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En este artículo proponemos una explicación novedosa del efecto Knobe. El efecto Knobe es una asimetría peculiar en la atribución de intencionalidad a un agente con relación a los efectos colaterales previstos de su acción, dependiendo sólo de la valoración moral del efecto y sin que nada más cambie en la situación juzgada: los efectos colaterales malos, pero no los buenos, se consideran intencionalmente producidos. Nos enfocamos aquí en la pregunta por la explicación de esa peculiar asimetría: ¿basta la valencia moral del efecto colateral para explicarla? Hacemos un análisis sistemático de una gran variedad de viñetas presentes en los estudios experimentales y de sus resultados. Intentamos así aislar los factores explicativos. Proponemos que la asimetría se explica por concordancia o discordancia entre la valencia moral del efecto colateral y la actitud moral del agente, juzgada por los espectadores.
Abstract:
In this article we discuss factors presumably responsible for the Knobe effect and offer a novel explanation. The Knobe effect refers to a peculiar asymmetry in attributions of intentionality to the foreseen side-effects of an action, depending only on their moral assessment and with no other changes in the circumstances: the bad effects, but not the good ones, are considered intentionally produced. We focus on the possible explanation: does the moral value of the effect explain the asymmetry? We analyze a variety of vignettes introduced in experimental studies and their results, trying to isolate the explanatory factors. We propose that a concordance or discordance between the moral valence of the side effect and the moral attitude of the agent, as judged by spectators, explains the asymmetry.
Keywords: Intentionality. Knobe-effect. Free-rider. Moral judgment. Harm-morality. Public goods.
Referências
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