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Resumo
Os modelos mais relevantes da teoria econÙmica da regulaÁ„o s„o revistos criticamente neste trabalho, sendo apontadas as inconsistÍncias entre os resultados teÛricos e a falta de suporte empÌrico de car·ter decisivo para esses modelos, apontando-se a necessidade de se considerar a autonomia do regulador perante os grupos de interesse e o contexto institucional.
Abstract
The most important models from regulation economic theory are critically reviewedin this paper. It is shown that the results presented by these models are reciprocally inconsistent and lack decisive empirical support, and that regulatorís autonomy from interest groups as well as the institutional context which supports regulation deserve more research.
Key words: Regulation. Interest groups. Industrial policy
Referências
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