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Inferential Rationality and Internalistic Scarecrows
v. 38 n. 3 (2015), Artigos
v. 38 n. 3 (2015)

Inferential Rationality and Internalistic Scarecrows

Artigos
Publicado 2016-01-13
Paulo Faria
Federal University of Rio Grande do Sul
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Palavras-chave

Inferential rationality. Content internalism. Singular terms

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FARIA, Paulo. Inferential Rationality and Internalistic Scarecrows. Manuscrito: Revista Internacional de Filosofia, Campinas, SP, v. 38, n. 3, p. 5–14, 2016. Disponível em: https://periodicos.sbu.unicamp.br/ojs/index.php/manuscrito/article/view/8642928. Acesso em: 28 abr. 2024.
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Resumo

In a recent paper, Manuel Pérez Otero attempted to turn the tables on Paul Boghossian's claim that content externalism is incompatible with the ‘a priority of our logical abilities’. In reply, Boghossian argued that Pérez Otero's criticism misses the main point of his argument through concentrating on the semantics of singular (as opposed to general) terms. I elaborate on Boghossian's reply by showing that even taken on its own terms Pérez Otero's paper fails to engage with internalism through systematically misrepresenting what a truly internalistic account of the semantics of singular terms should be.

 

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Referências

BOGHOSSIAN, P. A. ‘Externalism and Inference’, Philosophical Issues 2: 11-28, 1992.

BOGHOSSIAN, P. A. ‘The Transparency of Mental Content’, Philosophical Perspectives 8: 33-50, reprinted in Content and Justification (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2008): 159- 176, 1994.

BOGHOSSIAN, P. A. ‘Reply to Otero’s “Boghossian’s Inference Argument against Content Externalism Reversed”’, Philosophy and Phenomenological Review 89: 182-184, 2014.

BOGHOSSIAN, P. A. ‘Further Thoughts on the Transparency of Mental Content’ in Sanford C. Goldberg (ed.), Externalism, Self-Knowledge, and Skepticism: New Essays (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press): 97-112, 2015.

BURGE, T. ‘Memory and Self-Knowledge’, in P. Ludlow & N. Martin, eds. Externalism and Self-Knowledge (Stanford: CSLI): 351-370, 1998.

FARIA, P. ‘Unsafe Reasoning: a Survey’, Dois Pontos 6: 185-201, 2009.

KRIPKE, S. A. Naming and Necessity (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press), 1980.

LUDLOW, P. ‘What Was I Thinking? Social Externalism and Shifting Memory Targets’, in R. Shantz (ed.), The Externalist Challenge (Berlin: De Gruyter): 419-426, 2004. OTERO, M. P. ‘Boghossian’s Inference Argument against Content Externalism Reversed’, Philosophy and Phenomenological Review 89: 159-181, 2014.

SCHIFFER, S. ‘Boghossian on Externalism and Inference’, Philosophical Issues 2: 29- 38, 1992.

SORENSEN, ROY A. ‘Logical Luck’, The Philosophical Quarterly 48: 319-334, 1998.

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