Palavras-chave
redução
sobredeterminação causal
epifenomenalismo
Como Citar
Resumo
O artigo investiga a frequente alegação na literatura filosófica de que a concepção de Searle sobre a redução da consciência é incoerente. Após um exame das teses básicas de sua teoria da mente (seção 2), é discutida sua posição a respeito da identidade entre a consciência e a atividade cerebral (seção 3). Da adesão de Searle a uma tese da identidade de ocorrências deve-se concluir que não há contradição entre esta tese e a irredutibilidade ontológica que ele defende. Porém, é possível deduzir de sua teoria asserções que contradizem esta mesma teoria (seção 4), uma vez que essa irredutibilidade resulta em um dualismo de propriedades (seção 5).
Abstract:
The article investigates the frequent assertion in the philosophical literature which affirms that Searle’s conception of the reduction of consciousness is incoherent. After an exam on the basic theses of his theory of mind (section 2), his position concerning the identity between consciousness and brain activity is discussed (section 3). From Searle's adhesion to a token identity thesis, we can conclude that there is no contradiction between this thesis and the ontological irreducibility he defends. However, it is possible to deduce assertions from his theory that contradict this same theory (section 4) once this irreducibility results in a property dualism (section 5).
Keywords: Consciousness, reduction, causal overdetermination, epiphenomenalism.
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