Abstract
Martha Nussbaum tells us that emotions are cognitive value judgments. She claims that her theory, the neo-Stoic theory of emotions, can handle traditional objections to cognitive theories of emotions. However, in this paper I hold that she improperly takes advantage of the ambiguity of the term “cognition”: she faces the problems that arise when the term “cognition” is used in a very narrow sense (which claims that emotions are beliefs), resorting to a very wide sense under which any mental process is cognitive. I argue that this move does not solve the problems of the traditional cognitive theories of emotions. In order to show this, I distinguish four senses in which the term “cognitive” is used in theories of emotions, I analyze the ways Nussbaum uses them and why this move does not solve the traditional objections.References
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