Abstract
Further aspects of Rawls' theory of justice are critically examined. Rawls' difference principle is discussed and an alternative suggested. It is argued that Rawls' is a theory of institutional or political justice, rather than of social justice. Rawls' views are compared with those of Kant and important differences are brought out. An alternative view of justice is sketched and it is explained why no explicit principles of justice can be given.
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