@article{Peramatzis_2019, place={Campinas, SP}, title={Posterior analytics II. 11, 94b8-26: final cause and demonstration}, volume={42}, url={https://periodicos.sbu.unicamp.br/ojs/index.php/manuscrito/article/view/8657726}, abstractNote={<p>I present the text at Posterior Analytics (=APo) II.11, 94b8-26, offer a tentative translation, discuss the main construals offered in the literature, and argue for my own interpretation. Some of the general questions I discuss are the following:</p> <p>1. What is the nature of the explanatory syllogisms offered as examples, especially in the case of the moving and the final cause? Are they scientific demonstrative explanations? In the case of the final cause, are they practical syllogisms? Are they productive?</p> <p>2. Are we to read into such examples Aristotle’s requirements from APo I.4-6 that demonstrative premisses and conclusions are universal, per se, and necessary? If so, in what way? If such requirements do not apply here, what are the implications for question 1?</p> <p>3. What, if any, is the advantage of one type of causal explanation over another (e.g., of final over efficient) in cases in which there is causal competition between complementary explanations?</p> <p>4. What is the relation between the thesis of this chapter, especially the section dedicated to the final cause, and the argument of II.8-10? How is essence (the what-it-is) related to causes? How is explanation/demonstration-based definition related to causal explanation in terms of the four causes?</p>}, number={4}, journal={Manuscrito: Revista Internacional de Filosofia}, author={Peramatzis, Michail}, year={2019}, month={dez.}, pages={323–351} }