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A crise financeira asiática demonstra a fragilidade do sistema financeiro global. Falhas de coordenação nos mercados financeiros, equilíbrios múltiplos, ataques especulativos auto-realizáveis, defaults bancários disseminados são sintomas de risco sistêmico. O risco sistêmico torna necessária uma rede de proteção abrangente, capaz de conter os episódios de pânico e os spillovers nos mercados financeiros globais. Esta regulação deve ser tanto sistêmica como prudencial. Como o risco moral e a necessidade de um emprestador em última instância internacional são frutos gêmeos do risco sistêmico, uma regulação global deve tratá-los como questões complementares, e não substituíveis entre si. A idéia central do empréstimo em última instância é estabelecer um piso para o preço em mercados monetários cruciais. Isto está bastante distante daquilo que o FMI é capaz de oferecer. O papel de emprestador em última instância internacional só pode ser executado por um clube de bancos centrais poderosos, como o BIS, que cooperem numa base ad hoc para prevenir e conter as turbulências em mercados monetários globais.
Abstract
The Asian financial crisis demonstrates the fragility of the global financial system. Co-ordination failures in financial markets, multiple equilibria, self-fulfilling speculative attacks, widespread bank defaults are symptoms of systemic risk. Systemic risk calls for a comprehensive safety net capable of thwarting panic and spillovers in global financial markets. Such a regulation should be systemic as well as prudential. Since moral hazard and the need of an international lender-of-last-resort are the twin offspring of systemic risk, a global regulation should handle both questions as complementary instead of substitutable. The gist of lending in last resort is setting a bottom price in critical money markets. This is quite foreign to what the IMF can deliver. The role of the international lender-of-last-resort can only be played by a club of powerful central banks, such as the BIS, working on an ad hoc co-operation and dedicated to preventing disorderly conditions in global money markets.
Key-words: Financial crisis. Asian crisis. International financial system. Systemic risk
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