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da Costa’s conception of being modifies that of Quine to incorporate relativization to non-classical logics. A naturalistic view of this conception is discussed. This view tries to extend to logic some ideas of Maddy’s naturalism concerning mathematics.Referências
BERRY, G. “Logic with Platonism” in Words and Objections, D. Davidson and J. Hintikka (eds.), p. 243-77, 1975 DAVIDSON, D and HINTINKA, J. (ed.) Words and Objections, Dordrecht: D. Reidel, 1975.
da COSTA, N. C. A. “Logic and ontology”. Principia, 56, n.1, p. 279- 298, 2002.
HAHN, L. and SCHILPP, P. The Philosophy of W.V. Quine. La Salle, ILL: Open Court, 1986.
JECH, T. Set Theory 2nd edition. New York: Springer-Verlag, 1997.
KUNEN, K. Set Theory. Dordrecht: Elsevier, 1980.
MADDY, P. Naturalism in Mathematics. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1997 QUINE, W.V. “Reply to Parsons” In The Philosophy of W.V. Quine.L. Hahn and P. Schilpp (eds.), p. 396-403, 1986.
SMULLYAN, R. M. and FITTING, M. Set Theory and the Continuum Problem. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1996.
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