IS SELF-DECEPTION PRETENSE?

Autores

  • José Eduardo Porcher Universidade Federal do Rio Grande do Sul

Palavras-chave:

Self-deception. Belief. Imagination. Pretense. Make-believe. The aim of belief. Truth-directedness. Motivation. Action

Resumo

I assess Tamar Gendler’s (2007) account of self-deception according to which its characteristic state is not belief, but imaginative pretense. After giving an overview of the literature and presenting the conceptual puzzles engendered by the notion of selfdeception, I introduce Gendler’s account, which emerges as a rival to practically all extant accounts of self-deception. I object to it by first arguing that her argument for abandoning belief as the characteristic state of self-deception conflates the state of belief and the process of belief-formation when interpreting David Velleman’s (2000) thesis that belief is an essentially truth-directed attitude. I then call attention to the fact that Velleman’s argument for the identity of motivational role between belief and imagining, on which Gendler’s argument for self-deception as pretense depends, conflates two senses of ‘motivational role’—a stronger but implausible sense and a weaker but explanatorily irrelevant sense. Finally, I introduce Neil Van Leeuwen’s (2009) argument to the effect that belief is the practical ground of all non-belief cognitive attitudes in circum-stances wherein the latter prompt action. I apply this framework to Gendler’s account to ultimately show that imaginative pretense fails to explain the existence of voluntary actions which result from self-deception.

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Biografia do Autor

José Eduardo Porcher, Universidade Federal do Rio Grande do Sul

Pesquisador de Pós-Doutorado (PNPD/CAPES) vinculado ao Programa de Pós-Graduação em Filosofia da Universidade Federal do Paraná. Bacharel, Mestre e Doutor em Filosofia pela Universidade Federal do Rio Grande do Sul, onde também atuou como Professor Temporário. É membro do Grupo de Estudos em Metafísica, Epistemologia, Linguagem e Lógica da Universidade Federal de Santa Maria. Sua pesquisa se situa na intersecção das filosofias da mente, da psicologia e da psiquiatria.

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Publicado

2015-11-29

Como Citar

PORCHER, J. E. IS SELF-DECEPTION PRETENSE?. Manuscrito: Revista Internacional de Filosofia, Campinas, SP, v. 37, n. 2, p. 291–332, 2015. Disponível em: https://periodicos.sbu.unicamp.br/ojs/index.php/manuscrito/article/view/8641960. Acesso em: 6 dez. 2022.

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