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Estabilidade e difusão de arranjos verticais de produção: uma contribuição teórica
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Palavras-chave

Arranjos contratuais – Estabilidade
Difusão. Coordenação vertical

Como Citar

ZYLBERSZTAJN, D.; NOGUEIRA, A. C. L. Estabilidade e difusão de arranjos verticais de produção: uma contribuição teórica. Economia e Sociedade, Campinas, SP, v. 11, n. 2, p. 329–346, 2016. Disponível em: https://periodicos.sbu.unicamp.br/ojs/index.php/ecos/article/view/8643085. Acesso em: 27 fev. 2024.

Resumo

O objetivo deste estudo é contribuir para o desenvolvimento teórico da coordenação vertical em sistemas produtivos, elaborando o conceito de “estabilidade e difusão de arranjos contratuais”. Considerando o paradigma do alinhamento eficiente das características da transação com o arranjo contratual, espera-se que os arranjos mais eficientes difundam-se e substituam aqueles menos eficientes. Esse processo pode ser descrito por uma curva logística ao longo do tempo, com potencial aplicação na elaboração de alianças estratégicas em cadeias agroalimentares. A coexistência de arranjos contratuais alternativos é um enigma para a literatura que se baseia no alinhamento eficiente e pode ser explicada por: (1) situações de desequilíbrio, (2) barreiras para a adoção do arranjo contratual novo e superior devido à existência de rotinas não replicáveis e (3) efeitos do ambiente institucional no nível de adoção de determinado arranjo. O conceito é exemplificado na indústria avícola brasileira, explorando-se sua utilidade para o estudo de estratégias cooperativas em cadeias agroalimentares e sugerindo estudos empíricos posteriores.

Abstract

The objective of this study is to contribute for the theoretical development of vertical coordination in productive systems, shaping the concept of “stability and diffusion of contractual arrangements”. Considering the well-accepted statement of efficient alignment between transaction characteristics and contractual arrangement, more efficient arrangements are expected to diffuse and replace less efficient ones. This process can be described by a logistic curve along the time, with potential application for designing strategic alliances in food chains. The coexistence of alternative contractual arrangements is a puzzle in the literature that stresses the efficient alignment and can be explained by: (1) disequilibrium situations, (2) barriers for adoption of new and superior contractual architectures due to non replicable routines and (3) effect of institutional environment on the level of adoption of a specific arrangement. The concept is exemplified by the poultry production system in Brazil, stressing its usefulness for the study of cooperative strategies in food chains and suggesting further empirical studies.

Key words: Contractual arrangements – Stability, Diffusion. Vertical coordination

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Referências

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