Manuscrito: Revista Internacional de Filosofia

Na-na, na-na, boo-boo, the accuracy of your philosophical beliefs is doo-doo

2022-07-20T12:28:58+00:00

The paper argues that adopting a form of skepticism, Skeptical-Dogmatism, that recommends disbelieving each philosophical position in many multi-proposition disputes- disputes where there are three or more contrary philosophical views-leads to a higher ratio of true to false beliefs than the ratio of the “average philosopher” (as indicated by survey data). Hence, Skeptical-Dogmatists have more accurate beliefs than the average philosopher. As a corollary, most philosophers would improve the accuracy of their beliefs if they adopted Skeptical-Dogmatism.

Natural language at a crossroads

2022-07-20T12:47:18+00:00

Philosophy of language and computer science, despite being very distinct fields, share a great interest in natural language. However, while philosophy has traditionally opted for a formalist approach, computer science has been increasingly favoring probabilistic models. After presenting these two approaches in more detail, we discuss some of their main virtues and limitations. On the one hand, formalist models have trouble in acquiring semantic information from corpora and learning from large amounts of data. Probabilistic approaches, on the other hand, have difficulty in operating with compositionality, in dealing with contrast sets and hierarchical relations, and in distinguishing normative and descriptive views of meaning. We argue that a more fruitful dialogue between philosophers and computer scientists may help to produce a better approach to natural language and stimulate the integration of logical and probabilistic methods.

Two arguments for the incoherence of non-teleological deism

2022-07-20T13:31:58+00:00

I argue that one form of deism, what I shall call ‘moderate non-teleological deism’, seems prima facie incoherent (at least on the assumption of the intuitive Anselmian conception of God). I offer two arguments in support of the prima facie incoherence view: the moral irresponsibility argument and the practical irrationality argument. On the one hand, the moral responsibility argument suggests that three of the essential attributes of such a deistic God are inconsistent: omniscience, omnipotence and moral perfection. This is, of course, a variation of the well-known argument from evil. On the other hand, the practical rationality argument suggests that were such a deistic God to create the universe but have no further interest, plan or goal for the universe, the very act would have committed a deistic God to practical irrationality. I argue that this result follows from a widely accepted understanding of the nature of practical rationality and agency. I briefly examine some objections to the two arguments and conclude that moderate non-teleological deism seems prima facie incoherent.

A capacitarian account of culpability for negligence

2022-07-20T14:03:42+00:00

Ascribing moral and legal responsibility for negligent actions and omissions has always been deeply contested because it seems to be in tension with the natural intuition that responsibility requires control. In this paper I show that we can accommodate culpability for negligence within a control-based account of responsibility if we adopt a “capacitarian” view of control, according to which agents have responsibility-relevant control whenever they have the requisite abilities and opportunity to bring about the morally desired outcome. After explaining the structure of negligent wrongdoing and motivating this conception of control, I show how it can be successfully employed to account for the culpability of negligent agents and to rebut several important arguments against the idea that negligence can be culpable in the first place. I also explain in what respects my proposal is superior to other capacitarian views found in the literature.

A memory-based argument for non-reductionism about the transtemporal identity of persons

2022-07-20T14:17:21+00:00

Does memory constitue diachronic identity? Or does it presuppose it? Butler has claimed that it is the latter, and, in this paper, I will side with him. My argumentation, however, will take a different route. My claim is not that memory presupposes transtemporal identity because I can only remember episodes that have happened to me. Rather, I will probe the idea that some properties of episodic remembering may be such that accounting for them requires us to posit a subject the transtemporal identity of which can't be reduced to continuity. These properties are the pastness of the recollected episode coupled with its first-personal accessibility. The argument will make heavy use of the experience of temporality.

A plea for explanation

2022-07-20T16:21:17+00:00

The paper responds to Duffley's hypothesis that syntactic phenomena are explicable by the ways in which constructions are used. A model of explanation will be offered, and on this basis 'tough' constructions and the general counterfunctionality of syntax will be discussed.

Reply to john collins’ “a plea for explanation”

2022-07-20T16:29:05+00:00

Reply to John Collins A Plea for Explanation.

Vagueness as Arbitrariness

2022-07-20T16:58:06+00:00

BOOK REVIEW: SALLES, S. Vagueness as Arbitrariness, (Springer, 2021, 206 Pages).

The metaphysics of sensory experience

2022-07-20T17:34:08+00:00

This is a book review of "The Metaphysics of Sensory Experiencie" by David Papineau.