

BOOK REVIEW: GABRIEL, G. *Kant. Eine kürze Einführung in das Gesamtwerk*. Paderborn, Brill/ Schönningh, 2022, 144 pp).

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Abstract: Critical Study. Gottfried Gabriel: Kant. Eine kürze Einführung in das Gesamtwerk. Paderborn. Brill/ Schönningh, 2022.

This work should and can be considered from three points of view:

- a. In the first place, and as the title itself announces no less than the collection in which it is inserted, it is an introduction to Kant's thought. In this sense, it provides a set of indispensable basic information, which can be

found in many other introductions in this or another form.

- b. Secondly, this introduction is made from a particular point of view, namely that of offering a panoramic presentation of the whole of Kant's work in a problem-theoretical (*problemtheoretisch*) key. This implies, on the one hand, attention to the structure of the Kantian system and, on the other hand, to the internal articulations of the individual major works. Here we have, therefore, something that can be considered a novelty in comparison to other introductions. However, if this novelty is maintained from an exegetical and historical-philosophical point of view, another novelty already advances on the systematic level, establishing not merely an interpretation, but a philosophical dialogue with Kant. Starting from the principle that to understand an author is to go beyond him and that the attentive study of the classics, when properly carried out from a theoretical-problematic perspective, far from inhibiting personal reflective effort, promotes it (p. 15), Gabriel transcends Kant's results and explores possibilities that the philosopher merely hinted at. In this way, he arrives to offer a reflection on the idea of philosophical knowledge and its peculiar epistemological status, on the one hand and on the other hand,
- c. to question the Kantian starting point that the proposition is the exclusive realm of truth, thus drawing attention to the cognitive function of metaphors, symbols, and images and therefore considering the existence of knowledge and truth in art.

Based on the above, we will arrange our presentation in four parts, beginning with a quick description of the course of the book in which we will highlight those points that, in

one way or another, imply a peculiar emphasis in comparison to other introductions. In this panoramic presentation, however, we will omit those points that we will analyze in detail in the following three parts.

1. Summary of the Book Through Description of Chapter Contents

Chapters 1 and 2 are dedicated to preambles that analyze the pre-critical Kant, indicating, on the one hand, some key moments in the intellectual development that lead us to the *KrV* and, on the other hand, providing some biographical data that aims to give an image of Kant as a person. Special attention should be paid to the author's consideration of trying to undo the image of Kant as an abstract philosopher, detached from all experience and, why not say it, from human traits. This is intended to remove the initiator from certain clichés and oversimplifications that are extremely widespread and that are repeated at other times, as we have already pointed out.

Chapter 3 offers, as an introduction to the system, an orderly classification of Kant's works by subject and in chronological order, highlighting six thematic nuclei, namely epistemology, ethics, aesthetics, empirical point of view, political-cultural writings, philosophy of history and, lastly, logic.

Chapter 4 provides an overview of Kant's conception of philosophy and the articulation of the system. There is, of course, a correspondence between the structure of Kant's system in the three critiques, the tripartite division of the faculties of the soul prevalent in 18th-century Germany (understanding, will, and feeling), and the three classical

objects of philosophy (the true, the good and the beautiful), so that in each critique the principles governing each of these faculties and determining their specific objects are investigated. This arrangement, which, if correctly understood, is unquestionable, can, however, lead to incorrectly linking the task of critical philosophy to psychology. This danger leads to the necessity of placing a strong emphasis on the distinction between *Genese* and *Geltung* and of observing that the linking of the three Critiques to the three objects and of the latter to three faculties cannot overlook the fact that in all cases it is not a question of their actual empirical use, but of their *a priori* principles. By correctly emphasizing the centrality of the notion of validity (*Geltung*), the real problem of critical philosophy as a whole becomes fixed as the foundation of aspirations for universal validity. From what has been said, it is clear that Gabriel's general view of transcendental philosophy fits into the neo-Kantian tradition, according to which transcendental philosophy is essentially *Geltungstheorie*. Since aspirations of validity find their manifestation in judgments, the articulation of the critical system in three moments ends up referring to the existence of three types of irreducible judgments, namely the epistemological, the ethical and the aesthetic judgment. Consequently, judgment is a unifying factor throughout the different Critiques and a decisive element in their internal articulation. Since judgment is the object of study of logic, an internal link is established between logic and the other philosophical disciplines, and it is evident that the classification of judgments will play a crucial role in Kantian thought.

Chapter 5 deals with the Kantian concept of metaphysics and, above all, with the meaning of Kant's critique of metaphysics. The main aim of the *KrV* is to analyze the possibility of metaphysics as a science (p. 36). This theme has

two aspects: on the one hand, it is about the critique of metaphysics as a science in the form intended by rationalism (p. 42), on the other hand, however, the accent is always on how questions do not simply disappear but are rethought in new ways and different contexts (p. 54). Kant reformulates rationalist metaphysics into a metaphysics of nature and a metaphysics of morals, the former being limited in its results to setting out the conditions of possibility of empirical knowledge, while the latter will give rise to the ultimate human interests that constituted the legitimate motivating core of metaphysics.

Chapter 6 considers the theory of critical knowledge in general. The decisive point is the observation that this theory of knowledge is never an end in itself, but a means to a philosophical end that transcends it (p. 37). Note that, just as Gabriel stresses that Kant's main aim is the critical reformulation of metaphysics, he also emphasises the instrumental value of the theory of knowledge; in other words, the *Erkenntnistheorie* is not the ultimate end, but only the means for a re-foundation of metaphysics, which will ultimately anchor it to ethics. The significance of this statement can be overlooked by the novice reader. Indeed, it has been a perennial objection to Kant, no less than to neo-Kantianism, to observe in both a one-sided or primarily epistemological interest. This is certainly as false concerning Kant as it is concerning neo-Kantianism, but nothing less than Heidegger's authority has imposed this view in wide circles, always in the context of his critique of the primacy of the theoretical. Here again, as already about Kant's personality, Gabriel meets the facile generalisations in vogue among the non-specialist public. This approach will be repeated in the distancing Kant's image as the all-crushing destroyer (*Alleszermahler*), the rigorist in ethics, etc. Gabriel devotes special attention to the treatment of analytical

judgments. Analytical judgments, we are told, broaden our knowledge insofar as they make conceptual relations explicit (p. 40). The above consideration will allow us to affirm that Kant's definitions are not purely conventional and that they possess a cognitive value. Such remarks, which bring Kant closer to Frege, must be linked to the fact that, as we shall see below, Gabriel regards philosophical judgments as extensive analytic judgments (*Erweiterungsurteile*). The rest of the chapter discusses key concepts in Kantian systematics, such as the principle of causality, the distinction between phenomenon and thing in itself, etc.

While chapters 7 and 8 will be considered at another time, let us say that chapter 9 concentrates on the notions of sensibility and understanding. The radical distinction between sensibility and understanding places Kant in opposition to both rationalism and empiricism, establishing between the two a complementary and not an exclusive priority. Intuition and concept show a different structure, for while the former is dominated by the all-part relation, the latter is ruled by the universal-particular relation. For this reason, intuition and concept follow two different logics (p. 61), which require a different treatment in general and transcendental logic. While in the former there is between the two a merely formal difference of generality, namely between the universal and the particular, in the latter it is a question of a fundamental epistemological difference as two irreducible sources of knowledge.

Chapter 10 deals with Transcendental Dialectics. At the transcendental level, there is no theory of correct inference, but only a Transcendental Dialectic, which will be concerned with the basic structure of the fallacious inferences that lie at the basis of metaphysics. Kant distinguishes between inferences of the understanding and inferences of reason, the

former being immediate, the latter not. The inferences of reason in metaphysics are dialectical in that they seek to derive something new in a pro-syllogistic way, proceeding from the conditioned to its condition to jump from there to the unconditioned or absolute. We arrive in this way at the three Ideas of the special metaphysics (God, Soul, World). It is well known that Kant does not grant the Ideas a constitutive function, but a regulative one, ascribing to them a heuristic but not a strictly cognitive value. This point is of special interest for the reflection introduced by Gabriel, which we address in section B, since, as he indicates, the basis for the aforementioned Kantian thesis is ultimately none other than the reduction of knowledge to propositional truth. Finally, special mention should be made of the analysis of the proofs of the existence of God and the treatment of existence that anticipates Frege, not least the emphasis placed on the fact that the question of freedom opens the passage to ethics.

Chapter 11 deals with the Doctrine of Method. This is guided by the principle that there is no specific transcendental method, its main aim being to distinguish the philosophical method from the mathematical method. We shall discuss the issues arising from this in more detail below.

Chapter 12 begins the consideration of Kantian ethics, starting with the structure of the *KpV*, which we discuss below. Chapter 13, however, moves on to the analysis of the content of Kantian ethics, offering a general characterisation of it as an ethics of duty, prescriptive, formalist, universalist and cognitivist (p. 94), thus opposed to all eudemonic ethics, no less than to all emotivist ethics. Certainly, feelings do not cease to play a role in Kant as motivators of behaviour, but, unlike all emotivism, they are not the foundation of ethics. Gabriel complements his analysis with a consideration, on

the one hand, of the main principles and general features of Kantian ethics, and on the other, of some particular doctrines of special relevance, such as those referring to goodwill, the consideration of man as an end in himself, the derivations of this idea with the question of carnal love and the conception of marriage, racism, etc.

Chapter 14 considers the relationship between moral law and freedom of the will (p. 96). If, on the one hand, freedom is the ontological foundation of morality, on the other hand, morality is the cognitive foundation of freedom, since we recognise our freedom through the moral law. Morality is independent of all knowledge of the world and also of faith in God. Taking up and making explicit his claims about Kant's relation to metaphysics, Gabriel insists that Kant moves the very motivation of metaphysics from the theoretical to the practical realm. It is about the primacy of practical reason. Although Kant also carries out a metaphysics of nature, his primary aim is the foundation of the metaphysics of morals.

Chapter 15 deals with the thing itself and its relation to the postulates. Of the three Ideas (freedom, God, immortality), the first is highlighted as the one that is essential to the system. The other two Ideas do not contribute to the foundation of the system but lie in the field of religious hope. The antinomies of practical reason consist of the realisation that there is nothing in the world that ensures harmony between virtue and happiness/bliss (*Glückseligkeit*). To dissolve them, God and immortality are necessary. Therefore, also in the practical field, we are directed to the distinction between phenomenon and thing-in-itself. It is in this context that the sentence in the *KrV* that "I had to limit (*aufheben*) knowledge to give rise to belief (*Glauben*)" acquires its true meaning. The belief at stake here

is rational, but one that fits easily with Christianity. Distancing himself from other influential readings such as the neo-Kantian, Gabriel insists that the distinction between phenomenon and thing-in-itself is an essential element of the critical system, which fulfills four fundamental goals:

- a. to account for the possibility of synthetic *a priori* judgments in mathematics and physics,
- b. to reject the objection of subjective idealism,
- c. to ensure freedom of will,
- d. to enable hope in the fulfilment of man's religious needs.

Chapter 16 deals with the *KU*. Gabriel stresses that this work deals with two distinguishable problems, the finality of nature and art, which, in principle, would have required two different critiques. Kant gives a joint treatment of these two problems with the fragile argument that they both deal with Judgment (*Urteilstkraft*), in one case teleological, in the other aesthetic, and that they both have to do with finality, albeit of very different types. While the *KrV* and *KpV* constitute elements of a unitary project that is present from the beginning of critical philosophy, the two critiques of judgment are not part of this project, being a later addition. The reasons for this are as follows.

- a. Initially, Kant considers aesthetic judgment to be a mere empirical circumstance that cannot be the object of philosophical investigation in respect of which it is possible to establish *a priori* principles.
- b. Kant accepts, in the beginning, the Newtonian mechanical view of nature (which excludes finality) and remains in this conviction at least until the *Metaphysical Principles of Natural Science*, where he

explicitly states that science is only such insofar as it contains mathematics.

- c. While Kant leaves open the possibility of a completely mechanical explanation of nature in his early works, he denies it altogether in the *KU*, in which he considers that mathematical physics needs to be supplemented in its consideration of nature.

Chapter 17 deals with Kantian aesthetics, which, as we noted at the beginning, deals with the question of feeling. However, insofar as the feeling of pleasure and displeasure plays no role in theoretical and practical judgment, but has the character of a mere accompaniment, Kant attributes to it a place of its own with regard to aesthetic judgment (p. 108). As to the space devoted to Kant's aesthetics, it clearly shows the interests that are dear to Gabriel. The chapter is subdivided into two parts of varying importance, aesthetic judgment and aesthetic knowledge. Since the latter is dealt with separately, it is appropriate here to make only a few remarks on the former. In aesthetic judgment, we distinguish two types, judgments of beauty and judgments of sublimity. Every aesthetic judgment is connected with feeling (*Gefühl*), and, in particular, with the feeling of pleasure (*Lust*), but in different characteristic forms according to its type. Aesthetic judgments, however, are not judgments about an object, but about the feeling that this object arouses in us, and in this sense they are "subjective". Nevertheless, as they are subjective, in this sense, they can legitimately aspire to universal validity, even if, on the other hand, they are immediate and not capable of being grounded in rules. What provokes the feeling of pleasure is the harmony it brings about in the interplay of the faculties.

Chapter 18 deals with teleological thought, and little more can be said here, except to underline its relationship with the

attempt at a foundation of biology, on the one hand, and with an extremely topical question of the time in connection with the teleological proofs of the existence of God, on the other hand.

Chapters 19 and 20 consider Kant's minor writings, which go beyond systematic inspiration and have a strong motivating element in the situations at that time in Germany. The change in the political situation is emphasised in this respect. On the death of Frederick the Great of Prussia, Frederick II succeeded to the throne and initiated an anti-Enlightenment movement, which led to a radical distinction being drawn between freedom of thought and freedom of expression, with clear limits being imposed on the latter. This political movement was accompanied and prepared by an anti-rationalist philosophical movement. Kant opposes both of them in various writings and will try in some way to counteract this revolt. Because of his publications on religion at the limits of reason, Kant will be subject to restrictions on his public manifestations related to such sensitive issues.

Chapter 20 deals with the Kantian philosophy of history in its interrelations with ethics and the philosophy of religion.

In his conclusion, Gabriel ends by underlining those aspects of his book that he considers worthy of note and which we have highlighted in our exposition.

2. Logic

The centrality of the notion of judgment in the three Critiques leads us to expect common structures among them. Since judgment is the specific object of logic, let us

then turn to Kantian *Logic* in more detail. In other introductions, perhaps Kantian logic would not deserve special attention and would be considered one of the minor works. In Gabriel's case, and for the reasons given above, the *Logic* becomes fundamental and a special chapter is devoted to it, chapter 7.

With the treatment of logic as in chapter 7, the chronological order is interrupted, since, in chapter 4, where in the overview the chronological order is followed, logic is analysed last. Therefore, the three critiques should precede this chapter. But, for the reason stated above, only after this chapter can the structure of the Critiques themselves be placed.

Kantian *Logic* was published late, in 1812. This deserves some clarification. Kant never published a work with this title, but what is considered as such is a posthumous publication of his logic lessons by Jäsche. However, Jäsche's edition is problematic, as it brings together manuscripts from different periods. In addition, in his courses, whether in logic or metaphysics, Kant followed the usual manuals of his time, in the latter case, Baumgarten's, in the former, Meier's, expounding and commenting on them. Therefore, not everything Kant states in his *Vorlesungen* should be taken as his official position, and it can be presumed that some particular doctrines stated therein do not correspond exactly to Kant's systematic opinion. This explains some deviations in the structure of the critical works from the *Logic*.

Kantian logic is formal and normative. It does not, by itself, consider the content of the judgment and therefore does not guarantee the material truth of the judgment, for which a complement is necessary, which will be provided by

transcendental logic or epistemology. It also deals with criteria of validity that oppose all psychologism.

The main division of logic is the distinction between the Doctrine of elements and the Doctrine of the method. The Doctrine of Elements properly constitutes formal logic and follows the classical order from the simple to the complex, considering, in this order, concept, judgment and reasoning. The Doctrine of Method considers how the elements treated in the previous theory can be united in the whole of science and, for this reason, it corresponds to what we would today consider the theory of science.

One of the main results of logic for the construction of the system is the table of judgments, which has always been criticised for its artificial symmetry and suffers from problems such as the overlapping of the content of the judgment and the act of judging.

The *KrV*, the *KpV* and the *KU* all have a common structure in which the distinction between the Doctrine of the elements and the Doctrine of method stands out as the main division. In all three cases, however, there is already a difference concerning general logic, since both doctrines are qualified as “transcendental”. On this parallelism, however, differences are established between them which are at the same time differences from *Logic* itself and which, in all cases, respond to reasons of content.

Beginning with the *KrV*. Within the Doctrine of the Elements, there are two novelties concerning *Logic*. On the one hand, there is a subdivision in the Analytic between aesthetics and transcendental logic, thus introducing a chapter, on transcendental aesthetics, which has no parallel in formal logic. Transcendental logic, on the contrary, has, as

a theory of judgment, a clear correspondence with the general logic. The lack of transcendental aesthetics in general logic, and its presence in transcendental logic, refers to the fact that while the former deals with the formal conditions of all truth, the latter has to account for knowledge, which has content and therefore necessarily refers to intuition.

The treatment of aesthetics and analytics in separate chapters has a link with the Kantian thesis of the radical difference between sensibility and understanding. In the *Logic*, Kant does not insist on this difference, probably because he follows the arrangement of Meier's *Logic*. The way the relation between concept and intuition is treated in the *Logic* is purely formal between the general and the individual representation, without any reference to sensibility in the case of the latter.

On the other hand, transcendental logic is now subdivided into an analytic and a transcendental dialectic. The reason for this is that although formal logic deals with concept, judgment and reasoning, in transcendental logic the doctrine of pro-syllogistic reasoning, which is characteristic of metaphysics, is dealt with in the Dialectic.

In short, the two structural differences between *Logic* and *KrV* refer to the fact that we are no longer concerned with the formal conditions of truth, but with its material conditions, and thus no longer with the validity of inference, but with the validity of knowledge. Precisely for this reason, and despite the parallels, neither the doctrine of concepts nor that of principles is the same, for in transcendental logic it is not a question of any and every concept but of the categories, which is reflected in turn in the theory of principles.

But, in addition to these two differences, there is a third and essential point that should be highlighted. Not only are there formal parallels and differences between *Logic* and *KrV*, but there is also a theoretical inheritance of fundamental relevance: the classification of judgments. Indeed, categories are derived from judgments. The manifest Kantian interest in such a derivation clearly documents, then, that *KrV* not only guides its formal structure to Kantian Logic, but also draws from it for the development of some fundamental contents (p. 57).

In the case of the *KpV*, we start again from the basic differentiation of an elementary doctrine of practical reason and a doctrine of the method of practical reason, and, following what was already the case in the *KrV*, we move away from *Logic* to distinguish, within the doctrine of the elements, between an analytic and a dialectic. Within the Analytic, there are two essential differences with the *KrV*. On the one hand, in this case, the Doctrine of the principles precedes the Doctrine of the concept, since the moral law is primary to the concept of the good. On the other hand, instead of having an autonomous Aesthetics within the Doctrine of the Elements, we have only an Analytic, since in ethics, sensibility does not constitute a positive basis or foundation of judgment, but a subordinate plane, a factor in the motivation of action (*Triebfeder*). It is precisely for this reason that the sensibility at stake here no longer refers to sensations, but to feelings. In any case, it is worth noting that in the doctrine of the *Triebfeder*, the *Achtung* is something completely different from sensitive feelings. Lastly, the Doctrine of the method also takes on a different role, since it is no longer a method for knowledge, but proper guidance for moral education.

As we know, the *KU* presents a particularity related to the two previous critiques concerning its place in the Kantian system, since it will deal equally with aesthetics and teleology. Therefore, its relation to *Logic* must undergo a differentiated analysis. Kant continues to follow with respect to both the order of a distinction between Analytic and Dialectic. Strikingly, however, the Analytic itself is now an Analytic essentially linked to Aesthetics, whereas the Doctrine of Method appears only in relation to teleological judgment. This is because, since there are no rules of aesthetic judgment, as it were, there can be no Doctrine of method concerning it either. If the above already shows that the *KU* is not easily integrated into the scheme of *Logic*, this is even more evident in the application on the aesthetic plane in the classification of judgments by quantity, relation and modality. The adequacy of the aesthetic judgment to the table of judgments is purely artificial.

In short, if the three Critiques follow the formal scheme of *Logic*, they are not exactly parallel, but introduce novelties that are required by the nature of the content they are to deal with and which distinguish them from *Logic* and individualise them from each other (p. 27, 48).

3. The Status of Philosophical Knowledge

The treatment of the Doctrine of Method leads Gabriel to a principled reflection on the possibility, status and specificities of philosophical knowledge, which is not only concerned with making explicit the nature of philosophical knowledge according to Kant, but also introduces a systematic point of view.

Knowingly, Kant asserts two theses: on the one hand, that all knowledge presupposes intuition and concept, and on the other hand, however, that philosophical knowledge is rational knowledge by concepts. The apparent contradiction forces us to make the Kantian thesis about the epistemological peculiarity of philosophy more explicit (p. 75). A quick survey of the history of philosophy shows that this problem is not unique to Kant, but is present in other authors, from Hume to Wittgenstein (p. 76).

There are two possibilities here, either to accept that the thesis that knowledge presupposes intuition is valid only in the case of knowledge of objects, but not for second-order knowledge, such as philosophical knowledge, or to accept that this presupposes it in another way and in another sense than empirical knowledge, for example, in an indirect way, as would be the case with metaphors. Here, intuition would not be totally dispensed with, but it would be given a different function. Gabriel explicitly focuses his attention on the first possibility, but, as we shall see, he does not seem to totally disregard the second one.

Let us begin with the first possibility and, for a more in-depth analysis, let us concentrate on a particular case, namely, the Kantian distinction between analytic and synthetic judgments. According to Gabriel, this classification is operated by an analysis of the concept of knowledge (p. 78). The judgment about the types of judgments is a meta-judgment, and the question is to determine its status. Is this judgment an analytic or a synthetic judgment? Gabriel answers that it is an analytic judgment that, however, is of a special kind. Indeed, we have to differentiate between analytic judgments that merely proceed by decomposition of the concept into its characteristics (*Merkmale*), and which we might well call merely elucidatory analytic judgments, and

another type of analytic judgment, which broadens our knowledge and which we might well call amplifying analytic judgments (*Erweiterungsurteile*), providing a new determination of concepts and distinctions. In short, we must introduce a further distinction within analytic judgments to account for the peculiar status of judgments in which philosophical knowledge is expressed. Kant's mistake is to consider that an analytic judgment can only be elucidatory and cannot extend our knowledge, which ends up preventing him from adequately conceptualizing the very status of philosophical judgments.

Gabriel says very little about what legitimises these broadening judgments. Perhaps the answer to this question is to be found in another element that Gabriel stresses concerning philosophical knowledge, namely that even if this is rational knowledge by pure concepts, it does not cease to possess a link to sensible intuition, even if, admittedly, of another kind than empirical knowledge, namely by images and metaphors. This places philosophy in a special relationship with the *Dichtung*, which, of course, will imply at least qualifying the idea that philosophy is properly a science.

To demonstrate the plausibility of his thesis, Gabriel refers us to the Kantian treatment of transcendental Ideas (p. 78). What is the epistemological status itself of the Ideas of reason? That they are not knowledge *per se*, but that they play a role in knowledge, namely heuristic, is clear. But we cannot say that philosophical knowledge plays a heuristic role. There is another point, however, where a relation could be established, namely in the fact that even if the Ideas cannot be fully realised in sensible intuition, they do not lack all relation thereto. Indeed, there exists concerning them a "*symbolische Hypotyposen*", that is, they can be made intuitively accessible in an indirect way through images, comparisons

and metaphors. In sum, if we attend to the previous consideration, all knowledge would have a relation with intuition, even though this could be direct, as in the case of first-order knowledge, or indirect, as in the case of second-order philosophical knowledge.

4. The Possibility of Non-Propositional Knowledge and Art as a Mode Of Knowledge

The previous consideration leads us to place explicitly a more general question. Judgments occupy a central place in critical philosophy because, according to Kant, only they can be true or false. Kant thus reflects based on a tradition for which all knowledge is linked to propositional truth (p. 48). But is this unquestionable? Is all knowledge propositional?

The previous considerations on philosophical knowledge have revolved around the role of intuition in knowledge no less than the attention to possibilities of the relation of knowledge to sensible intuition diverse from that established in transcendental aesthetics. The notion of a "*symbolische Hypotyposen*" of the Ideas of reason evidences the possibility of another type of relation that is not that given in the empirical knowledge that Kant thematises. With this, Kant concedes in the treatment of the Ideas of reason that imaginative expressions possess a cognitive value.

On the above basis, Gabriel advances in his treatment of aesthetics by considering the possibility that art is a form of knowledge or contains a cognitive value, a thesis that he clearly wishes to differentiate from another, justly expressly denied by Kant, that aesthetic judgment expresses knowledge. According to Gabriel, it is here, in the treatment of the aesthetic Ideas, that there is in Kant a starting point

for the idea of the cognitive value of art, even if, certainly, Kant does not expressly affirm this thesis. To support his point of view, Gabriel analyses in detail the function of aesthetic Ideas, establishing their relationship both with sensible intuition and with the Ideas of reason. What is characteristic of aesthetic Ideas is that, even if a process of progressive conceptualisation of them is always possible, they can never be fully conceptualised. This links Kantian aesthetic ideas to Baumgarten's *perceptio praegnans*. In both cases, we are dealing with representations (*Vorstellungen*) that cannot be fully conceptualised. Their cognitive value consists in the fact that, as opposed to logical distinctions through characteristics (*Merkmale*), they operate a concentration (*Verdichtung*) that releases concomitant or associated representations (*Nebenvorstellungen*) based on similarity and analogy. It is through this connotative power that the image can establish links and relationships that could hardly be achieved in a purely conceptual way.

The analysis of the aesthetic Ideas leads back to the consideration of the Ideas of reason, establishing an important link between the two. In fact, both the one and the other have a peculiar relation with respect to the relation established by Kant in knowledge between intuition and concept. Moreover, insofar as the Ideas of reason cannot be fully retranslated in terms of intuition, aesthetic Ideas cannot be fully retranslated in terms of the concept. In the case of the aesthetic Idea, the adequate concept to account for the intuition is lacking; in the case of the Ideas of reason, the adequate intuition for the concept is lacking. It is then precisely for this inverse reason that Kant denies one and the other Ideas the possibility of mediating knowledge. To sum up: *“Wenn man Kant nicht darin folgt, Erkenntnis ausschliesslich an die Form des Urteils zu binden, kann man mit Kant gegen Kant nicht*

nur ästhetischen Ideen, sondern auch Vernunftideen einen Erkenntniswert zusprechen., (p. 117)¹

5. Final Considerations.

To conclude our analysis, we would like to introduce four considerations with which we intend to leave open an equal number of questions.

- a. Gabriel establishes a clear relation in terms of epistemological status between the Ideas of reason, aesthetic Ideas and philosophy. Even though there is a difference between the three, since in the first two cases, and more clearly in the second, it is a matter of non-propositional knowledge, in the third, it is a matter of propositional knowledge albeit of a special kind. In any case, despite this difference, there is something in common which seems to be the desire to avoid the reduction of all forms of knowledge to scientific knowledge (p. 111).
- b. There is a certain oscillation in Gabriel's approach concerning the revision of the thesis that all truth is found in judgment, since at times this thesis is understood in the sense of indicating that of a non-propositional knowledge, at others, in a more careful way, of a certain cognitive content present

¹ I cannot fail to observe that Gabriel's critical ideas concerning Kant are a reflection of a systematic effort that constitutes the central aim of other works by the author, such as *Präzision und Prägnanz: Logische, rhetorische, ästhetische und literarische Erkenntnisformen* (Paderborn, Mentis, 2019) and *Erkenntnis* (Berlin, De Gruyter, 2015).

in non-propositional structures (p. 114). This is very clear in the case of art, but it could also be indicated in the case of the Ideas of reason. Perhaps this would require a careful analysis of the relations and differences between cognitive content and knowledge itself. If the image has a cognitive value, it is because it plays an auxiliary, even if necessary, role in the construction of knowledge. This does not mean, however, that the image is in itself knowledge. We could accept that the image has a cognitive value in the sense of playing a role in knowledge, but precisely because this role is subsidiary and dependent, we should not consider that in the image as such there is knowledge.

- c. In short, if we take together what Gabriel says about philosophy and what he says about art, we always find that, as opposed to the Kantian scheme, which starts from an absolute distinction and autonomy of intuition and concept, and considers that only in their integration is knowledge produced, two possibilities are considered, one on the side of intuition and the other on the side of the concept, which leads to a sort of cognitive continuum in which the case considered by Kant appears at the midpoint, but for the two sides there are possibilities of different degrees.
- d. In Gabriel's considerations with respect to philosophical knowledge, as well as to art, I see an essential link that obviously revolves around the specificity of the relation of both to sensible intuition, given the singularity of this relation as opposed to that present in empirical knowledge. If we understand metaphor in a form that is not

merely linguistic, but as a reference to any mode of imagistic presentation, we could say that here we are confronted with a central philosophical problem, whose importance has been decisive in recent times, concerning the relation between metaphor and literality. It seems to me that this question is linked to that concerning the relation between sensible intuition and understanding or concept, which was already widely addressed in the eighteenth century, and concerning which critical philosophy establishes a decisive position on the radical and absolute distinction between the two. Given the above, we might ask ourselves whether Gabriel's proposal does not ultimately lead to the establishment of a difference of degree between metaphor and literalism, between image and proposition, and, ultimately, between sensible and intellectual. If this is so, then we might further ask, even if we accept the systematic value of the positions suggested by Gabriel, to what extent they can be referred to Kant or, moreover, to what extent they can be claimed to be possible developments from Kant, positions that ultimately contradict the fundamental points of the critical doctrine of Kant.

References

Gabriel, G. Kant. Eine kurze Einführung in das Gesamtwerk.. Paderborn Brill/Schöningh, 2022. 144p.

