MOTIVATING MODERATE CONTEXTUALISM*

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Abstract: Cappelen and Lepore argue that moderate contextualism is not a stable position for the arguments that support it put it on a slippery slope to radical contextualism. My aim is to stabilize moderate contextualism (or at least a version of it) by providing an account of the sorts of arguments it should rely on. These differ from standard contextualist arguments in that they rely on speakers’ intuitions about the truth-value of uttered sentences, and not about what such utterances say. Given certain conditions of systematicity, clarity and how widespread these intuitions are, I claim we have good evidence for determining whether an expression

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is context sensitive. Although this method does render quantifier expressions and ‘to rain’ context sensitive, it does not do so with ‘red’. We thus obtain prima facie motivation for moderate contextualism that does not lead to radical contextualism. However, the methodology does not distinguish contextualism from relativism. I thus run through different reasons for introducing elements into contexts of use and elements into circumstances of evaluation.

**Keywords:** Semantic content. What is said. Quantifier expressions. Minimalism. Relativism.

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**MOTIVANDO O CONTEXTUALISMO MODERADO**

**Resumo:** Cappelen e Lepore argumentam que o contextualismo moderado não é uma posição estável, uma vez que os argumentos que o sustentam o colocam em uma encosta escorregadia que conduz ao contextualismo radical. Meu objetivo é estabilizar o contextualismo moderado (ou pelo menos uma versão do mesmo) provendo um tratamento dos tipos de argumentos nos quais ele deveria estar sustentado. Estes diferem dos argumentos contextualistas usuais porque eles partem das intuições dos falantes sobre o valor de verdade de sentenças proferidas, e não sobre o que estas sentenças dizem. Dadas certas condições de sistematicidade, claridade e quão difundidas estas intuições são, eu afirmo que temos boas evidências para determinar se uma expressão é sensível ao contexto. Ainda que este método identifique expressões quantificadoras e ‘chove’ como sensíveis ao contexto, ele não faz o mesmo com ‘vermelho’. Temos assim motivações prima facie para o contextualismo moderado que não leva ao contextualismo radical. No entanto, esta metodologia não distingue o contextualismo do relativismo. Assim, eu examino diferentes razões para introduzir elementos nos contextos de uso e nas circunstâncias de avaliação.


The debate between contextualists and semantic minimalists concerns the extent to which the propositional content of uttered sentences can be determined by appealing to contextual features. Radical contextualists (for example, Bezuidenhout 2002, Carston 2002, Travis 1994, 1996 and 1997) claim that only by giving a free
rein to context can there be a content that is fully propositional or truth-conditional and constitutes what is said by an utterance. They insist that appealing purely to the conventional aspects of meaning, and even allowing for disambiguation and saturation, that is, allowing context to disambiguate and to assign reference to indexicals, contextuals (expressions such as ‘friend’, ‘enemy’, ‘neighbour’) and tense-indicators, will not suffice to obtain a proposition. At most, what is had is a propositional function, a blueprint for a proposition or what has been called ‘a propositional radical’ (Bach 2001). So, on this view no uttered sentences of natural language semantically express full propositions, and it is only against the background of a context, that a sentence, or rather an utterance of it, can express a full proposition and have truth-conditions.

Semantic minimalists, on the other hand, argue either that there is always a minimal proposition that is semantically expressed by an uttered sentence (Borg 2004, and Soames in his 2002 guise) or, at least, that in many of the paradigmatic examples of contextualists there is a minimal proposition that is semantically expressed (Cappelen and Lepore 2005, 2007). A minimal proposition is obtained through the grammar, syntax and linguistic meaning of the expressions contained in the uttered sentence and the intervention of context only when it is grammatically, that is, lexically or morphemically, triggered.¹ For example, indexicals, contextuals² and

¹ This is the way Cappelen and Lepore put it. It is not quite the way in which Soames (2002) puts it. For him, the proposition semantically expressed by a non-indexical or ambiguous sentence on an occasion of utterance is, roughly, either the proposition that is always asserted in all “normal” contexts once indexicality and ambiguity are resolved or the proposition that is determined by the semantic convention or competence rules of the sentence. For a discussion of these, see Ezcurdia 2004.

² Cappelen and Lepore are hesitant about including contextuals. For our purposes, it will do no harm to include them amongst the expressions their
tense indicators trigger context, but not —so one version of the view claims— quantifier expressions, adverbs such as ‘ready’ or adjectives such as ‘red’.

In between semantic minimalism and radical contextualism lies moderate contextualism, a position that has been criticised by both minimalists and radical contextualists as unstable (Cappelen and Lepore 2005, and Bezuidenhout 2006 concurs). According to moderate contextualism (‘MC’ henceforth), the role of context is not limited to indexicals, contextuals and tense-indicators; there are further expressions whose semantic values are obtained relative to a context, and which are necessary for determining the semantic content of an uttered sentence. On MC, quantifier expressions, but not colour adjectives such as ‘red’, are context sensitive. The key difference between semantic minimalism and MC, however, is not merely a difference in the number of expressions that are context sensitive but that, according to MC, contextual dependence of a proposition semantically expressed need not be lexically or morphemically triggered. For on MC —at least on the version I am advocating— some uttered sentences may require context to supply something to their content, but that may or may not be triggered by a syntactical element, be it “hidden” or explicit. As long as we have evidence from speakers’ semantic competence that such contextual intervention is necessary, more to the point, as long as linguistic view takes to be context sensitive. Creswell argues that they are context sensitive (see his 1996, especially chapters 2 and 3).

As usual, positing a hidden syntactical element will require syntactical evidence. According to this taxonomy, a moderate contextualist view can accommodate an indexicalism such as the one defended by Stanley (“all effects of extra-linguistic context on the truth-conditions of an assertion are traceable to elements in the actual syntactic structure of the sentence uttered”, 2000, p. 391), as well as an unarticulated constituents view (Perry 1986).

meaning requires there to be an element supplied by context, such intervention is allowed.

The main difference between radical and moderate contextualism lies in the fact that for the former no proposition is ever semantically expressed, whereas for the latter a full truth-evaluable proposition could be semantically expressed by an uttered sentence. This proposition differs from other propositions that are the result of the pragmatics of the utterance. Nonetheless, unlike some versions of semantic minimalism, on my preferred version of moderate contextualism there is no commitment to the existence of a fully propositional content that is semantically expressed by every uttered sentence in natural language. As such then, MC seems to offer a cautious view on language: contextual dependence need not be syntactically triggered, and need not be pervasive; the content semantically expressed by an uttered sentence can be fully truth-conditional, but need not be.

Cappelen and Lepore’s reason for the instability of MC is that the arguments that motivate it ultimately lead it to radical contextualism. Such arguments are based on intuitions about what is said by an utterance. Cappelen and Lepore claim they are of two sorts: context shifting arguments and incomplete proposition arguments. These involve assessing speakers’ intuitions about what gets said by an utterance in a given context. If the intuitions are that what is said differs from context to context —context shifting arguments— or that it is determined by context on pain of there being no proposition —incompleteness arguments—, then the claim is that context determines what is said or, more precisely, the proposition said. Although contextualists do give further arguments in support of their view, it is true that most are elaborations of incompleteness and context shifting arguments or they rely directly on intuitions about what is said by certain utterances.
My main aim in this paper is to show that MC is a stable position.⁴ To this end I provide principled reasons for MC not to rely on arguments concerning speakers’ intuitions about what is said, but rather on arguments concerning speakers’ intuitions about truth-values. In section 1, I present the methodology for constructing such arguments setting constraints on them. In sections 2 and 3, I apply the strategy in some detail to ‘red’, quantifier expressions and ‘to rain’, and advance my claim that these last two, but not the first, are context sensitive. However, since the methodology tests for judgments about truth-values it does not distinguish between contextualism and relativism; it does not discriminate between an expression’s being context sensitive and its requiring that truth be relativized to a parameter to obtain the truth-value of (utterances of) sentences containing it. In arguing for the context-sensitivity of quantifier expressions and ‘to rain’, I discuss reasons for thinking that an element is relevant to context as well as different reasons one might give for introducing parameters for truth (section 4). I end by examining the extent to which the methodology suggested draws on the much maligned notion of what is said.

1. EVIDENCE FROM INTUITIONS

Here is a common line of reasoning. If we are interested in finding out what a sentence uttered by a speaker says, it seems natural (almost obvious) to focus on speakers’ intuitions about what is actually said by a given utterance. These intuitions are supposed to guide us in identifying the proposition said. So if a sentence (when uttered) intuitively seems to say different propositions given different contextual conditions, then the sentence is context sensitive. When

this difference is due not solely to ambiguous expressions, indexicals, contextuels or tense-indicators, contextualism is right (moderate or radical, depending on the extent to which this happens in language). The task is then to test, for different sentences, competent speakers’ intuitions about what the sentence says in different contexts of utterance. This is what context shifting arguments (CSA) consist of.

One sort of context shifting argument that contextualists give concerns our intuitions about what gets said in a given context by a sentence containing a quantifier expression. Suppose (1) is uttered by Paul during a party in his house in New Zealand on the 27th of February, 2008:

(1) There is no wine.

Our intuitions are that Paul has not intended to say, nor has he said or conveyed, that there is no wine anywhere, but rather that there is no wine at a particular location, namely, his house. Suppose further that I utter (1) in my flat in Mexico City. Our intuitions are that Paul and I have said different things with our utterances: I have said that there is no wine in my flat, and Paul that there is no wine in his house. These intuitions are supposed to be evidence that the proposition said by Paul is that there is no wine in Paul’s house or that there is no wine in context C’, or some such, where context supplies the place of which it is said that there is no wine and thus restricts the domain of the quantifier.5

Cappelen and Lepore claim that this sort of argument puts moderate contextualists on a slippery slope to radical contextualism for one could generate a context shifting argument for just about

5 The verb’s tense requires of context that it supply the time of which it is said that there is no wine. But this sort of context intervention is fine by semantic minimalism for it is grammatically triggered.

any sentence or expression in the language. Take any sentence and consider whether what is said could differ in different contexts, even when ambiguity, syntactic ellipsis, polysemy, nonliterality and vagueness are not an issue. It is likely that such arguments could be produced for any sentence. On this, I agree with Cappelen and Lepore. To take just one example consider the following situations described by Bezuidenhout (2002):

We are at a county fair picking through a barrel of assorted apples. My son says ‘Here’s a red one,’ and what he says is true if the apple is indeed red. But what counts as being red in this context? For apples, being red generally means having red skin, which is different from what we normally mean by calling a watermelon, or a leaf, or a star, or hair, red. But even when it is an apple that is in question, other understandings of what it is to call it ‘red’ are possible, given suitable circumstances. For instance, suppose now that we’re sorting through a barrel of apples to find those that have been afflicted with a horrible fungal disease. This fungus grows out from the core and stains the flesh of the apple red. My son slices each apple open and puts the good ones in a cooking pot. The bad ones he hands to me. Cutting open an apple he remarks: ‘Here’s a red one’. What he says is true if the apple has red flesh, even if it also happens to be a Granny Smith apple. (Bezuidenhout 2002, p. 107)

According to Bezuidenhout’s intuitions, what gets said by (2) is determined by the context in which it is said, such that even if the skin of the apple in question is not red, (2) may say something true.

(2) Here’s a red one.⁶

There are two issues to consider here. Firstly, if our argument just stops here, it is clear that it is no good. In order for any

⁶ The verb’s tense and ‘here’ are context-sensitive aspects of (2). However, I shall ignore them for present purposes.
argument relying on intuitions to be good, the intuitions that thought experiments or actual cases elicit must be put to the test. In particular, we must ensure that we are getting clear and widespread intuitions, that is, intuitions that hold before any or most tests and intuitions that most of the relevant subjects have (in this case, speakers). When the intuitions are neither clear nor widespread, nothing may be concluded from them. Unfortunately, when contextualists give this sort of argument they do not put their intuitions to the test. Worse even, for when they are put to the test, our intuitions are strained and turn out not to be clear and/or widespread. We shall presently see this with Bezuidenhout’s intuitions concerning (2).

Secondly, there are context shifting arguments which do not lead us to this slippery slope and which provide evidence for the context sensitivity of expressions beyond those admitted by semantic minimalism. These are context shifting arguments that consider, not speakers’ intuitions about what is said by utterances, but rather their intuitions about the truth-values of utterances. Granted many speakers’ intuitions about the truth-value of Bezuidenhout’s son’s utterance of (2) in the situation described is that it is true, so some may think that there is no genuine difference between a CSA regarding intuitions about what is said and one that tests intuitions about the truth-value of an utterance. Whilst I agree that alone any CSA concerning truth-value is on no surer ground than a CSA regarding intuitions about what is said, as we shall see, it is on surer ground if certain conditions are met.

Consider a sentence $S$ with an alleged context sensitive expression $e$, and take two contexts to be relevantly different when they differ in the respect relevant to $e$’s putative context sensitivity. In the case of ‘red’ the relevant difference in contexts would be in the way something is red, for example, due to its skin or its flesh. Furthermore, take literal utterances to be just those utterances made
without intending to say something metaphorical, ironic, sarcastic, etc., or to conversationally implicate something else. Now, if

(I) there is a clear and widespread intuition amongst competent speakers that $S$ in a context $C$ has a certain truth-value and in another context $C'$, which is relevantly different from $C$ with respect to $e$, $S$ has a different truth-value, and

(II) not assuming that context enters (somehow) in the determination of semantic content renders most of what competent speakers semantically express when making literal and sincere utterances of $S$ as having a different truth-value (or no truth-value) from what the clear and widespread intuition says,

then we have good evidence for thinking that context determines the semantic content of utterances of $S$, and that $e$ is a context sensitive expression. Furthermore,

(III) if for any sentence (be it $S$, or $S'$, $S''$, ...) that contains $e$ –or most of the sentences that contain it– (I) and (II) are true of them,

then we have even stronger evidence of $e$’s context sensitivity. My claim is that CS arguments concerning intuitions about truth-values are compelling when they depend on evidence of type (I), (II) and (III), and when a relativist account of them has been eliminated as an option.\footnote{For ease of exposition, in the present section and the next two, I shall largely ignore this last condition, but I shall return to it in section 4 below.}

As for the nature of the sentences that generate Context

Shifting Truth-Value Arguments, we should note that the less complex they are the better evidence we shall have for an expression’s being context sensitive just because less variables would need to be controlled and considered and, as in other areas of research, this is always a desirable feature. This is not to say that non-atomic sentences could not be used in generating CSTAs, but just that evidence obtained from atomic or less complex sentences will be more compelling.

But why intuitions about truth-values and not about what is said? Because when speakers make judgments about what is said they are not always good at identifying what is said (much less so at distinguishing what is semantically expressed from what is pragmatically imparted or conveyed). When speakers judge what is said by utterances of (1) and (2) they are highly influenced by context, and basically try to process what people are intending to convey in those situations. Consider propositional attitude attributions such as (3) and (4).

(3) The ancient astronomers didn’t believe that Hesperus was Phosphorus.

(4) Lois Lane didn’t believe that Clark Kent was Superman.

Take your intuitions about the truth-values of these sentences or, rather, the utterances of these sentences. Our intuitions regarding these are in agreement, they are very clear and widespread: both sentences (or their utterances) are true. Think now about what those sentences (or their utterances) say. Here our intuitions do not coincide, they are not clear or widespread. Speakers differ widely on what the proposition said is (whether it be the one semantically expressed (if any) or pragmatically asserted). Some claim that (3) says *that the ancient astronomers didn’t believe that the object named*...
'Hesperus' was the object named 'Phosphorus', others that they didn’t believe that the astronomical object observed in the evening was the astronomical object observed in the morning, etc. And something similar applies to (4), viz. that Lois Lane didn’t believe that the man she knew as Clark Kent was the man she knew as Superman, or that she didn’t believe that the man who works with her in her office was the man with superpowers, etc. Ask any competent speaker and these are the sorts of reactions you will get: widespread agreement on truth-values for which people have clear intuitions, and widespread disagreement on what is said. What these cases show is that speakers are not always reliable in identifying what is said (let alone distinguish the propositions that are semantically expressed from those that are pragmatically imparted or conveyed) by an utterance of a sentence, but they are relatively good at detecting truth-value. My claim is that when intuitions about truth-value are clear, coincide greatly and are systematic in the way described in (II) and (III) above, they constitute good evidence for semantic content. Claiming that they provide good evidence is not to claim that it is the only relevant evidence or that it is conclusive evidence or that other considerations, especially theoretical, are not needed. Indeed, I have already mentioned that we would need reasons to eliminate relativism as a possibility, and these will be at least in part be of a theoretical nature. Remember that our purpose is to stabilize moderate contextualism by offering motivation for it that does not lead to a radical form of contextualism. In order to achieve this all

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8 Some might want to argue that our intuitions are not so widespread for after all there are those like Salmon and Soames who hold that (3) and (4) are false, that the ancient astronomers did believe that Hesperus was Phosphorus, and that Lois Lane did believe that Clark Kent was Superman. But both Salmon and Soames recognize that there is a clear and widespread intuition that runs against them, and even set themselves the task of explaining away such intuition. (See Salmon 1986 and Soames 2002.)
we need are arguments or tests that are good evidence for the context sensitivity of certain expressions but not of others. After this, MC may resort to other arguments to deny radical contextualist accounts of the initial data.

Minimalists have expressed scepticism that we could learn anything different from arguments concerning truth-values rather than from arguments concerning what is said.\(^9\) And to an extent, I agree. If what we are asked to consider are just judgments about truth-values of particular utterances, then we are on no better footing than we are concerning intuitions about what is said on those specific cases. For judgments about truth-values rely on what the speakers think a certain utterance says, conveys and/or imparts. However, the situation is very different when what we are asked to do is not only consider the truth-values of a given utterance, but to look for systematicity in our intuitions regarding truth-values, systematicity of the sort required by (II) and (III). Upon doing so, we filter what is semantically expressed out of what is pragmatically said, imparted or conveyed, by identifying its systematic effect on truth-values of utterances in which they appear, and thus their type of contribution to semantic content.

An additional reason for thinking that intuitions about truth-value that satisfy (I), (II) and (III), are good evidence for detecting semantic content is that they track speakers’ semantic competence. It is the systematicity of (clear and widespread) intuitions about truth-value that lead us to think that speakers are being sensitive to the constant elements of expressions, whether these require the systematic intervention of context or not; and what remains

\(^9\) Cappelen and Lepore claim that they are at a loss when people ask them to consider intuitions about truth-values (2005, p. 98). I think their bemusement might be best construed as an expression of the sort of scepticism described in this paragraph.
constant across uses of an expression just is its linguistic meaning, knowledge of which is constitutive of speakers’ semantic competence. Furthermore, semantic theories aim at identifying not only linguistic meaning but also semantic content, that is, the contribution which the meanings of expressions make to propositional content (if any) whether aided by context or not. But we ideally want such a theory to track the semantic content of an utterance of a sentence that is derived from speakers’ semantic competence, either solely from it or from it and the contextual elements that semantic competence calls upon. Given this, it would be strange for semantically competent speakers to continue to use expressions in a language that render most of what they semantically express when they use those expressions as having a different truth-value (or no truth-value at all) from what they thought it would have. Suppose (counterfactually) that an expression \( e \) started life in a language as a context insensitive expression, but as time went on most of the semantic content of the utterances of sentences containing \( e \) were false, even obviously false to speakers, when speakers were using them intending to express something true. Then we would expect either

(a) \( e \) to gradually become context sensitive, or

(b) speakers to begin making explicit the relevant parts of context for \( e \).

The cases that generate context shifting truth-value arguments (‘CSTA’ henceforth) that satisfy (I), (II) and (III), are ones in which (b) is certainly not the case, so (a) would most plausibly be the case. One could argue, of course, that neither (a) nor (b) are the case, but rather (c) that what have evolved are our pragmatic strategies which allow us to be phonetically economical. However, the fact that there is systematic disagreement between the truth-values that speakers
think such sentences have and the values assigned to the putative semantic contents suggests that there is something about \( e \) that has evolved and become constant, and this suggests that it is part of \( e \)'s stable linguistic meaning.

2. A CONTEXT SHIFTING TRUTH-VALUE ARGUMENT FOR ‘RED’

CSTAs are harder to generate than the original CSA. Consider Bezuidenhout’s example again to see whether a CS truth-value argument could be generated for it. In particular, let us test (2) for clear and widespread intuitions regarding truth-value.

[...] suppose now that we’re sorting through a barrel of apples to find those that have been afflicted with a horrible fungal disease. This fungus grows out from the core and stains the flesh of the apple red. My son slices each apple open and puts the good ones in a cooking pot. The bad ones he hands to me. Cutting open an apple he remarks: ‘Here’s a red one’. What he says is true if the apple has red flesh, even if it also happens to be a Granny Smith apple. (Bezuidenhout 2002, p. 107)

If as Bezuidenhout suggests what matters for our intuitions about what is said is the flesh of the apple, then it would not matter what sort of apple would be handed over by her son to her. If it did not have red flesh then (2) would not be true in that context. We have to acknowledge that all she says is that having red flesh suffices for truth in this context. But if we are in the business of giving truth-conditions (even if these are pragmatic truth-conditions), which I believe Bezuidenhout and all contextualists are, we also need to have necessary conditions for the truth of an utterance. I thus take her to mean that in that context (2) is uttered truly if and only if the apple has red flesh.
Think now of a situation just like the one just described except that her son hands her over an undiseased Gala apple, an apple with red skin but white flesh, whilst uttering (2). Would we say that the utterance is true or false? Do we have clear intuitions? I think we do not. There are two perfectly natural reactions in these situations. On one we would say ‘No, that’s not right’, or ‘You’re wrong. That’s not red. It’s a perfectly edible apple’. Another equally natural response would be to say ‘That’s not the kind of red we mean’ or ‘Stop joking about’ or ‘We want the ones with red flesh, not red skin’, etc. My intuitions pull me in both directions: we can take the assertion as false and relevant, or as true and irrelevant. In fact, in one same conversational situation, there could be two participants, both interlocutors of Bezuidenhout’s son, who would react in these different ways: one would claim that what is said is false and the other that it is true. In the state of such conflicting intuitions, it appears that (I) has not been met and so that we do not have a CSTA for ‘red’. But some may argue that this is too quick.

A radical contextualist could rejoin by explaining away why both reactions are acceptable. One possible explanation is that one of the reactions accommodates whilst the other does not, and if that

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10 In fact, most untutored reactions I have observed of competent speakers when asked have been that it is not clear whether in this case an utterance of (2) is true.

11 Lewis (1979) notes that in conversation, unlike games, if someone makes an “incorrect” move or contribution, then we adjust or accommodate the parameters of what is at stake in order to count that move or contribution as acceptable. However, in order for this change in standard to be effected, all conversational participants must accept that the standard has changed; otherwise there is no accommodation and the contribution is not acceptable. Speaking of standards of precision, Lewis writes:

is the case – so the argument goes– then we do have a genuine case of CSTA for ‘red’. The person who judges the utterance as false is still taking the standard of red being red-fleshedness and not red-skinneledness. However, the person who takes it to be true needs to adjust or accommodate so that the utterance comes out as true and, in order to achieve this, she must claim that the standard in question has changed and it is now red-skinnedness. Indeed, the fact that she takes it as true is evidence that some form of accommodation has taken place, so the rejoinder claims. 12

One could certainly offer this as an explanation of what is going on with the diverging intuitions, but all that matters for our purposes is that the radical contextualist (and others) admits that there is a datum here, namely, that our intuitions are not clear or widespread in this case. And this is precisely what the rejoinder is assuming. 13 Furthermore, however, the test advocated does not rely

If the standards have been high, and something is said that is true enough only under lowered standards, and nobody objects, then indeed the standards are shifted down. (Lewis 1979, p. 352; my emphasis)

It is not clear that this is satisfied in the situation above.

12 An object’s making an appearance in the perceptual environment may raise the salience of that object or of some property of the object, but its simply making an appearance does not automatically do so. If I am talking about my cat in New Zealand and her illness, and a different cat comes into the room, I do not designate this second cat when I say ‘The cat had to have a nosectomy’, not even if the second cat has made a lot of noise or jumped on our laps. What determines whether a thing’s salience (be it property or object) is raised will depend on, at least partly, something like Lewis’s rules of accommodation.

13 This response is analogous to the response that neo-Russellians have before judgments about the truth-values of propositional attitude reports such as (3) and (4) above. The datum is not denied but rather an explanation of it is offered. See footnote 8 above.
solely on (I)’s being satisfied. Recall that in order to have good evidence, at least (II) must also be satisfied, that is, not assuming that context enters (somehow) in the determination of semantic content renders most of what people semantically express when making literal and sincere utterances of $S$ as having a different truth-value (or no truth-value) from what the clear and widespread intuition says. If not assuming the intervention of context does not render most of what people semantically express as having a different truth-value from what the clear and widespread intuition says, then we have no evidence in favour of the context-sensitivity of the expression in question. And this is just what happens with ‘red’. Supposing that ‘red’ is context sensitive does not render most of what people semantically express when making literal and sincere utterances of $S$ as having a different truth-value (or no truth-value) from what the clear and widespread intuition says our utterances have. Think again of Bezuidenhout’s son when he utters (2) whilst holding a red-fleshed and cut-open Granny Smith apple in the context of looking for apples with red flesh. Well, he has said something true, for the apple is red in some way. That’s the intuition we have and that is the intuition Bezuidenhout has. Contrast this with (2) being uttered whilst handing over apples with no red skin or flesh. In that case, (2) would have been false.

What exactly counts as being red, as having the property of red, is something that requires looking at our practices concerning how we classify objects as being red. We might want to claim that we take something to be red if and only if a normally easily visually observable portion of it which is sufficiently significant is red. This

14 Notice that here I am omitting a discussion of borderline cases of something’s having the property red either because it is underdetermined whether it is red or orange, or because it only has a red spot on its skin (or
is certainly vague for we would need to know more about what counts as “a normally easily visually observable” and as a “sufficiently significant portion”. Now, it is true that for something to be red, it has to be red in some way. Let (AR) abbreviate a biconditional in which we have spelled out the different ways in which something is taken to be red, that is, the conditions for applying the concept red, and where ‘in some way’ stands in for those different ways of being red.

(AR) Something is red (or has the property of being red) if and only if it is red in some way.

Looking at our practices of classifying something as red and giving a detailed characterization of our application conditions of the concept red is not thereby to engage in metaphysics, contrary to what Cappelen and Lepore think (2005, pp. 157-166), for one is not delving into issues of whether colours exist or whether colour concepts are vague, etc. Rather one is just pointing to the way in which we use the concept without analyzing it away, as the concept red appears again on the right hand side of the biconditional. But this does not mean either that the detailed application conditions of a term constitute its meaning. In providing the application conditions of the concept or of the term ‘red’, that is, in fleshing out (AR), one is not committed to claiming that the proposition semantically expressed by a sentence containing ‘red’ must include the concept/property of being red in some way or of having a significant part of a normally visually and easily observable surface to the naked human eye as red, or... One may have it that the meaning of ‘o is red’ is just given by (MR):

in the flesh). These should not be a source of worry. In these cases, we don’t have clear and widespread intuitions about utterances of (2).

(MR) ‘o is red’ means that (semantically expresses the proposition, or is true if and only if) o is red.

The biconditional (AR) concerns how we apply the concept or property, not the meaning of ‘red’. As Sainsbury (2001) has pointed out, there are expressions in the language with a determinate meaning that is unspecific as to the ways in which it may be satisfied. Compare it to the different ways in which one may pay one’s phone bill: I can pay it by cheque at the bank, with cash through the ATM, over the phone using a credit card, over the internet using PayPal, etc. There are many ways in which one can pay one’s bills but these do not constitute the meaning of ‘paying a phone bill’. The demand that semantics must give us this is wrongheaded for then every new way that technology allows us to make a payment would entail a change of meaning to ‘paying a phone bill’ and this seems to be unreasonable and unnecessary.\(^{15}\)

We can now see how it is that not supposing that ‘red’ is context sensitive, that is, supposing that the contribution of ‘red’ to the semantic propositional content of an utterance is just the concept \textit{red}, does not render most of what people say as having a different truth-value from what they take it to have. For the concept

\(^{15}\) Clapp (2007) argues that minimalists should be able to tell us, on the basis of sociological and/or psychological facts, which single proposition of many propositions are expressed by ‘Fluffy is on the mat’ or, more precisely, which of many truth-conditions are the ones expressed by an utterance of this sentence. Amongst the candidates considered are Fluffy’s having a paw on the mat, it hovering on cables over it, and so on. But the minimalist need not choose one as Clapp desires for she may just say that it expresses a determinate proposition that leaves unspecified the details of how it may be made true. For the minimalist all the options considered by Clapp could be ways of being on the mat.
may be satisfied in diverse ways, through having red flesh, having red skin, being red inside, etc. Hence, when uttered whilst holding a red-skinned apple, the semantic content of the utterance of (2) will be true, just as when showing a red-fleshed apple, but it will not be true when we present an apple that is neither red-skinned nor red-fleshed. So we seem to get the right truth-value assignments even if we deny the context-sensitivity of ‘red’. Admittedly, in the situation in which our intuitions are conflicting as above, when we are separating red-fleshed from white-fleshed apples and Bezuidenhout’s son presents a red-skinned apple, the consequence will be that the semantic content of an utterance of (2) will be true. But given that in that situation we do not have clear and widespread intuitions about what the truth-value should be in that case, then this is not an objection to the prediction the non-context-sensitivity of ‘red’ makes. I conclude, then, that condition (II) is not satisfied and so we don’t have a CSTA for ‘red’.

In order to bolster my case, however, I would need to consider what happens with other sentences in which ‘red’ occurs and which are uttered sincerely and literally, that is, without intending to say something metaphorical, ironic, sarcastic, etc., or to conversationally implicate something else. Take these to be utterances of the following:

(5) The red book is in the cupboard.
(6) The red envelope has my name on it.
(7) That watermelon is very red.

Independently of the contextual situation we consider, it is clear that (5)-(7) can be uttered with a literal use in mind. Given (MR), i.e. that ‘o is red’ is true if and only if o is red, and given that being red involves different ways of being red, would the resulting

propositions have a truth-value different from what speakers’ intuitions would say? *Prima facie*, it does not seem so. But although one would need to review the situations in which the sentences are uttered, I suspect we would have a similar situation to that discussed with (2) in this section, the situation in which our intuitions are not clear or widespread. The same goes for other sincere and literal utterances of sentences containing ‘red’. My suspicion would need to be bolstered by considering more cases, but what I have said so far suffices for showing how I would argue in each instance. And the more cases are tested, the greater the evidence in favour of the non-context sensitivity of ‘red’ (and other colour adjectives).

For those interested in developing counterexamples to the non-context-sensitivity of ‘red’, I should emphasize that the relevant cases have to be ones in which the speakers are intending the sentences to be used literally, that is, non-metaphorically, non-ironically, etc., and without conversationally implicating something else. Some may think that even considering only these cases, there are examples in which ‘red’ is used literally, but in which were (MR) (or even (AR) no matter how it is spelled out) to hold they would be false utterances, contrary to what speakers would normally think. Say that before a glass of Malbec I utter (8) and before a painting of young Elizabeth I I utter (9).

\[(8) \text{ Here is some red wine.}\]
\[(9) \text{ She had red hair.}\]

Were (MR) to hold, then (8) and (9) could very well be false. More than this. It would appear that were (MR) to hold in the cases of ‘red wine’ and ‘red hair’, most of our utterances containing these expressions would have a different truth-value from what speakers would have intended them to have. And so, we would appear to be
before counterexamples to the non-context sensitivity of ‘red’. However, it is unclear that we are before cases in which ‘red’ is being used as a genuine adjective, an adjective that expresses the property red. Consider the coherence of the following:

(10) Is red wine really red?
(11) Is red hair really red?

Our ability to ask these questions coherently suggests that ‘red’ is not functioning as an adjective in (8) and (9), but rather that ‘red wine’ and ‘red hair’ constitute non-complex nouns that refer to a kind just as ‘water’ does. So if counterexamples are to be provided, they had better be of a different sort.

The fact that there is no CSTA for ‘red’ provides us with good evidence that ‘red’ is not context sensitive. What we need to do now is to show that there are CSTAs for other expressions in the language beyond indexicals, contextuals and tense-indicators, though not for ‘red’. I think that a CSTA can be generated for quantifier expressions and ‘to rain’. And if I am right in thinking that a CSTA shows that these expressions are context sensitive but no such argument could be supplied for ‘red’ then we will have found a way of stabilizing moderate contextualism.

Although I have no space to consider other cases in detail here, it is worth noting that I do not think that we can generate CSTA’s for other cases given by contextualists in the literature such as ‘Smith weighs 80 kgs’, ‘Jill didn’t have fish for dinner’, ‘Lucas destroyed those shoes’, ‘That’s a dangerous dog’, and ‘Mario is a philosopher’. (For a survey, see Cappelen and Lepore 2005, Chapter

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16 Amongst quantifier expressions I include definite descriptions though I shall say nothing about them here.

3.) I shall not go through the cases for each of them here, but to make things fully explicit remember that the strategy is to look for intuitions that two utterances of the same sentence differ in truth-value when there is a relevant difference in the contexts in which they are uttered, that such intuitions are not only widespread and systematic (in the way described in (II) and (III) above) but are also clear. In order to make sure you are getting clear intuitions, you must put them to the test and see if they are strained in any way.

3. QUANTIFIER EXPRESSIONS AND RAIN

Think of (1) again as uttered by Paul in his New Zealand home, and suppose further that there is no wine there. Our immediate intuition is that Paul has said something true, despite the fact that there is wine elsewhere. Suppose that I utter (1) in my flat in Mexico City in an attempt to hide the wine in my flat from my guests. Our intuitions are that when uttered by me (1) is false, but when uttered by Paul (1) is true. Our intuitions here are widespread about the truth-values of both Paul’s utterance and my utterance.

Now, let us try to apply a twist in which our intuitions regarding truth-value might be tested to assess whether our intuitions are clear. In the apple case we thought of a way in which intuitions might pull us in a different direction. We introduced an apple that could be thought of as red though it did not satisfy the property of being red in the way required by the context. An analogous case here would be to introduce a way in which we would be led to think of Paul’s utterance of (1) as false by supposing that there is some wine somewhere at the time of utterance. But, of course, when Paul utters (1) there is wine somewhere at his time of utterance, and he is even aware of this. Indeed, what may have prompted him to utter (1) might be to request someone to fetch some wine from somewhere. He himself is then aware of the fact...
that there is wine elsewhere and so is his audience. We cannot, therefore, produce a twist analogous to the one we produced in the apple case in order to put a strain on our intuitions. For the twist is already there, and it is there most of the time when we use quantifier expressions. When we utter any of the sentences (1) or (12)-(15), we are thinking of the quantifier applying at a certain place or for a certain group. We are thinking of the domain as restricted somehow by context.

(12) A few students failed.
(13) Everyone put a life vest on.
(14) Most vineyards have lost their crops.
(15) Every table is covered with books.

Notice further that (II) is satisfied. Not supposing that context constrains the domain of quantifier expressions does render most of what we semantically express with our literal and sincere utterances as having a different truth-value from what the clear and widespread intuition says our utterances have. Not only Paul would have said something false, but anyone who ever uttered (1) from at least the 15th century (or earlier) up until now would have uttered something false. Suppose (13) is uttered by someone after being shipwrecked, then (13) would be uttered truly in that situation, though rejecting context’s role in restricting the domain of a quantifier would render any utterance of (13) false. And this runs against our intuitions that utterances of (13) are true on many occasions. The same can be argued for (12), (14) and (15).

(III) is also satisfied. Think again of speakers’ awareness that if any of these sentences were uttered taking the domain to be that of existing things, then most of what they would utter would be false.

Surely, after so many centuries of using quantifier expressions, we would have learned something. Either our expressions would have become context sensitive, or we would have supplied the contextual material left out. We would always have to say ‘There is no wine in the house’. But perhaps you think that that is what we do, that our utterances of (1) are in some sense incomplete (not only the propositions), that we just utter abbreviations of these longer sentences. What would supply that extra material? Presumably, context (be it speakers’ intentions or a mutually known context). Whatever way we look at it, it seems inevitable that context must come into play. What has been said suffices to show that ‘there is no $F$’ is context sensitive, and it is more or less evident how the reasoning would go for other quantifier expressions such as those in (12)–(15). I hold that the same applies to other quantifier expressions such as ‘some’ and ‘at least’. It may appear that atomic sentences with ‘at least’ will always turn out to be true in an account that denies its context-sensitivity for no matter how big the domain of discourse is, ‘at least’ is just meant to pick out a small part of it. In this way it behaves more like ‘some’ than like ‘every’, ‘no’ and even ‘most’. But always coming out true even for atomic sentences may not be the right sort of truth-value that a competent speaker would assign. Consider (16) and (17) uttered by me in 2008 when going over the different outcomes of the courses taught in that year and in which all of my students received pass marks.

\[16\] Some students failed in 2008.

\[17\] At least two students failed in 2008.

The shared intuitions here are that (16) and (17) are both false (and that either I am being deceptive or have misspoken). Yet, according to the context-insensitive account of ‘some’ and ‘at least’, (16) and
(17) are true (that is, if not all the existing students passed their exams). Given this, we have the beginnings of CST arguments for both ‘at least’ and ‘some’. Perhaps not assuming the context-sensitivity of ‘some’ and ‘at least’ may render less disparities in the truth-value judgments obtained from speakers and those assigned by a non-contextual account than in the case of other quantifiers. But given that many other quantifier expressions do generate CST arguments and a theoretical preference to treat quantifier expressions uniformly, we have good reason to treat ‘some’ and ‘at least’ as context-sensitive.\(^{17}\)

So far then, we seem to be justified in thinking that unlike colour adjectives like ‘red’, we can generate CST arguments for quantifier expressions. But as usual, there are always objections to be considered. I shall examine two of them here.\(^{18}\) The first is a charge that the sentences and contexts I have used in providing a CSTA for ‘there is no \(F\)’ is significantly different from that of the case of ‘red’. In the former case, what was considered was a default context, whilst in the latter an unusual or marked context. If I were to use an unusual or marked context for the case of ‘there is no \(F\)’ then, so the objection runs, I should find that our intuitions would be equally strained and so no CST argument would be generated for the quantifier phrase. I am unsure what a marked or unusual context would be for a quantifier expression, but let us suppose for the sake of argument that a default context for a quantifier expression is one in which the domain is restricted by the place in which it is used. This is what we assumed above: the domain of the quantifier

\(^{17}\) This is very different from what Cappelen and Lepore (2005, pp. 88 ff) do. They focus their attention on ‘at least’ and then wrongly generalize their conclusion to other quantifier expressions.

\(^{18}\) I am grateful to Adèle Mercier for the first and to Manuel García-Carpintero for the second objection.

expression in utterances of (1) was restricted by the place in which it was uttered. If uttered by me in my flat in Mexico City then the objects to be considered were those in that flat, whilst if uttered in Paul’s home the objects to be considered were the ones at his place. An unusual or marked context would then be one in which the objects to be considered are not those of the place of utterance.

Suppose that we are all at Paul’s home and that there is a bottle of wine there that no one likes or is willing to drink. In order to get a different kind of wine, Paul phones the off-licence, where there has been a break-in and all the wine has been taken. So upon hanging up the phone, Paul utters (1), i.e. ‘There is no wine’. What are our intuitions regarding the truth-value of this utterance? There is no confusion or unclarity in competent speakers’ intuitions here. The widespread and clear intuition is that Paul has said something true. Here the domain of discourse of the quantifier is then taken to be not the place of utterance but rather the place to which the phone call was placed. Contrary to what the objection suggests, it appears that even with unusual contexts we get clear intuitions regarding the truth-values of utterances of (1).

The second objection claims that if we consider the speaker’s intentions as to what they mean when they make their utterances, in particular, the child in the apple case, then we shall have no unclarity about the truth-value of the utterances. But I am unsure of how this would be helpful. If the child is meaning to make a joke when uttering (2) whilst handing over a red-skinned apple in the context in which we were interested in red-fleshed ones, then the objection claims that we would take (2) as having a clear truth-value. However, I just do not know how competent speakers would take

19 Unlike the expressions of unclarity or confusion expressed by those untutored competent speakers when faced with the red apple case, there were none in this case. See footnote 10 above.

the utterance. If the child is assumed to be making a joke, then he may either be saying something that he takes to be false to tease someone or something that he takes to be blatantly true but not in the right way. Taking into account the child’s intention does not shed light on this nor does it help to get a clear intuition regarding the truth-value of his utterance. Perhaps the objection is suggesting that we not only take into account the general intention of the speaker but his specific intention when uttering (2), namely, whether he meant to say that the apple was red-fleshed or red-skinned or he meant to be neutral over the kind of redness involved. I am unsure that even looking at speakers’ intentions in such fine detail will deliver clear truth-value judgments about what was said or uttered by the speaker. After all, there is the problem of separating speaker’s meaning from what his words say, something the one who is making a judgment would inevitably have to do if taking into account such fine-grained speakers’ intentions. Yet it is not clear that competent speakers could do this without some theoretical background and, worse, preference. What motivated our introduction of CST arguments versus CS arguments that considered directly intuitions about what was said was precisely a desire to require as little as possible for the truth-value judges to make this distinction. The aim was to filter out the semantic content of an utterance from certain systematicity found in judges’ truth-value judgments, judgments that did not require them to reflect explicitly on what the speaker meant versus what her utterances said. Whether the distinction had to be made tacitly or not was left as an open matter. Thus, considering speakers’ intentions cannot be allowed by the CSTA strategy and, even if one were to consider them, they will not help to get clear and widespread intuitions about the truth-value of utterances of (2).

I think we are now justified in claiming that there is a CST argument for ‘there is no $F$’ but not for ‘red’. This has got us close to
stabilizing moderate contextualism, but we are not there yet. What the CSTA for quantifier expressions has established is that there is an element that the context supplies and that is needed to obtain the right truth-conditions of utterances containing quantifier expressions. What has not been established yet is where that element should come in. It can come in either at the level of semantic content or in relativizing truth. Because CSTAs look for truth-value judgments, they are neutral over this matter, and so they are not helpful here. We, therefore, need a further argument that shows that in the case of quantifier expressions we should treat them as context sensitive (where context supplies some added material to semantic content) rather than treating them relativistically (where there is an introduction of a parameter relative to which truth may be predicated). We shall turn to this task in the following section. However, it will be useful to see whether a CST argument can be generated for ‘to rain’.

One may be inclined to say that utterances of (18) gain a truth-value depending on the place of utterance but, as Perry (1986) has remarked, this is not so.

(18) It is raining.

If Mark is talking about the weather in Mexico City to someone else, he may say (18) about the latter rather than about the place he is at. So it would appear that if there is any context-dependence of utterances like (18) it is a dependence simply on a place, which can arguably be contextually supplied in two sorts of ways: as intended by the speaker or as determined by the conversational context. These two may coincide, but need not. A speaker may intend a place but the conversational context determine a different place. Whilst on
the former a speaker must have a place in mind, on the latter the speaker need not have a place in mind.\footnote{There are other options for an utterance’s truth-conditions to depend on something that is not in the speaker’s mind. That extra element may be supplied, as Perry (1986) suggests, by our local-weather talk practices. He takes it that if the place relevant for the truth-conditions of an utterance of (18) is obtained through our local-weather talk practices then the extra element required for the truth-conditions of (18) is not part of the propositional content of the uttered sentence but rather a parameter relative to which truth is obtained. We shall assume he is right about this in the next section.}

Consider two utterances of (18) made in two relevantly different contexts: one in which the relevant place is Mexico City and in the other it is Austin. Suppose further that it is raining in Austin but not in Mexico City. Competent speakers will say that (18) is false when the relevant place is Mexico City and true when it is Austin. Suppose Mark is in Austin, he is not speaking on the phone to anyone or reading weather reports of any places, and there is no antecedent conversation, when he utters (18). Our intuitions are that he says something true. Are these intuitions clear? I think so. To put our intuitions to the test we need to put in a twist in which it is not raining elsewhere. But, as in the quantifier case, this is a twist that is already there. Not only is it true that in other places it will not be raining, but speakers themselves know that rain occurs at places so that when they utter (18) intending to say something true, they know be false of other places. Mark may perfectly well utter (18) whilst completely aware that it is not raining in Mexico City or in London.

(II) also seems to be satisfied: if we did not assume that context entered into the determination of semantic content, it would render most of what people semantically expressed as having a different truth-value (or none at all, if what is semantically expressed is a
propositional function) from what the clear and widespread intuition says. (18) would never or hardly ever be uttered falsely for it appears it is always raining somewhere, though people would on many occasions say it is false. This gives us then good evidence that ‘to rain’ is context sensitive, in particular, that it is sensitive to a place, whether this be the place of utterance or not.

Would (III) be satisfied? If we focus on sentences such as (19) and (20), it would. Considerations analogous to those just given for (18) would hold. But perhaps someone might think that given the context insensitivity of sentences in which the place is explicitly mentioned, as in (21) and (22), (III) is not satisfied.

(19) It is not raining.
(20) It will rain tomorrow.
(21) It is raining in Mexico City.
(22) It is raining in Austin.

(21) and (22) seem to be context insensitive since the place of which rain is being predicated has been explicitly supplied. Does this show that (III) is not satisfied or further that ‘to rain’ is not context sensitive? As we have been saying so far, satisfying (I) and (II) constitutes good evidence for the context sensitivity of an expression; satisfying (III) in addition just bolsters our case further, but not satisfying it does not leave us without an argument. Nonetheless, I think there are many other sentences in which the verb is used and in which no explicit place is supplied:

(23) It was raining this morning before María woke up.
(24) It will start raining as soon as I get out of the car.
The existence of sentences such as (19), (20), (23) and (24) lend plausibility to the claim that, in addition to ‘rain’ satisfying (I) and (II) with respect to (18), it will also satisfy it with respect to these sentences. And so (III), to an extent, will be also satisfied, thereby bolstering our argument for the context sensitivity of ‘to rain’. However, again we have to be careful, for we would need to rule out a relativist account of the context dependence of ‘to rain’.

4. CONTEXT-SENSITIVITY OR RELATIVISM

According to Perry (1986), we can explain the truth-conditions of utterances or statements made with (18) in either of two ways: either by supposing that context supplies a propositional constituent, viz. a place, or by supposing that (18) expresses a propositional function which is true relative to a place. In the first case, we shall say that an utterance of (18) expresses a proposition and is about a place, a place which is an unarticulated constituent of the proposition. However, on the second explanation, we are to say that an utterance of (18) expresses a propositional function and concerns a place. In either case, when uttered (18) will be true if and only if it is raining in \( l \) at the time of utterance by predicating truth simpliciter on the former explanation and truth relative to a place on the latter. One could say the same for quantifier utterances of (1): context may supply a propositional constituent that restricts the domain of the quantifier or it may supply an element relative to which the propositional function semantically expressed by an utterance of (1) obtains a truth-value.

The issue is how to decide between these two accounts for the case of ‘to rain’ and of quantifier expressions, that is, between a contextualist and a relativist account of them. One way would be to work with Kaplan’s distinctions between character and content, and
between contexts of use and circumstances of evaluation, and to look for criteria for inserting elements into these contexts. As is well-known, for Kaplan a context of use is an ordered quintuple of a subject, a time of use, a place of use, the actual world, and a sequence of possible referents of demonstratives. But, what makes it the case that an element figures in a context of use? One criterion suggested by Braun (1996, p. 161) is that contexts of use just include objects that are the referents of indexical expressions, and not what determines such referents. However, this is neither true nor useful. The time specified in a context of use just is the time and day on which a sentence is used, yet it helps to determine the reference of ‘yesterday’. If the day of use is the 30th of May, then the linguistic meaning of ‘yesterday’ will determine that the day referred to is the 29th of May. So the criterion does not hold but, more importantly, it is not useful if precisely what we are interested in testing is whether certain non-indexical expressions are context sensitive or not. A better strategy would be to look for positive reasons for introducing elements as circumstances of evaluation. We can certainly find some in the literature (Perry 1986, Recanati 2007), but there is a straightforward reason we can give against a relativist account of quantifier expressions.

One of the differences between assigning a parameter and assuming context dependence is that the additional element is assigned to evaluate the truth of the whole uttered sentence whilst this is not so with context dependence. Context dependence can

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21 We have been using ‘context’ throughout as different from Kaplan’s notion of a context of use. When I mean the latter, I will use ‘contexts of use’.

22 Of course, reasons could be negative. It could be to introduce into the circumstance of evaluation whichever elements are needed to obtain a function to a truth-value that context itself has not introduced. This will not be helpful in the present discussion.
occur at a subsentential level. So if there is evidence of contextual shift within a sentence containing quantifier expressions, we would have reason to think that contextualism holds for quantifier expressions. Lewis (1979) provided a well-known example with definite descriptions that provides the basis for context-shift. The sentence ‘The dog bit the other dog’ has to be read as there being two different dogs in a context, but the idea could have been expressed with (25) which, on at least one reading, should allow for the fact that there are two dogs involved.

(25) The dog bit the dog.

A similar situation arises with uncontroversial quantifier expressions:

(26) Everyone greeted everyone.

(26) can plausibly be read as everyone greeting everyone else but not themselves.

Here context can intervene to restrict the domain of each of the quantifiers, but it will deliver a different restriction for the second quantifier since it must have a narrower domain than the first.23 Hence, a relativist account of quantifiers is ruled out, and a contextualist account upheld. The details of how quantifier expressions are context sensitive is up for debate –that is, whether they involve introducing syntactical elements at the level of Logical Form or whether they just make a contribution to the semantic content by introducing an unarticulated constituent–, but that is not

23 Stanley and Williamson (1995) give further examples; and Stanley and Szabó (2000, p. 249) use this argument to rule out a model theoretic approach to quantifier expressions.

our concern here. Our concern has been to show that they are context sensitive and that the motivation for their context sensitivity does not render every other expression put forth by radical contextualists as context sensitive, thus allowing for a stable brand of moderate contextualism. We can now conclude this in light of our discussions of ‘red’ and quantifier expressions, and in light of our ruling out a relativist account of the latter.

It is instructive, nonetheless, to see what happens with utterances of (18). If we are to rule out a relativist approach to these utterances we cannot do so by appealing to the previous argument, for no such subsentential variation is possible for ‘to rain’. We can, however, consider the positive reasons for introducing a parameter or an element in the circumstances of evaluation to see whether (18) satisfies it or not.

Perry (1986, 1993a) has given two reasons for holding that an utterance concerns, rather than is about, an element \( v \). The first has to do with whether there is an external guarantee –that is, external to the utterance–\(^{24}\), be it from the practice in a community or otherwise, as to what the relevant \( v \) is. The second has to do with whether \( v \) is stable or invariant through a whole mode of discourse or whether the relation or function to \( v \) is stable though its value changes. If any of these are satisfied, then Perry thinks the utterance is to be characterized as semantically expressing a propositional function and merely concerning \( v \). Neither of these seems to hold for the case of ‘to rain’.\(^{25}\) For (18) may be uttered of different places,

\(^{24}\) Recanati (2007) does not interpret Perry’s externality criterion this way, but I think he is mistaken. See Ezcurdia forthcoming.

\(^{25}\) Perry was happy to grant that on occasions a propositional function account of the semantic content of utterances of (18) was adequate whilst, on other occasions, it was not. But we prefer a uniform account of utterances like (18). My argument above assumes that this is what we are looking for.
some of which bear the relation of being where the speaker is but others which do not. An example of the latter is when Mark, whilst in Austin, reads about weather conditions in London when thinking of travelling there and utters (18). This case also shows that there is not always a guarantee as to which is the relevant place. But more than this, it shows that there is no stable relation that holds such that there is a guarantee as to which of the many possible places an utterance concerns or is about.

Recanati (2007) has argued that we should treat (18) relativistically even though the places in question are not the same throughout nor do speakers bear the same relation to them. He claims that there are two sorts of ways in which (18) may be relativized and that each corresponds to two modes of discourse (or language-games): one is an egocentric mode and the other is an anaphoric mode. On the egocentric mode, the place is inherited from the context in which the utterance is made and so there is an invariant relation that the speaker bears to different places, namely, the ones he is in. On the anaphoric mode, the place is obtained from what is cognitively salient or in the background conversation, and there is an invariant function though obtained in virtue of speakers’ intentions:

Whenever there is parametric invariance, there is something that does not vary (the function) and something that varies (the value of the function, which varies as a function of its arguments). [...] the relevant parameter will be the topic of conversation. Now the value of that parameter varies as a function of the intentions which the speaker makes sufficiently manifest to the hearer. What varies freely here are the speaker’s intentions, which are indeed fairly unconstrained. But those intentions serve as argument to the function, and the arguments to the function are unconstrained in all cases of parametric invariance. When the mode of discourse concerns local weather, the argument is the place of utterance, and that is unconstrained too: one can say ‘It is raining’ anywhere, and wherever one says it (in that mode), what one says will be true iff it is raining there. Similarly, in the other mode, one can intend to
characterize the weather at any place by saying ‘It is raining’, and whatever the place one thereby intends to characterize, what one says will be true iff it is raining in that place. (Recanati 2007, pp. 283-4)

Things seem to be forced on Recanati’s relativist account of (18) since there isn’t a single function for all utterances of (18), nor can there be if we are not to leave out one of his two ways of obtaining a place, either by the local-weather-talk practice or through speakers’ intentions. So why force things in this direction? Recanati’s motivation was to supply an alternative to an unarticulated constituents account of utterances of (18), where the propositional content expressed by such utterances involve an unarticulated constituent of the proposition, namely, a place. For him, if there is anything that is unarticulated then it does not figure in the propositional content expressed, rather it serves just to introduce a parameter relative to which truth is obtained. Although Recanati has succeeded in presenting an alternative to the unarticulated constituents explanation, he has not given us reasons to accept it more readily than it nor has he argued directly against it. Because of this and because there is not a single function for all utterances of (18), we should not be so quick to give up an unarticulated constituents account, hence, a contextualist account of ‘to rain’. On the latter, the meaning of ‘to rain’ requires that there be a place in which it occurs, thus obtaining a systematic account of the context sensitivity of (18) despite the way in which that place is supplied being up for grabs.

Another criterion is present in Kaplan (1977, p. 504), King (2003, p. 202) and Stanley (2005, pp. 134-6). They hold that one may introduce new parameters for relativizing truth if and only if there

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26 In fact, without an argument against an unarticulated constituents account, Recanati’s explanation could not be adopted without begging the question against moderate contextualism.

are operators that shift parameters. So we can introduce a parameter for worlds because there are shifting parameter operators in the language such as ‘actual’ and ‘actually’. In the case of places, ‘somewhere’ may be taken to be such operator:

\[(27) \text{ Somewhere, the sun is shining.}\]

If ‘somewhere’ is genuinely an operator, then we would have a reason to suppose that places are a parameter relative to which truth is predicated. Kaplan himself proposed (1977, p. 504) to treat sentences like (18) as expressing (or having as a content) a function from location, time and world, to truth-values. But King (2003) has recently argued that ‘somewhere’ behaves more like a quantifier over places than an operator. For one thing ‘somewhere’ occurs in argument positions in different sentences (e.g. (28)-(30)).

\[(28) \text{ John was somewhere.}\]

\[(29) \text{ Somewhere is pretty.}\]

\[(30) \text{ He found somewhere to go.}\]

\[(31) \text{ Somewhere in North Lake Tahoe is prettier than here.}\]

\[(32) \text{ John was somewhere in North Lake Tahoe.}\]

\[(33) \text{ Chris went somewhere in North Lake Tahoe every Friday.}\]

Furthermore, ‘somewhere’ can be restricted with predicative material (as in (31)-(33)) which is a trait of quantifiers, and can

\footnote{\((27)-(29)\) and \((31)-(32)\) are King’s examples (2003, p. 224). He acknowledges that \((29)\) may sound a bit strange, but he assumes it is because of the unrestricted quantification and parallels it to ‘Something is beautiful’ which is similar though slightly less odd.}

exhibit scope ambiguities with respect to other quantifiers: (33) can be read as Chris going to different places on different Friday nights, and as going to the same place every Friday night. A further argument against treating ‘somewhere’ or even ‘anywhere’ as operators is that they do not iterate as operators do (‘It is necessary that it is necessary that...’). Whether Kaplan, King and Stanley are right in supposing that parameters can only be introduced if there are operators that shift them is not an issue I shall address. But if they are, it is clear that we have no reason to introduce parameters for places, and so a relativist account of (18) is undermined.

It seems then that we have very little reason for thinking that (18) is true relative to a place. The exact context sensitive account of those utterances will have to wait, but there are at least three accounts of which the moderate contextualist may avail herself. On one, offered by Perry (1986, p. 210), the meaning of ‘to rain’ requires that a place be introduced at the semantic content level. The meaning of ‘to rain’ is that it occurs in places, so it will determine

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28 King does not use this argument against location operators but he could. See King 2003, p. 228.
29 There is another argument for introducing a parameter that needs mentioning. This has to do with alleged cases of faultless disagreements, in which we consider an assertion of sentence S and a denial of S, and we have the intuition that both are asserting and denying the same thing whilst both being correct or true (in some sense). The introduction of the parameter is motivated to explain why the two assertions are seemingly true: they would be true relative to different parameters. On such an account, the same proposition is being asserted and denied, yet it is done relative to different parameters: John asserts p relative to a parameter m’ and Mary asserts p relative to a parameter m”. However, this sort of motivation would not be applicable to our case for there is no initial scenario in which we would have the intuition that there is an assertion of (18) and a denial of it such that both are asserting and denying the same and both are correct or say something true.

that part of the contribution of the verb to the semantic content of the uttered sentence will be a place, whether this be the place the speaker is in or not. Two others are considered by Stanley (2000): one (very Davidsonian in spirit) involves ‘rain’ introducing a hidden event or situation variable,\(^{30}\) and another introducing variables for location and time. Whilst the first approach is only available to the moderate contextualist, either of these last two can be accepted not only by the moderate contextualist but also by the semantic minimalist for it requires that at the level of Logical Form there are representations of events or location and time.

It should be clear that the fact that we should prefer an analysis of quantifier expressions and ‘to rain’ on which they are context sensitive does not entail that for every expression for which we can obtain a CSTA we will be able to rule out a relativist account of it. Adjectives of taste, like ‘beautiful’, ‘delicious’, and so on, may well require such an account.\(^{31}\)

\(^{30}\) A Davidsonian reason for an account of this sort would be to allow for inferences from sentences with adverbial modifications, for example, from ‘It rained heavily for a while’ to ‘It rained’. CST arguments for ‘to rain’, however, help us distinguish the role which a place has for the truth-conditions of any utterance of a sentence containing ‘to rain’, from the role that the different ways of raining have. For whilst a CST argument for ‘to rain’ requires that a place be supplied somehow, this is not so with the different ways of raining. As elsewhere, we may have perfectly determinate truth-conditions that are indeterminate with respect to the ways it may rain.

\(^{31}\) For an overview of the different relativist positions see Kölbel 2008, and a defence of one see Kölbel 2002. For a contextualist account of such adjectives, see Glanzberg 2007. Glanzberg 2007 also instructively shows that we could not accept the criteria given in Richard 2004 for the introduction of parameters for we would end up with a rather uncomfortable and more radical relativism. In any event, Richard’s criteria

5. FINAL REMARKS

I have argued that, contrary to what semantic minimalists have claimed, moderate contextualism is a stable view by providing motivation for it that does not lead to radical contextualism. I have offered a different way of motivating moderate contextualism that does not enquire into competent speakers’ judgments about what is said by utterances of sentences, but rather which enquires after truth-value judgments. However, it might appear that moderate contextualism as I have motivated it has introduced and relies on an unexplained notion of what is said for although it does not ask explicitly what judges think has been said, it does speak of literal utterances and it asks for their judgments about the truth values of such literal utterances. However, even if this is right and there is a notion of what is said that is being used upon obtaining evidence from CST arguments, it is of an innocuous sort.

Indeed, in constructing CST arguments we have appealed to literal utterances by a speaker, but by it we have only meant that the speaker is uttering a sentence without intending to say something metaphorical, ironic, sarcastic, etc., or to conversationally implicate something else. We have given only a negative characterization of such utterances and not a positive one. In particular, we have not intended by a ‘literal utterance’ anything about the success of a speaker’s intentions in saying something, and so have not committed ourselves to a particular view of what is said. There is no commitment to what is said as characterized by Grice, namely, as what is essentially opposed to what is conversationally and conventionally implicated, though we have taken something from this characterization. Nor is there a commitment to what is said as a

are more of a faultless disagreement sort and hence not relevant for our case at hand. See footnote 29.

locutionary act, that is, as an act of saying something of something else, or as an illocutionary act, viz. as an act akin to assertion where a commitment to the truth of what is uttered is involved, or to any other account.

It is worth emphasizing that it is not clear that the CSTA strategy does in effect rely on a notion of what is said, for all it requires is that competent speakers make judgments of truth-values of utterances. However, some may think that competent speakers cannot make judgments about truth-values of utterances without thinking about what those utterances say, but then the notion of what is said that underlies CST arguments is of an innocuous sort. If CST arguments require that judges consider what is said in order to assign a truth-value to an utterance, the notion of what is said that they will be working with will just be whatever they take that to be, for they are relying on their own intuitions of what is said (or uttered). Hence, CST arguments’ reliance on what is said (if there is any) is of an innocent sort, in particular, one that does not require a preference for a particular theory of it. Thus whether one or another account of what is said is correct, though something that would be interesting to consider, it is not essential for the strategy here advocated, in particular, it is not essential to show that moderate contextualism is a stable position.

REFERENCES


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