Keywords
filosofia da identidade
síntese transcendental
método
Kant
Schelling
How to Cite
Abstract
The Transcendental Doctrine of Method initially distinguishes the method of mathematics through the construction of concepts, typical of mathematics, and the analysis of concepts, which would belong to philosophy. Does it mean that Kant once and for all excludes synthesis in philosophy, reserving synthesis for the method of constructing concepts in mathematics? If so, we would be facing a dichotomy regarding the critical, non-dogmatic method: either the construction of concepts in mathematics, or the analysis of concepts in philosophy. Schelling criticizes the Kantian proposal following the interpretative line of dichotomy; to remedy what he considers the Kantian impasse, he proposes, as an alternative, the construction of concepts in philosophy itself, since he argues that the method of Kantian philosophy would only deal with analysis of concepts unrelated to intuition, according to his interpretation. We want to show, however, that this is not a dichotomy, as Kant proposes a transcendental synthesis of concepts for philosophy as the key to the enigma to make philosophy a rigorous science. An indispensable moment to understand this transcendental synthesis by concepts is the concept of thing in general, which must play the role of sensible intuition for there to be a synthesis in the discursive use of reason. We want to show that Kant was not restricted to a dichotomous question (synthesis-construction of concepts X analysis-dismemberment of the notes of a concept) in the method of proof, but trichotomic, whose third term would be the transcendental synthesis by concepts, ignored by Schelling.
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