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LOGICAL TRUTH AND LOGICAL STATES OF AFFAIRS: RESPONSE TO DANIELLE MACBETH
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Palavras-chave

Logical truth. Logical property. Analiticity. Logical state of affairs. Predication.

Como Citar

CHATEAUBRIAND, Oswaldo. LOGICAL TRUTH AND LOGICAL STATES OF AFFAIRS: RESPONSE TO DANIELLE MACBETH. Manuscrito: Revista Internacional de Filosofia, Campinas, SP, v. 31, n. 1, p. 69–78, 2015. Disponível em: https://periodicos.sbu.unicamp.br/ojs/index.php/manuscrito/article/view/8642074. Acesso em: 9 out. 2024.

Resumo

Danielle Macbeth disagrees with the view that there are logical truths in an ontological sense, and argues that we have no adequate epistemological account of our access to such features of reality. In my response I recall some main aspects of my ontological and epistemological formulation of logic as a science, and argue that neither Quine’s considerations against meaning, nor Benacerraf’s considerations against Gödel’s realism, show the untenability of an approach to logical truth in terms of logical propositions that denote logical states of affairs.

 

Resumo:

Danielle MacBeth discorda da tese que há verdades lógicas em um sentido ontológico e argumenta que não há um tratamento adequado de nosso acesso epistêmico à tais aspectos da realidade. Em minha réplica relembro algumas características principais de minha formulação ontológica e epistemológica da lógica como ciência, e argumento que nem as considerações de Quine contra a noção de significado, nem as considerações de Benacerraf contra o realismo de Gödel, mostram a invalidade de uma concepção de verdade lógica em termos de proposições que denotam estados de coisa lógicos.

Palavras chave: Verdade lógica. Propriedade lógica. Analiticidade. Estado de coisas lógico. Predicação.

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Referências

BENACERRAF, P. “Mathematical Truth”. The Journal of Philosophy, 70, pp. 661-679, 1973. Reprinted in Benacerraf and Putnam, 1983.

BENACERRAF, P., PUTNAM, H. (eds.). Philosophy of Mathematics: Selected Readings. Englewood-Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1964. Second edition, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983.

BERNAYS, P. Review of Gödel 1944. The Journal of Symbolic Logic, 11, pp. 75-79, 1946.

BERNAYS, P. “Sur le Platonisme dans les Mathématiques”.

L’Enseignement Mathématique, 34, pp. 52–69, 1935. Translated as “On Platonism in Mathematics” in Benacerraf and Putnam.

BERGSTRÖM, L., FØLLESDAL, D. “Interview with Willard Van Orman Quine in November 1993”. Theoria, 60, pp. 65-78, 1994.

BUENO, O. “Truth and Proof”. Manuscrito, 31, pp. 419-439, 2008.

CHATEAUBRIAND, O. “Platonism in Mathematics”. Manuscrito, 28, pp. 201-230, 2005.

GÖDEL, K. “Russell’s Mathematical Logic”. In P. A. Schilpp (ed.). The Philosophy of Bertrand Russell, pp. 126-153. Evanston and Chicago: Northwestern University Press, 1944. Reprinted in Benacerraf and Putnam.

GÖDEL, K. “What is Cantor’s Continuum Problem”. American Mathematical Monthly, 54, pp. 515-525, 1947. Revised and expanded in Benacerraf and Putnam.

HARDY, G. A. “Mathematical Proof”. Mind, 38, pp. 1-25, 1929.

HARDY, G. A. Ramanujan. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1940.

KRIPKE, S. Naming and Necessity. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1980.

QUINE, W. V. “Two Dogmas of Empiricism”. The Philosophical Review, 60, pp. 20-43, 1951.

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