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Neste artigo, argumento que o pensamento singular sobre um objeto envolve modos de pensar não descritivos ou de re sobre este objeto, isto é, modos de apresentação fundados sobre relações contextuais de contato com o objeto. Eu analiso estes modos de apresentação como arquivos mentais nos quais o sujeito pode guardar informações adquiridas através das relações em questão. Eu mostro que esta abordagem de arquivos mentais fornece uma solução ao difícil problema da comunicação de pensamentos singulares: se pensamentos singulares dependem de relações contextuais com os objetos de pensamento, como eles podem ser comunicados através de diferentes contextos? O que torna possível a comunicação, quando o falante e o ouvinte não estão nas mesmas relações contextuais com os objetos sobre os quais porta o pensamento do falante?
Abstract:
In this paper, I argue that singular thought about an object involves nondescriptive or de re ways of thinking of that object, that is, modes of presentation resting on contextual relations of ‘acquaintance’ to the object. Such modes of presentation I analyse as mental files in which the subject can store information gained through the acquaintance relations in question. I show that the mental-file approach provides a solution to a vexing problem regarding the communication of singular thoughts: If singular thoughts depend upon contextual relations to the objects of thought, how can they be communicated across contexts? What makes communication possible when the speaker and the addressee do not stand in the same contextual relations to the objects the speaker’s thought is about?
Keywords: Singular thought. Descriptivism. Mental files. Communication.
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