On the supposed impossibility of interpreting Kant as an austere constructivist
PDF (Português (Brasil))

Keywords

Kant
Constructivism
Analytic-synthetic distinction
Imperatives
Metaethics

How to Cite

Back, M. B. G., & Klein, J. T. (2023). On the supposed impossibility of interpreting Kant as an austere constructivist. Kant E-Prints, 17(2), 7–35. Retrieved from https://periodicos.sbu.unicamp.br/ojs/index.php/kant/article/view/8673582

Abstract

The argument developed in this article aims to defend Kant's austere interpretation of constructivism from the objections raised by Jeremy Schwartz (2017) in his article Was Kant a ‘Kantian Constructivist’?. With this in mind, we first reconstruct Schwartz’s interpretation of the analytic-synthetic distinction in the practical sphere based on the contradiction characterization and we indicate objections to its acceptance. In the following, we present the containment characterization of analyticity and how it can be transposed to the case of imperatives without resulting in conflicts with the austere interpretation of constructivism. Finally, considerations are outlined regarding the formality of the constitutive principles of practical reason and their scope, reaching the conclusion that an identity between austere constructivism and practical logicism cannot be established.

PDF (Português (Brasil))

References

Hill, T. E., Jr. (1973). The Hypothetical Imperative. The Philosophical Review, 82(4), 429–450.

Kant, I. (2017). A metafísica dos costumes (J. Lamego, Trad.; 3ª ed.). Calouste Gulbenkian.

Kant, I. (1989). Crítica da razão pura (M. P. dos Santos e A. F. Morujão, Trad.; 2ª ed.). Calouste Gulbenkian.

Kant, I. (2011). Fundamentação da metafísica dos costumes (P. Quintela, Trad.; 2ª ed.). Edições 70.

Kant, I. (1997). Foundations of the metaphysics of morals (L. W. Beck, Trans.; 2nd ed.). Prentice-Hall, Inc.

Kant, I. (1993). Grounding for the metaphysics of morals: with, On a supposed right to lie because of philanthropic concerns (J. W. Ellington, Trans.; 3rd ed.). Hackett Publishing Company, Inc.

Kant, I. (2001). Groundwork of the metaphysics of morals (M. J. Gregor, Trans.). Virtual Publishing; Cambridge University Press.

Kohl, M. (2017). The normativity of prudence. Kant-Studien, 108(4), 517–542.

Korsgaard, C. M. (2008). The Constitution of Agency: Essays on Practical Reason and Moral Psychology. Oxford University Press.

Korsgaard, C. M., & O’Neill, O. (2010). The Sources of Normativity (14th ed.). Cambridge University Press.

MacFarlane, J. (2002). Frege, Kant, and the Logic in Logicism. Philosophical Review, 111, 25–65.

O’Neill, O. (2000). Constructions of Reason: Explorations of Kant's Practical Philosophy. Cambridge University Press.

Rawls, J. (1980). Kantian Constructivism in Moral Theory. The Journal of Philosophy, 77(9), 515–72.

Schwartz, J. (2017). Was Kant a ‘Kantian Constructivist’? Kantian Review, 22(2), 257–280.

Street, S. (2010). What is Constructivism in Ethics and Metaethics? Philosophy Compass, 5, 363–84.

Van Cleve, J. (1999). Problems from Kant. Oxford University Press.

Wood, A. (2002). The Final Form of Kant’s Practical Philosophy. In M. Timmons (Ed.), Kant’s Metaphysics of Morals. Interpretative Essays (pp. 1–21). Oxford University Press.

Creative Commons License

This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License.

Copyright (c) 2023 Marina B. G. Back, Joel T. Klein

Downloads

Download data is not yet available.