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Falsity, negation and modality: reply to Luiz Carlos Pereira


Modality. Falsity. Negation. Wittgenstein. Possible entities

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CHATEAUBRIAND, Oswaldo. Falsity, negation and modality: reply to Luiz Carlos Pereira. Manuscrito: Revista Internacional de Filosofia, Campinas, SP, v. 27, n. 1, p. 193–200, 2016. Disponível em: Acesso em: 22 jul. 2024.


In §1 I explain that my rejection of possible (and impossible) states of affairs as a basis for an account of falsity is not part of a general rejection of modal notions but is a rejection of possible and impossible entities of any sort. I then show that my account of senses and of propositions is indeed a modal account. In §2 I examine some of Wittgenstein’s ideas about falsity, as presented by Luiz Carlos, in relation to my account of falsity and negation. In §3 I discuss the modal aspects of identification for propositions.


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