Palavras-chave
freedom
reflection
doxastic voluntarism
responsability
Como Citar
Resumo
Is there such a thing as free belief? This paper is not about free
expression of belief or free speech. It is about freedom of belief as a mental state. In
the sense in which the believer would be the cause of his or her own belief, and could
believe at will, it is, for well-known reasons, impossible. Some writers, however, like
McDowell, have argued, in a Kantian spirit, that obeying the norms of thought and
setting oneself as a member of the "space of reasons” could provide the appropriate
notion of free belief. Their account is based on the idea that a reflexive believer is
automatically a free believer. I argue that this is wrong. There is no appropriate
notion of free belief in this sense, although this does not show that one cannot be
responsible for one's belief.
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