Palavras-chave
Crenças
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Resumo
Usando definições probabilísticas de algumas atitudes mentais centrais, este artigo amplia trabalho anterior sobre referência dentro de mundos possíveis, dando uma teoria completa de atitudes proposicionais. O trabalho anterior utilizava o cálculo epsilon para simplificar e esclarecer a lógica modal dos predicados: principalmente a identidade de indivíduos se torna bem mais clara. Alguns detalhes deste trabalho são primeiro explicados antes de se usarem as definições probabilísticas para transferir os resultados para o campo geral das atitudes, e assim resolver vários problemas relativos à "opacidade referencial". Outros problemas também são resolvidos a caminho, em particular o de Kripke sobre a crença, e os de Hintikka sobre a onisciência, e sobre a crença no impossível.
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Este trabalho está licenciado sob uma licença Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License.
Copyright (c) 1993 Manuscrito: Revista Internacional de Filosofia
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