Resumo
The causal/ explanatory exclusion argument is one of the principal
weapons against the possibility of mental causes/ explanations having genuine
causal/ explanatory power. I argue that the causal and the explanatory versions of
the exlusion argument should be distinguished. There are really two arguments, one
of them perhaps successful, the other one not.
Referências
DAVIDSON, D. (1995) "Thinking Causes”, in J. Heil & A. Mele (eds.)
Mental Causation (Oxford University Press, Oxford).
KIM, J. (1994). “Explanatory Knowledge and Metaphysical Dependence”, Philosophical Issues, 5.
(1996). Philosophy of Mind (Boulder, Westview Press).
(1998). Mind in a Physical World (Cambridge, Mass., MIT Press).
Mental Causation (Oxford University Press, Oxford).
KIM, J. (1994). “Explanatory Knowledge and Metaphysical Dependence”, Philosophical Issues, 5.
(1996). Philosophy of Mind (Boulder, Westview Press).
(1998). Mind in a Physical World (Cambridge, Mass., MIT Press).

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