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Resumo
Boa parte das análises recentes do presidencialismo baseiam-se no pressuposto de que o confronto entre executivo e legislativo cria condições simultâneas para a estabilidade das políticas e para o rompimento do regime. Neste trabalho, mostro que há uma tensão lógica inerente entre essas duas predições e que elas se baseiam em pressupostos contraditórios. Em seguida, desenvolvo um modelo de impasse executivo-legislativo e sustento que a instabilidade do regime é mais provável quando atores partidários são unilateralmente impacientes, quando o desenho institucional é inclinado a favor de um partido e quando o número de partidos é maior. Na terceira seção, testo as predições do modelo usando dados de cortes transversais em séries no tempo para dezenove países do hemisfério ocidental entre 1950 e 2000. Por fim, discuto como essa abordagem ilumina alguns enigmas empíricos, como a sobrevivência histórica do presidencialismo americano e os baixos níveis de instabilidade do regime criados por impasses executivo-legislativo na América Latina na década de 1990. Palavras-chave: presidencialismo, estabilidade, regime, América Latina.
Abstract
Much of the recent analysis of presidentialism has been based on the assumption that executivelegislative confrontation creates simultaneous conditions for policy stability and regime breakdown. In the first section of the paper, I show that there is an inherent logical tension between these two predictions and that they rely on contradictory assumptions. In the second section, I develop a model of executivelegislative deadlock and argue that regime instability is more likely when partisan players are unilaterally impatient, when institutional design is biased in favor of one party, and when the number of parties is greater. In the third section, I test the predictions of the model using time-series cross-section data for 19 presidential countries in the Western Hemisphere between 1950 and 2000. Finally, I discuss how this approach illuminates some empirical puzzles like the historical survival of American presidentialism and the lower levels of regime instability created by executive-legislative deadlock in Latin America in the 1990s.
Keywords: presidentialism, stability, regime, Latin America.
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