SOME REMARKS ON THE ELIMINATION OF PROPOSITIONS

Autores

  • Pedro Santos

Palavras-chave:

Propositions. Reduction. A. N. Prior. B. Russell. Multiple relation.

Resumo

The paper raises a metaphysical dilemma for propositionalists and discusses two strategies for eliminating propositions, one based on Priorian quantification, the other on multigrade relations. The first strategy is criticised for being of dubious intelligibility and for giving an implausible picture of propositional-attitude states. It is argued that the second strategy works for the case of Russellian propositions.

 

Resumo:

O artigo levanta um dilema para os proposicionalistas e discute duas estratégias para a eliminação de proposições, a primeira baseada em quantificação prioriana, a segunda em relações de grau múltiplo. A primeira estratégia é criticada por não ser claramente inteligível e por resultar numa concepção implausível das atitudes proposicionais. Argumenta-se que a segunda estratégia funciona no caso de proposições russellianas.

Palavras chave: Proposições. Redução. A. N. Prior. B. Russell. Relação múltipla.

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Referências

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Publicado

2015-12-02

Como Citar

SANTOS, P. SOME REMARKS ON THE ELIMINATION OF PROPOSITIONS. Manuscrito: Revista Internacional de Filosofia, Campinas, SP, v. 31, n. 2, p. 601–634, 2015. Disponível em: https://periodicos.sbu.unicamp.br/ojs/index.php/manuscrito/article/view/8642110. Acesso em: 29 jan. 2023.

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