Resumo
In this paper I examine arguments by Benacerraf and by Chihara against Gödel’s platonistic philosophy of mathematics.
Referências
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Benacerraf, P., Putnam, H. (eds). Philosophy of Mathematics: Selected Readings. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1964. Second edition. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983.
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Chateaubriand, O. Logical Forms. Part II: Logic, Language, and Knowledge. Campinas, São Paulo: Unicamp, 2005. (Coleção CLE, v. 42)
Chihara, C.S. Ontology and the Vicious Circle Principle. Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell, 1973.
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Gödel, K. Russell’s Mathematical Logic. In: P.A. Schilp (ed.). The Philosophy of Bertrand Russell, pp. 125-153. New York, N.Y.: Tudor, 1944. Repr. in P. Benacerraf and H. Putnam (eds.).
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