Federalismo realocativo: sobre-representação legislativa e gastos públicos no hemisfério ocidental

Autores

  • Edward L. Gibson Northwestern University
  • Ernesto F. Calvo Northwestern University
  • Tulia G. Falleti Northwestern University

Palavras-chave:

Federalismo. Representação política. Gastos públicos. Território. Sistema proporcional

Resumo

Este artigo trata da economia política do federalismo e a questão básica examinada é se a sobre-representação de territórios (estados e províncias) nas legislaturas nacionais dos sistemas federais afeta a distribuição territorial dos gastos públicos dos governos federais. A hipótese testada é que afeta e a sobre-representação territorial produz uma distorção dos gastos federais que beneficia as populações que vivem em territórios sobrerepresentados. Para captar essa conexão entre sobre-representação territorial e a distribuição não-proporcional de fundos públicos foi introduzida uma distinção conceitual: os países em que essa conexão existe são identificados como casos de federalismo realocativo, enquanto que os países com padrões territoriais de gastos públicos que são proporcionais à população são identificados como casos de federalismo proporcional. Os argumentos baseiam-se em dados subnacionais dos quatro maiores países federais do hemisfério ocidental: Estados Unidos, Brasil, México e Argentina.

 

Abstract

This article is an inquiry into the political economy of federalism and the basic question explored is, does the overrepresentation of territories (states or provinces) in national legislatures of federal systems affect the territorial distribution of public spending by federal governments? The hypothesis to be tested is that it does, and that territorial overrepresentation produces a distortion of federal spending which benefits the population that live in overrepresented territories. To capture this connection it was introduced a conceptual distinction between territorial overrepresentation and the non-proportional distribution of public funds: countries where this connection exists are identified as cases of reallocative federalism, whereas countries with territorial patterns of public spending that are proportional to population are identified as cases of proportional federalism. The evidence is drawn from subnational-level data (at the provincial/state level) from the Western Hemisphere’s four largest federal countries, the United States of America, Brazil, Mexico, and Argentina. benefits populations living in overrepresented territories.

Keywords: federalism, political representation, public expenditures, territory, proporcional system

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Biografia do Autor

Edward L. Gibson, Northwestern University

Edward L. Gibson is Professor of Political Science at Northwestern University.  His current research focuses on conflicts and dynamics of democratization in Latin America and the United States.  Previous work has addressed the politics of federalism, party politics, and market reform in Latin America.  He has published three books, most recentlyBoundary Control: Subnational Authoritarianism in Federal Democracies (Cambridge, 2012).  Boundary Control addresses the problem of subnational authoritarianism in national democracies via a comparison of the “Solid South” in 19th and 20thcentury United States and contemporary Argentina and Mexico.

Ernesto F. Calvo, Northwestern University

Ernesto F. Calvo (Ph.D. Northwestern University) is a professor of political science in the Department of Government and Politics at the University of Maryland. His research focuses on the comparative study of electoral and legislative institutions. His work has been published in the American Journal of Political ScienceWorld PoliticsComparative Political Studies, the British Journal of Political ScienceElectoral Studies, and other top journals of EEUU, Europe, and Latin America. He has received awards from the American Political Science Association and the Latin American Studies Association for his work on electoral systems and the distribution of patronage resources. He is currently conducting research on patronage networks, cosponsorship networks, and representation.

Tulia G. Falleti, Northwestern University

Tulia G. Falleti is The Class of 1965 Term Associate Professor of Political Science and Senior Fellow of the Leonard Davis Institute for Health Economics at the University of Pennsylvania. She is the author of Decentralization and Subnational Politics in Latin America (Cambridge University Press, 2010), which earned the Donna Lee Van Cott Award to the best book on political institutions by the Latin American Studies Association. Her articles on federalism, decentralization, authoritarianism, and qualitative methods have appeared in the American Political Science Review,Comparative Political StudiesPubliusStudies in Comparative International DevelopmentQualitative Sociology, among other journals and edited volumes printed in the United States, the United Kingdom, France, Argentina, Mexico, and Brazil.

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Publicado

2015-10-19

Como Citar

GIBSON, E. L.; CALVO, E. F.; FALLETI, T. G. Federalismo realocativo: sobre-representação legislativa e gastos públicos no hemisfério ocidental. Opinião Pública, Campinas, SP, v. 9, n. 1, p. 98–123, 2015. Disponível em: https://periodicos.sbu.unicamp.br/ojs/index.php/op/article/view/8641123. Acesso em: 4 dez. 2021.

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