Changes of mind

beliefs and value judgments

Autores

  • Gustavo Ortiz-Millán Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México

Palavras-chave:

Juízos de valor, Crença, Revisão de crença, Dilemas morais, Conflito de valor

Resumo

In this paper I argue that the way in which we revise and change our beliefs is different from that in which we revise and change our judgments of value; this is due to the fact that judgments of value, unlike beliefs, have no truth-values. Changes of judgments of value do not answer in the same way to the restrictions that apply to changes of beliefs and that are determined by the norms that govern beliefs. I argue that, first when we revise and change our beliefs, we should be in a position to suspend judgments, and when trying to remove doubts, we should try to avoid falsehood and, second when changing beliefs, we should be in a position to assign probabilities to those conjectures we are in suspense about. These two conditions apply to the case of changes of attitudes with truth-values, such as beliefs; I argue that these two characteristics do not apply to cases of changes of judgments of value.

 

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Biografia do Autor

Gustavo Ortiz-Millán, Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México

Pesquisador no Instituto de Investigaciones Filosóficas na Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México.

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Publicado

2007-12-31

Como Citar

ORTIZ-MILLÁN, G. Changes of mind: beliefs and value judgments. Manuscrito: Revista Internacional de Filosofia, Campinas, SP, v. 30, n. 2, p. 569–597, 2007. Disponível em: https://periodicos.sbu.unicamp.br/ojs/index.php/manuscrito/article/view/8643448. Acesso em: 28 nov. 2022.

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