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A relação entre o comportamento da elite política e as preferências gerais da população está no cerne de discussões sobre democracia representativa. Porém, pouco se sabe sobre quem influencia quem e quanto tempo demora para que tal influência seja sentida. Este artigo apresenta resultados a partir de um conjunto de dados organizados em série temporal que permite verificar a relação entre o clima da opinião pública, a escolha presidencial de instrumentos de governo (legislação extraordinária versus ordinária) e o apoio do congresso às iniciativas dos presidentes no Brasil. Foram coletadas observações mensais sobre a popularidade do presidente, padrões de votação nominal no congresso e uso de medidas provisórias, e da legislação comum, pelo executivo. Esse conjunto de dados permitiu testar, usando técnicas de séries temporais, o impacto dessas variáveis umas sobre as outras e a defasagem temporal necessária para que esses impactos se tornem significativos.
Abstract
The relationship between elite behavior and mass preferences is in the essence of discussions about representative democracy. However, very little is known about who influences whom and how long it takes for such influence to be felt. This article presents results from a time-series dataset that allows us to verify the relationship between the mood of public opinion, presidents’ choice of policy making instrument (extraordinary vs. ordinary legislation) and congressional support to presidents’ policy initiatives in Brazil. We collected monthly observations of presidential popularity, patterns of roll-call voting in congress and presidents use of “medidas provisórias” as well as regular legislation. This dataset allows us to test, using time-series techniques, the impact of these variables on each other and the amount of lags it takes for these impacts to become significant.
Keywords: public opinion, executive, legislative, time-series.
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