TY - JOUR AU - Martone, Filipe PY - 2016/10/27 Y2 - 2024/03/28 TI - Singular Reference Without Singular Thought JF - Manuscrito: Revista Internacional de Filosofia JA - Manuscrito - Rev. Int. Fil. VL - 39 IS - 1 SE - Artigos DO - UR - https://periodicos.sbu.unicamp.br/ojs/index.php/manuscrito/article/view/8646145 SP - 34-59 AB - In this paper I challenge the widespread assumption that the conditions for singular reference are more or less the same as the conditions for singular thought. I claim that we refer singularly to things without thinking singularly about them more often than it is usually believed. I first argue that we should take the idea that singular thought is non-descriptive thought very seriously. If we do that, it seems that we cannot be so liberal about what counts as acquaintance; only perception (and memory) will do. I also briefly discuss and reject semantic instrumentalism. Finally, I argue that while singular reference is cheap, singular thought comes only at a price. ER -