Palavras-chave
mental causation
supervenience
functionalism
supervenience
functionalism
Como Citar
RABOSSI, Eduardo. Mental Causation: Anatomy of a Problem. Manuscrito: Revista Internacional de Filosofia, Campinas, SP, v. 25, n. esp., p. 285–304, 2025. Disponível em: https://periodicos.sbu.unicamp.br/ojs/index.php/manuscrito/article/view/8660340. Acesso em: 16 maio. 2025.
Resumo
The origins and development of the problem of mental causation are outlined. The underlying pressuppositions which give rise to the problems are identified. Possible strategies for solving, or dissolving the problem are examined.
Referências
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DAVIDSON, D. (1970). "Mental Events”. In: Essays on Actions and
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(1993). “Thinking Causes”. In: Heil & Mele (1993).
(1994). “Davidson, Donald”. In: S. Guttenplan (ed.), A
Companion to The Philosophy of Mind (Oxford, Blackwell).
HEIL, J. & MELE, A. (eds.) (1993). Mental Causation (Oxford, Clarendon
Press).
KIM, J. (1989). "The Myth of Non-Reductive Materialism". Proceedings of
the American Philosophical Association 63. Included in Kim (1993a).
(1993a). Supervenience and Mind (Cambridge, Cambridge
University Press).
(1993b). “Can Supervenience and Non-Strict Laws Save
Anomalous Monism?”. In: Heil & Mele (1993).
© Manuscrito, 2002.
XXV (Special Number), pp. 285-304.
. (2000). Mind in a Physical World (Cambridge, Mass., MIT Press).
304
EDUARDO RABOSSI
KIM, J. (1996). Philosophy of Mind (Boulder, Co, Westview Press).
McGINN, C. (1993). Problems in Philosophy (Oxford, Blackwell).
MCLAUGHLIN, B. (1993). “On Davidson's Response to the Charge of
Epiphenomenalism”. In: Heil & Mele (1993).
PUTNAM, H. (1967). "The Nature of Mental States”. In: Mind, Language
and Reality (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1975).
PUTNAM, H. (1973). "Philosophy and our Mental Life”. In: Mind,
Language and Reality (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press,
1975).
SOSA, E. (1984). "Mind-Body Interaction and Supervenient Causation”,
Midwest Studies in Philosophy, 9.
(1993). “Davidson's Thinking Causes”. In: Heil & Mele (1993).
Block (ed.) Readings in Philosophy of Psychology Vol. I (Cambridge,
Mass., Harvard University Press).
BLOCK, N. & FODOR, J. (1972). "What Psychological States Are
Not”, Philosophical Review, 81.
DAVIDSON, D. (1970). "Mental Events”. In: Essays on Actions and
Events (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1980).
(1993). “Thinking Causes”. In: Heil & Mele (1993).
(1994). “Davidson, Donald”. In: S. Guttenplan (ed.), A
Companion to The Philosophy of Mind (Oxford, Blackwell).
HEIL, J. & MELE, A. (eds.) (1993). Mental Causation (Oxford, Clarendon
Press).
KIM, J. (1989). "The Myth of Non-Reductive Materialism". Proceedings of
the American Philosophical Association 63. Included in Kim (1993a).
(1993a). Supervenience and Mind (Cambridge, Cambridge
University Press).
(1993b). “Can Supervenience and Non-Strict Laws Save
Anomalous Monism?”. In: Heil & Mele (1993).
© Manuscrito, 2002.
XXV (Special Number), pp. 285-304.
. (2000). Mind in a Physical World (Cambridge, Mass., MIT Press).
304
EDUARDO RABOSSI
KIM, J. (1996). Philosophy of Mind (Boulder, Co, Westview Press).
McGINN, C. (1993). Problems in Philosophy (Oxford, Blackwell).
MCLAUGHLIN, B. (1993). “On Davidson's Response to the Charge of
Epiphenomenalism”. In: Heil & Mele (1993).
PUTNAM, H. (1967). "The Nature of Mental States”. In: Mind, Language
and Reality (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1975).
PUTNAM, H. (1973). "Philosophy and our Mental Life”. In: Mind,
Language and Reality (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press,
1975).
SOSA, E. (1984). "Mind-Body Interaction and Supervenient Causation”,
Midwest Studies in Philosophy, 9.
(1993). “Davidson's Thinking Causes”. In: Heil & Mele (1993).
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