@article{Hickey_2016, place={Campinas, SP}, title={Kant´s concept of the transcendental object}, volume={24}, url={https://periodicos.sbu.unicamp.br/ojs/index.php/manuscrito/article/view/8644786}, abstractNote={<p>It is argued that there is a plausible way to read Kant as consistently repudiating a two-worlds picture and upholding a de-reistic view whereby the transcendental object or thing in itself indicates only a pure concept of the understanding whose role is to govern the synthesis of any unified manifold. This reading of Kant liberates him from the well-known textual and philosophical difficulties of the two-worlds view. Furthermore, I argue that this interpretation leads to a strong idealist position as opposed to the double-aspect view of Allison and Prauss. This idealist position was basically adopted by Fichte in his Introductions to the Science of Knowledge of 1797, wherein the debunking of the thing in itself was a crucial step in his ultimate argument for the unity of theoretical and practical reason.</p>}, number={1}, journal={Manuscrito: Revista Internacional de Filosofia}, author={Hickey, Lance}, year={2016}, month={abr.}, pages={103–139} }