of *Feder*. For a person repeatedly apperceiving (what is called) *Korn* as first and foremost containing alimentary grain, the old and the new concept must have been

roughly identical because of the identity of the dominant feature (“cereal grain”), while those features which differed were so marginal that they were never given separate linguistic expression (cf. *Schreibfeder*).

Another flaw of Wundt’s model of meaning change is the unsuccessful attempt to distinguish between purely associative influences and the external influences and conditions of apperception. This is clearly visible in his treatment of *Verdichtung*. For Wundt, there are two types of compression of meaning:

a) due to external, syntactic associations (e.g. Fr. *université* β Lat. *universitas litterarum*; Fr. *capitale* β *ville capitale*)

b) due to internal associations of a notion with its frequent use (e.g. Ger. *Gift* “poison” β “gift”; Fr. *poison* β Lat. *potio* “drink”).

The only reason for this distinction, claims Rozwadowski (1903: 58) is Wundt’s failure to acknowledge the binary character of apperception. What we have here is that in a) the two-element stage is preserved, while in b) it is not. This is a very superficial difference. At one time, Ger. *Gift* used to mean “medicine/dose given” (cf. Pol. *dawka*), so from the psychological point of view it did consist of two elements, just like Fr. *ville capitale*, *bonne domestique* or the like.

Insistence on distinguishing sharply between purely linguistic versus non-linguistic conditions of change leads to proposing inadequate explanations of individual changes. It is thus naïve of Wundt to explain the change of Lat. *adripare* “come ashore” > Fr. *arriver* “arrive” as due to the fact that former inhabitants of coastal regions moved inland while continuing to use the same word. Rozwadowski (1903: 56) is convinced that the change in question could have taken place without anyone having to move anywhere. It was enough that, for people returning from a journey (by whatever means of transport), the psychological representation of that activity was dominated by the pleasant feeling which also accompanies the moment when a boat reaches the shore (a feeling which, living on the coast, they must have experienced frequently). In fact, in most cases of semantic change we have to do with *both* changes in the external conditions *and* associative (syntactic) changes.

Additionally, in Wundt’s scheme of things, emotional factors give rise to yet another distinct class of meaning changes, exemplified by Ger. *elend* “miserable” (originally: “strange, exile”), Fr. *chétif* “puny, stunted” (β Lat. *captivus*), or Fr. *piètre* “poor, miserable” (β Lat. *pedestris*). Singling these out as a separate category is as unnecessary, in Rozwadowski’s opinion, as drawing a sharp line between changes with a constant vs. those with a changing dominant feature. The allegedly emotion-dominated changes can also be shown to be affected by associations. The words in question did not have the relevant emotional overtones from the start, but acquired

them over time. In the case of *piètre*, for example, we can imagine a situation where a wandering beggar arrives at the door, upon which someone remarks: *Some piètre is here*. The emotional element would at first have been contained in the intonation, in the facial expression or in the contemptuous wave of the hand; only later would it come to be associated with the word as such. The change is thus not due to emotion inherent in the word: that emotion is only generated through the association created by the repeated use of the word in a certain context.

Within the category of complicative change Wundt distinguished processes due to primary versus secondary complications, another distinction Rozwadowski claims cannot be upheld, as there is no principled difference in the respective developments of, say, Ger. *überlegen*, *erwägen* or Fr. *penser* (Wundt's *Übertragung der Bezeichnungen äü²erer Gegenstände oder Zustände auf Empfindungen*) as opposed to those of *begreifen*, *vorstellen*, *verstehen* (Wundt's *Bezeichnungen der Gemütszustände*).

Finally, metaphors (like Fr. *les lunettes* lit. "small moons" ß Lat. *luna*, or Ger. *Kelch*, *Kröne*, *Kätzchen* as names of parts of a flower) should not be classified as singular changes of meaning, not just because the status of the category itself (i.e. *singulärer Bedeutungswandel*) is doubtful, but because most metaphors are common, everyday phenomena, not rare, singular developments. For us, Rozwadowski (1903: 68) argues by way of illustration, the concepts of hair and leaves are separate ones, so that when a poet talks of a *green-haired palm tree* we call it a metaphor. But for our remote ancestors this might have been no different than our calling the leg of a table a *leg*. In other words, metaphor is a purely developmental notion. The only truly singular change of meaning is uninteresting from the point of view of linguistics, because it involves creations (such as, e.g., the term *gas*) which have arisen by conscious reflection.

4. Comments and reflections

As I hope to have shown, Rozwadowski's modifications go in the direction of making Wundt's (1900) proposals more coherent and, in effect, simpler, through linking related phenomena, doing away with unnecessary distinctions, and reducing the multitude of categories. While he was not the only author to have criticized Wundt's excessively complicated classification of semantic changes⁷, his effort was exceptional in that he attempted to make Wundt's model work, rather than simply rejecting it.

The view of change which emerges from the two papers (Rozwadowski 1903 and 1904) seems to be founded on a firm belief in the unity of linguistic synchrony and diachrony. As repeatedly noted,

nomination and change of meaning are viewed as stages of the same process: in both cases a new meaning develops, the main difference being that in the latter instance the form of the word may remain unchanged.⁸ Rozwadowski sums it up as follows:

Wir haben gesehen,

1) da² die grammatischen Termini: Wurzelnomen, suffixales Simplex, Kompositum, Wortgruppe (bzw. syntaktische Gruppe) nur verschiedene Entwicklungsphasen eines und desselben Grundprozesses bezeichnen, der in Wechselwirkung der binär analytischen und einheitlich synthetischen Apperzeptionsfunktion besteht;

2) da² eine feste, einfach vorliegende Bedeutung, die wir nicht zurückverfolgen können, ferner die Benennung (Namengebung), Verdichtung der Bedeutung und Bedeutungswandel ebenfalls nur verschiedene Phasen desselben Prozesses bezeichnen, der auf Gliederung und Zusammenfassung der Begriffe beruht (...) (Rozwadowski 1904: 50)

Some of Rozwadowski's pronouncements – such as, e.g., the claim that metaphors are mostly common, everyday phenomena – appear to be consonant with those of today's cognitive linguistics, with its emphasis on the ubiquity of metaphor, fuzziness of category boundaries, the role of perceptual salience and the like. These, arguably, merit separate treatment.

All this notwithstanding, it is still true that Rozwadowski did not go far enough in his critique of Wundt. Despite recognizing the role of language use in context as an important factor in change, he basically continued to view changes in meaning in the typical nineteenth-century way, i.e. as resulting from changes in mental representations. As Nerlich (1992: 79ff) has shown so convincingly, views like that no longer held much interest for students of semantic change at the beginning of the twentieth century.

Notas

¹ Where, for a time, one of his colleagues was Jan Baudouin de Courtenay. For more information see Adamska-Salaciak (1996) and (1998); for a general characterization of Polish linguistics of the period see Wsik (2001).

² In what follows, all translations from Polish are mine.

³ The only German reaction that I am aware of is the review by Dittrich (1906).

⁴ All emphasis in quotations is original.

⁵ For Rozwadowski, "to apperceive" is "to perceive with understanding".

⁶ This, incidentally, is a belief espoused not only by Wundt and Rozwadowski. An identical scenario was presented in Chapter X of Kruszewski's *O erk nauki o jazyke* (1883; for the English version, see Kruszewski 1995); there are also remarkably similar passages in Bréal (e.g. 1897: 129).

⁷ Delbrück's (1901: 170ff) famous critique may be mentioned as a case in point.

⁸ Thus, we might say that in the latter case one is dealing with *semasiological* change, in the former with both *semasiological* and *onomasiological* change.

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