Resumo
Dans la première partie de cet article, je distingue entre plusieurs manières de comprendre la thèse selon laquelle la signification serait essentiellement normative. Je suggère que dans l'esprit de ceux qui l'ont défendue, cette thèse vise principalement la notion de contenu intentionnel conceptuel, bien qu'elle pourrait aussi concerner le contenu non conceptuel. Dans la deuxième partie, je montre comment la stratégie déployée par Brandom (1994) pour fournir une explication normative du contenu conceptuel pourrait permettre de préserver la perspective interprétationniste de Davidson tout en évitant certains des écueils auxquels ele semble être confrontée, à condition toutefois qu'elle admette l'existence de contenus non conceptuels. Je termine en mentionnant quelques-unes des questions auxquelles cette nouvelle forme d'interprétationnisme devra éventuellement répondre.
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