Palavras-chave
explanation
mental causation
belief
mental causation
belief
Como Citar
GOLDBERG, Sanford C. Mentalistic Explanation and Mental Causation. Manuscrito: Revista Internacional de Filosofia, Campinas, SP, v. 25, n. esp., p. 199–216, 2025. Disponível em: https://periodicos.sbu.unicamp.br/ojs/index.php/manuscrito/article/view/8660331. Acesso em: 18 maio. 2025.
Resumo
In this paper I present an internal difficulty for the hypothesis that
mentalistic explanation is causal explanation. My thesis is that intuitively acceptable
mentalistic explanations appear to violate constraints imposed by the mental causation
hypothesis.
Referências
AUDI, R. (1994). “Dispositional Beliefs and Dispositions to Believe”,
Nous 28:4, pp. 419-434.
BACH, K. (1997). "Do Belief Reports Report Beliefs?", Pacific
Philosophical Quarterly 78, pp. 215-241.
BRAUN. D. (1991). "Content, Causation, and Cognitive Science”,
Australasian Journal of Philosophy 69:4, pp. 375-389.
(1995). “Causally Relevant Properties”, Philosophical Perspectives 9,
pp. 447-475.
GOLDBERG, S. (2002). "Belief and Its Linguistic Expression”, Philo-
know: Verbal reports on mental processes”, Psychological Review 84,
SEGAL, G. & SOBER, E. (1990). "The Causal Efficacy of Content",
SANFORD GOLDBERG
sophical Psychology 15:1, pp. 65-76.
NISBETT, R.E. & WILSON, T.D. (1977). “Telling more than we can
pp. 231-259.
216
Philosophical Studies 63, pp. 1-30.
SHIER, D. (1996). “Direct Reference for the Narrow Minded”, Pacific
Philosophical Quarterly 77, pp. 225-248.
Nous 28:4, pp. 419-434.
BACH, K. (1997). "Do Belief Reports Report Beliefs?", Pacific
Philosophical Quarterly 78, pp. 215-241.
BRAUN. D. (1991). "Content, Causation, and Cognitive Science”,
Australasian Journal of Philosophy 69:4, pp. 375-389.
(1995). “Causally Relevant Properties”, Philosophical Perspectives 9,
pp. 447-475.
GOLDBERG, S. (2002). "Belief and Its Linguistic Expression”, Philo-
know: Verbal reports on mental processes”, Psychological Review 84,
SEGAL, G. & SOBER, E. (1990). "The Causal Efficacy of Content",
SANFORD GOLDBERG
sophical Psychology 15:1, pp. 65-76.
NISBETT, R.E. & WILSON, T.D. (1977). “Telling more than we can
pp. 231-259.
216
Philosophical Studies 63, pp. 1-30.
SHIER, D. (1996). “Direct Reference for the Narrow Minded”, Pacific
Philosophical Quarterly 77, pp. 225-248.
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