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Este artigo se propõe a demonstrar que as análises que preconizam a extensão da negociação privada no que diz respeito ao Conhecimento, à Informação e aos Direitos de Propriedade Intelectual não constituem instrumentos adequados pelo fato de dependerem de hipóteses que não correspondem às particularidades desses ativos: racionalidade substantiva, contratos completos e ausência de incerteza. Após apresentar os fatos estilizados e os principais elementos teóricos desse debate, ressaltarei os limites explicativos dessa abordagem e proporei uma análise alternativa baseada nos conceitos de especificidade dos ativos, no sentido definido por Williamson. A esse respeito, mostrarei em que consistem as complementaridades entre o mercado e as instituições.
Abstract
This article aims to demonstrate that the analysis that advocates an extension of private logic in regard to Information, Knowledge and Intellectual Property Rights does not constitute an appropriated framework as it depends on hypotheses that do not correspond to the specificities of such assets: substantive rationality, complete contracts and absence of uncertainty. After presenting the stylized facts that match this economy and the main elements of the theoretical debate, it is underlined the explanatory limits of this approach and proposed an alternative analysis based on the concepts of asset specificities in the sense defined by Williamson. In this respect, I will stress the necessary complementarities between market and institution.
Keywords: Transaction costs; Intellectual Property Rights; Institutions.
Citas
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