Palavras-chave
emergence
realism
pragmatism
realism
pragmatism
Como Citar
NIÑO EL-HANI, Charbel; PIHLTROM, Sami. A Pragmatic Realistic View of Emergence. Manuscrito: Revista Internacional de Filosofia, Campinas, SP, v. 25, n. esp., p. 105–154, 2025. Disponível em: https://periodicos.sbu.unicamp.br/ojs/index.php/manuscrito/article/view/8660034. Acesso em: 15 maio. 2025.
Resumo
This paper examines the notion of emergence from the perspective of
pragmatism, drawing special attention to Donald Davidson's recent account of the
emergence of thought and to Hilary Putnam's pragmatic realism, which, we argue, can
be applied to the question of the reality of emergent properties. Our overall conclusion is
that the debate over the concept of emergence actively going on in contemporary
metaphysics, philosophy of mind, and philosophy of science should be focused more
stronghy on the realism issue, even though most emergentists (and their critics) tend to
assume a rather straightforward metaphysical realism - a view that ought to be called
into question on pragmatist grounds.
Referências
[17:53, 12/06/2020] Gabriel Volpi: ALEXANDER, S. ([1920]1979). Space, Time, and Deity (Gloucester, Peter
Smith), 2 vols.
ANDERSEN, P.B., EMMECHE, C., FINNEMANN, N.O. & CHRIS-
TIANSEN, P.V. (eds.) (2000). Downward Causation: Minds, Bodies
and Matter (Aarhus, Aarhus University Press).
BAAS, N. A. (1994). “Emergence, Hierarchies, and Hyperstructures”. In:
Langton, C.G. (ed.) Artificial Life III, Santa Fe Studies in the Sciences of
Complexity, Proc. Volume XVII (Redwood City, Addison-Wesley),
(1996). “A Framework for Higher-order Cognition and
Consciousness”. In: Hameroff, S.R.; Kaszniak, A.W.; Scott, A.
(eds.) Toward a Science of Consciousness (Cambridge, Mass., MIT
Press), pp. 633-648.
BAILEY, A. (1999). “Supervenience and Physicalism”. Synthese 117, 53-
73.
BICKLE, J. (1998). Psychoneural Reduction: The New Wave (Cambridge,
Mass., MIT Press).
BLOOR, D. (2001). "What Is a Social Construct?", Facta Philosophica 3(2),
CHAITIN, G. (1975). “Randomness and Mathematical Proof". Scientific
American CCXXXII, pp. 47-52.
CHALMERS, D. (1996). The Conscious Mind (New York, Oxford
University Press).
CUNNINGHAM, B. (2001). "The Reemergence of 'Emergence”,
Philosophy of Science 68 (PSA 2000 Proceedings), pp. 562-S75.
DAVIDSON, D. (1970). “Mental Events”. In: Davidson, D. (1980)
Essays on Actions and Events (Oxford, Clarendon Press), pp.
227.
(1974). “On the Very Idea of a Conceptual Scheme”. In:
pp. 141-156.
207-
Clarendon Press), pp. 183-198.
(1980). Essays on Actions and Events (Oxford, Clarendon Press).
[17:54, 12/06/2020] Gabriel Volpi: (1984). Inquiries Into Truth and Interpretation (Oxford, Clarendon
Press).
(1997). “The Emergence of Thought". In: Davidson, D. (2001)
Subjective, Intersubjective, Objective (Oxford, Clarendon Press), pp.
123-134.
DENNETT, D. C. (1987). The Intentional Stance (Cambridge, Mass., MIT
Press).
(1991). "Real Patterns”, The Journal of Philosophy 88(1), pp. 27-51.
DEVITT, M. ([1984)1991). Realism and Truth, 2nd ed. (Cambridge, Mass./
Oxford, Blackwell).
DREYFUS, H.L. & SPINOSA, C. (1999). “Copying with Things-in-
Themselves: A Practice-Phenomenological Argument for Realism",
Inquiry 42, pp. 49-78.
EL-HANI, C.N. (2000). Níveis da Ciência, Níveis da Realidade (São Paulo,
FE-USP). Tese de Doutorado.
an
(2002). "On the Reality of Emergents”, forthcoming in Principia.
EL-HANI, C.N. & EMMECHE, C. (2000). "On Some Theoretical
Grounds for Organism-Centered Biology: Property
Emergence, Supervenience, and Downward Causation", Theory in
Biosciences 119, pp. 234-275.
EL-HANI, C.N. & PEREIRA, A. M. (1999). "Understanding biological
causation”. In: Hardcastle, V.G. (ed.) Where Biology Meets Psychology:
Philosophical Essays (Cambridge, Mass., MIT Press), pp. 333-356.
(2000). “Higher-Level Descriptions: Why Should We Preserve
Them?”. In: Andersen, P.B.; Emmeche, C.; Finnemann, N.O.;
Christiansen, P.V. (eds.) Downward Causation: Minds, Bodies and
Matter (Aarhus, Aarhus University Press), pp. 118-142.
[17:56, 12/06/2020] Gabriel Volpi: 150
CHARBEL NIÑO EL-HANI AND SAMI PIHLSTRÖM
http://www.humboldt.edu/~essays)
EL-HANI, C. N. & PIHLSTRÖM, S. (2002). "Emergence Theories and
Pragmatic Realism”, Essays in Philosophy 3(2). (available at
EL-HANI, C. N. & VIDEIRA, A. A. P. (2001). “Causação
Descendente, Emergência de Propriedades e Modos Causais
EMMECHE, C., KØPPE, S. & STJERNFELT, F. (1997). "Explaining
Emergence: Towards an Ontology of Levels", Journal for General
Determination, and Reduction”. Journal of Philosophy 72, pp. 551-
Aristotélicos”. Theoria 16(2), pp. 301-329.
Philosophy of Science 28, pp. 83-119.
(2000). "Levels, Emergence and Three Versions of Downward
Causation”. In: Andersen, P.B.; Emmeche, C.; Finnemann, N.O.:
Christiansen, P.V. (eds.) Downward Causation: Minds, Bodies and
Matter (Aarhus, Aarhus University Press), pp. 13-34.
ENGEL, P. (2002). "Intentionality, Normativity and Community", Facta
Philosophica 4, pp. 25-50.
FODOR, J. (1974). "Special Sciences, or the Disunity of Science as a
Working Hypothesis”. In: Boyd, R.; Gasper, P.; Trout, J.D. (eds.)
(1991) The Philosophy of Science (Cambridge, Mass., MIT Press), pp.
429-441.
GRIFFIN, D. R. (2001). Animal Minds: Beyond Cognition to Consciousness 2nd
Edition, Completely Revised & Expanded (Chicago, University of
Chicago Press).
HAACK, S. (2002). "Realisms and Their Rivals: Recovering Our
Innocence”, Facta Philosophica 4, pp. 67-88.
HELLMAN, G. & THOMPSON, F. (1975). “Physicalism: Ontology,
564.
151
.
HORGAN, T. (1982).
“Supervenience and Microphysics”. Pacific
Philosophical Quarterly 63, pp. 29-43.
(1993). “From Supervenience to Superdupervenience: Meeting
the Demands of a Material World”. Mind 102, pp. 555-586.
HUMPHREYS, P. (1997). "Emergence, not Supervenience”. Philosophy of
Science 64 (Proceedings), pp. 5337-S345.
JAMES, W. ([1907]1975). Pragmatism: A New Name for Some Old Ways of
Thinking, ed. by F. Bowers et al. (Cambridge, Mass., Harvard
University Press).
KIM, J. (1992). “Downward Causation' in Emergentism and Non-
reductive Materialism”. In: A. Beckermann, H. Flohr & J. Kim
(eds.), Emergence or Reduction? Essays on the Prospects of Noreductive
Physicalism (Berlin/New York, Walter de Gruyter), pp. 119-138.
(1993). Supervenience and Mind (New York, Cambridge
University Press).
Te
(1989). “The Myth of Nonreductive Materialism”, in: P.K.
Moser & J.D. Trout (eds.) (1995), Contemporary Materialism: A
Reader, pp. 133-149.
(1996). Philosophy of Mind (Boulder, Westview Press).
(1997). “Supervenience, Emergence, and Realization in the
Philosophy Of Mind”. In: Carrier, M.; Machamer, P. K. (Eds.)
Mindscape: Philosophy, Science, and the Mind (Pittsburgh, University of
Pittsburgh Press), pp. 271-293.
(1998). Mind in a Physical World: An Essay on the Mind/ Body
Problem and Mental Causation (Cambridge, Mass./London, The MIT
Press).
[17:58, 12/06/2020] Gabriel Volpi: 152
pp. 3-36.
University Press), pp. 305-321.
(1999). "Making Sense of Emergence”, Philosophical Studies 95,
P. B.; Emmeche, C.; Finnemann, N. O.; Christiansen, P. V. (eds.)
(2000). “Making Sense of Downward Causation”. In: Andersen,
Downward Causation: Minds, Bodies and Matter (Aarhus, Aarhus
LLOYD MORGAN, C. (1923). Emergent Evolution (London, Williams
MCDOWELL, J. (1994)1996). Mind and World, 2nd ed. (Cambridge,
NAGEL, E. (1961). The Structure of Science (New York, Harcourt, Brace
NIINILUOTO, I. (1999). Critical Scientific Realism (Oxford/New York,
and Norgate).
Mass./London, Harvard University Press).
and World).
Oxford University Press).
O'CONNOR, T. (1994). “Emergent Properties”, American Philosophical
Quarterly 31(2), pp. 91-104.
OPPENHEIM, P. & PUTNAM, H. (1958). “Unity of Science as a
Working Hypothesis”. In: Boyd, R.; Gasper, P. & Trout, J. D.
(Eds.) (1991) The Philosophy of Science (Cambridge, Mass., MIT
Press), pp. 405-427.
PEREIRA, A. M. (1998). Lendo Rorty lendo Davidson. In: Pinto, P. R.
M.; Magro, C.; Santos, E. P. F. & Guimarães, L. (org.) Filosofia
Analítica, Pragmatismo e Ciência (Belo Horizonte, Ed. UFMG).
PIHLSTRÖM, S. (1996). Structuring the World: The Issue of Realism and the
Nature of Ontological Problems in Classical and Contemporary Pragmatism;
Acta Philosophica Fennica 59, The Philosophical Society of
Finland, Helsinki.
153
(1998), Pragmatism and Philosophical Anthropology: Understanding Our
Human Life in a Human World (New York, Peter Lang).
(1999a), "What Shall We Do with Emergence? A Survey of a
Fundamental Issue in the Metaphysics and Epistemology of
Science", South African Journal of Philosophy 18, pp. 192-210,
(1999b). "How Minds Understand Their World: Remarks on
John McDowell's Naturalism, Kantianism, and Pragmatism”,
Facta Philosophica 1, pp. 227-243.
(2002). “The Re-Emergence of the Emergence Debate”,
forthcoming in Principia,
(2003). Naturalizing the Transcendental A Pragmatic View
(Amherst, NY, Prometheus/Humanity Books), forthcoming.
PUTNAM, H. (1990). Realism with a Human Face, ed. by J. Conant
(Cambridge, Mass./London, Harvard University Press).
(1994). Words and Life, ed. by J. Conant (Cambridge, Mass./
London, Harvard University Press).
(1999). The Threefold Cord: Mind, Body, and World (New York,
Columbia University Press).
RESCHER, N. (1980). “Conceptual Schemes", Midwest Studies in
Philosophy 5, pp. 323-345.
RORTY, R. ([1987]1991). "Nonreductive Physicalism". In: Objectivity,
Relativism, and Truth: Philosophical Papers, Volume 1 (Cambridge,
Cambridege University Press), pp. 113-125.
SALTHE, S. N. (1985). Evolving Hierarchical Systems: Their Structure and
Representation (New York, Columbia University Press).
SEARLE, J. (1992). The Rediscovery of the Mind (Cambridge, Mass., The
MIT Press).
[17:59, 12/06/2020] Gabriel Volpi: SPERRY, R.W. (1969). "A modified concept of consciousness".
(1983). Science and Moral Priority: Merging Mind, Brain, and Human
(1991). "In defense of mentalism and emergent interaction",
STEPHAN, A. (1997). "Armchair Arguments against Emergentism",
(1998). “Varieties of Emergence in Artificial and Natural
(1999). Emergenz: Von der Unvorhersagbarkeit zur Selbstorganisation,
Psychological Review 76, pp. 532-536.
Values (New York, Columbia University Press).
Journal of Mind and Behavior 12, pp. 221-245.
Erkenntnis 46, pp. 305-314.
Systems”, Zeitschrift für Naturforschung53c, pp. 639-656.
(Dresden/München, Dresden University Press).
TAYLOR, C. (1995). Philosophical Arguments (Cambridge, Mass./London,
Harvard University Press).
TROUT, J. D. (1991). “Reductionism and the Unity of Science:
Introductory Essay”. In: Boyd, R.; Gasper, P. & Trout, J. D.
(Eds.). The Philosophy of Science (Cambridge, Mass., The MIT Press),
pp. 387-392.
VAN CLEVE, J. (1990). "Mind-dust or magic? Panpsychism versus
emergence”. In: Tomberlin, J. (Ed.) Philosophical Perspectives: Action
Theory and Philosophy of Mind (Atascadero, CA., Ridgeview), vol. IV,
pp. 215-226.
Smith), 2 vols.
ANDERSEN, P.B., EMMECHE, C., FINNEMANN, N.O. & CHRIS-
TIANSEN, P.V. (eds.) (2000). Downward Causation: Minds, Bodies
and Matter (Aarhus, Aarhus University Press).
BAAS, N. A. (1994). “Emergence, Hierarchies, and Hyperstructures”. In:
Langton, C.G. (ed.) Artificial Life III, Santa Fe Studies in the Sciences of
Complexity, Proc. Volume XVII (Redwood City, Addison-Wesley),
(1996). “A Framework for Higher-order Cognition and
Consciousness”. In: Hameroff, S.R.; Kaszniak, A.W.; Scott, A.
(eds.) Toward a Science of Consciousness (Cambridge, Mass., MIT
Press), pp. 633-648.
BAILEY, A. (1999). “Supervenience and Physicalism”. Synthese 117, 53-
73.
BICKLE, J. (1998). Psychoneural Reduction: The New Wave (Cambridge,
Mass., MIT Press).
BLOOR, D. (2001). "What Is a Social Construct?", Facta Philosophica 3(2),
CHAITIN, G. (1975). “Randomness and Mathematical Proof". Scientific
American CCXXXII, pp. 47-52.
CHALMERS, D. (1996). The Conscious Mind (New York, Oxford
University Press).
CUNNINGHAM, B. (2001). "The Reemergence of 'Emergence”,
Philosophy of Science 68 (PSA 2000 Proceedings), pp. 562-S75.
DAVIDSON, D. (1970). “Mental Events”. In: Davidson, D. (1980)
Essays on Actions and Events (Oxford, Clarendon Press), pp.
227.
(1974). “On the Very Idea of a Conceptual Scheme”. In:
pp. 141-156.
207-
Clarendon Press), pp. 183-198.
(1980). Essays on Actions and Events (Oxford, Clarendon Press).
[17:54, 12/06/2020] Gabriel Volpi: (1984). Inquiries Into Truth and Interpretation (Oxford, Clarendon
Press).
(1997). “The Emergence of Thought". In: Davidson, D. (2001)
Subjective, Intersubjective, Objective (Oxford, Clarendon Press), pp.
123-134.
DENNETT, D. C. (1987). The Intentional Stance (Cambridge, Mass., MIT
Press).
(1991). "Real Patterns”, The Journal of Philosophy 88(1), pp. 27-51.
DEVITT, M. ([1984)1991). Realism and Truth, 2nd ed. (Cambridge, Mass./
Oxford, Blackwell).
DREYFUS, H.L. & SPINOSA, C. (1999). “Copying with Things-in-
Themselves: A Practice-Phenomenological Argument for Realism",
Inquiry 42, pp. 49-78.
EL-HANI, C.N. (2000). Níveis da Ciência, Níveis da Realidade (São Paulo,
FE-USP). Tese de Doutorado.
an
(2002). "On the Reality of Emergents”, forthcoming in Principia.
EL-HANI, C.N. & EMMECHE, C. (2000). "On Some Theoretical
Grounds for Organism-Centered Biology: Property
Emergence, Supervenience, and Downward Causation", Theory in
Biosciences 119, pp. 234-275.
EL-HANI, C.N. & PEREIRA, A. M. (1999). "Understanding biological
causation”. In: Hardcastle, V.G. (ed.) Where Biology Meets Psychology:
Philosophical Essays (Cambridge, Mass., MIT Press), pp. 333-356.
(2000). “Higher-Level Descriptions: Why Should We Preserve
Them?”. In: Andersen, P.B.; Emmeche, C.; Finnemann, N.O.;
Christiansen, P.V. (eds.) Downward Causation: Minds, Bodies and
Matter (Aarhus, Aarhus University Press), pp. 118-142.
[17:56, 12/06/2020] Gabriel Volpi: 150
CHARBEL NIÑO EL-HANI AND SAMI PIHLSTRÖM
http://www.humboldt.edu/~essays)
EL-HANI, C. N. & PIHLSTRÖM, S. (2002). "Emergence Theories and
Pragmatic Realism”, Essays in Philosophy 3(2). (available at
EL-HANI, C. N. & VIDEIRA, A. A. P. (2001). “Causação
Descendente, Emergência de Propriedades e Modos Causais
EMMECHE, C., KØPPE, S. & STJERNFELT, F. (1997). "Explaining
Emergence: Towards an Ontology of Levels", Journal for General
Determination, and Reduction”. Journal of Philosophy 72, pp. 551-
Aristotélicos”. Theoria 16(2), pp. 301-329.
Philosophy of Science 28, pp. 83-119.
(2000). "Levels, Emergence and Three Versions of Downward
Causation”. In: Andersen, P.B.; Emmeche, C.; Finnemann, N.O.:
Christiansen, P.V. (eds.) Downward Causation: Minds, Bodies and
Matter (Aarhus, Aarhus University Press), pp. 13-34.
ENGEL, P. (2002). "Intentionality, Normativity and Community", Facta
Philosophica 4, pp. 25-50.
FODOR, J. (1974). "Special Sciences, or the Disunity of Science as a
Working Hypothesis”. In: Boyd, R.; Gasper, P.; Trout, J.D. (eds.)
(1991) The Philosophy of Science (Cambridge, Mass., MIT Press), pp.
429-441.
GRIFFIN, D. R. (2001). Animal Minds: Beyond Cognition to Consciousness 2nd
Edition, Completely Revised & Expanded (Chicago, University of
Chicago Press).
HAACK, S. (2002). "Realisms and Their Rivals: Recovering Our
Innocence”, Facta Philosophica 4, pp. 67-88.
HELLMAN, G. & THOMPSON, F. (1975). “Physicalism: Ontology,
564.
151
.
HORGAN, T. (1982).
“Supervenience and Microphysics”. Pacific
Philosophical Quarterly 63, pp. 29-43.
(1993). “From Supervenience to Superdupervenience: Meeting
the Demands of a Material World”. Mind 102, pp. 555-586.
HUMPHREYS, P. (1997). "Emergence, not Supervenience”. Philosophy of
Science 64 (Proceedings), pp. 5337-S345.
JAMES, W. ([1907]1975). Pragmatism: A New Name for Some Old Ways of
Thinking, ed. by F. Bowers et al. (Cambridge, Mass., Harvard
University Press).
KIM, J. (1992). “Downward Causation' in Emergentism and Non-
reductive Materialism”. In: A. Beckermann, H. Flohr & J. Kim
(eds.), Emergence or Reduction? Essays on the Prospects of Noreductive
Physicalism (Berlin/New York, Walter de Gruyter), pp. 119-138.
(1993). Supervenience and Mind (New York, Cambridge
University Press).
Te
(1989). “The Myth of Nonreductive Materialism”, in: P.K.
Moser & J.D. Trout (eds.) (1995), Contemporary Materialism: A
Reader, pp. 133-149.
(1996). Philosophy of Mind (Boulder, Westview Press).
(1997). “Supervenience, Emergence, and Realization in the
Philosophy Of Mind”. In: Carrier, M.; Machamer, P. K. (Eds.)
Mindscape: Philosophy, Science, and the Mind (Pittsburgh, University of
Pittsburgh Press), pp. 271-293.
(1998). Mind in a Physical World: An Essay on the Mind/ Body
Problem and Mental Causation (Cambridge, Mass./London, The MIT
Press).
[17:58, 12/06/2020] Gabriel Volpi: 152
pp. 3-36.
University Press), pp. 305-321.
(1999). "Making Sense of Emergence”, Philosophical Studies 95,
P. B.; Emmeche, C.; Finnemann, N. O.; Christiansen, P. V. (eds.)
(2000). “Making Sense of Downward Causation”. In: Andersen,
Downward Causation: Minds, Bodies and Matter (Aarhus, Aarhus
LLOYD MORGAN, C. (1923). Emergent Evolution (London, Williams
MCDOWELL, J. (1994)1996). Mind and World, 2nd ed. (Cambridge,
NAGEL, E. (1961). The Structure of Science (New York, Harcourt, Brace
NIINILUOTO, I. (1999). Critical Scientific Realism (Oxford/New York,
and Norgate).
Mass./London, Harvard University Press).
and World).
Oxford University Press).
O'CONNOR, T. (1994). “Emergent Properties”, American Philosophical
Quarterly 31(2), pp. 91-104.
OPPENHEIM, P. & PUTNAM, H. (1958). “Unity of Science as a
Working Hypothesis”. In: Boyd, R.; Gasper, P. & Trout, J. D.
(Eds.) (1991) The Philosophy of Science (Cambridge, Mass., MIT
Press), pp. 405-427.
PEREIRA, A. M. (1998). Lendo Rorty lendo Davidson. In: Pinto, P. R.
M.; Magro, C.; Santos, E. P. F. & Guimarães, L. (org.) Filosofia
Analítica, Pragmatismo e Ciência (Belo Horizonte, Ed. UFMG).
PIHLSTRÖM, S. (1996). Structuring the World: The Issue of Realism and the
Nature of Ontological Problems in Classical and Contemporary Pragmatism;
Acta Philosophica Fennica 59, The Philosophical Society of
Finland, Helsinki.
153
(1998), Pragmatism and Philosophical Anthropology: Understanding Our
Human Life in a Human World (New York, Peter Lang).
(1999a), "What Shall We Do with Emergence? A Survey of a
Fundamental Issue in the Metaphysics and Epistemology of
Science", South African Journal of Philosophy 18, pp. 192-210,
(1999b). "How Minds Understand Their World: Remarks on
John McDowell's Naturalism, Kantianism, and Pragmatism”,
Facta Philosophica 1, pp. 227-243.
(2002). “The Re-Emergence of the Emergence Debate”,
forthcoming in Principia,
(2003). Naturalizing the Transcendental A Pragmatic View
(Amherst, NY, Prometheus/Humanity Books), forthcoming.
PUTNAM, H. (1990). Realism with a Human Face, ed. by J. Conant
(Cambridge, Mass./London, Harvard University Press).
(1994). Words and Life, ed. by J. Conant (Cambridge, Mass./
London, Harvard University Press).
(1999). The Threefold Cord: Mind, Body, and World (New York,
Columbia University Press).
RESCHER, N. (1980). “Conceptual Schemes", Midwest Studies in
Philosophy 5, pp. 323-345.
RORTY, R. ([1987]1991). "Nonreductive Physicalism". In: Objectivity,
Relativism, and Truth: Philosophical Papers, Volume 1 (Cambridge,
Cambridege University Press), pp. 113-125.
SALTHE, S. N. (1985). Evolving Hierarchical Systems: Their Structure and
Representation (New York, Columbia University Press).
SEARLE, J. (1992). The Rediscovery of the Mind (Cambridge, Mass., The
MIT Press).
[17:59, 12/06/2020] Gabriel Volpi: SPERRY, R.W. (1969). "A modified concept of consciousness".
(1983). Science and Moral Priority: Merging Mind, Brain, and Human
(1991). "In defense of mentalism and emergent interaction",
STEPHAN, A. (1997). "Armchair Arguments against Emergentism",
(1998). “Varieties of Emergence in Artificial and Natural
(1999). Emergenz: Von der Unvorhersagbarkeit zur Selbstorganisation,
Psychological Review 76, pp. 532-536.
Values (New York, Columbia University Press).
Journal of Mind and Behavior 12, pp. 221-245.
Erkenntnis 46, pp. 305-314.
Systems”, Zeitschrift für Naturforschung53c, pp. 639-656.
(Dresden/München, Dresden University Press).
TAYLOR, C. (1995). Philosophical Arguments (Cambridge, Mass./London,
Harvard University Press).
TROUT, J. D. (1991). “Reductionism and the Unity of Science:
Introductory Essay”. In: Boyd, R.; Gasper, P. & Trout, J. D.
(Eds.). The Philosophy of Science (Cambridge, Mass., The MIT Press),
pp. 387-392.
VAN CLEVE, J. (1990). "Mind-dust or magic? Panpsychism versus
emergence”. In: Tomberlin, J. (Ed.) Philosophical Perspectives: Action
Theory and Philosophy of Mind (Atascadero, CA., Ridgeview), vol. IV,
pp. 215-226.
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