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En este trabajo intento mostrar, en primer lugar, que el realismo interno de Hilary Putnam no logra explicar filosóficamente la fijación de la referencia de las expresiones del lenguaje cotidiano. En segundo lugar, sugiero una explicación alternativa del mecanismo de fijación de la referencia apelando al concepto de interpretación radical; además, el enfoque interpretativo lo concebiré como una variante del realismo que acepta la relatividad conceptual, pero rechaza la relatividad ontológica.
This paper intends to show, first, that Hilary Putnam’s internal realism does not provide a satisfactory philosophical explanation of the fixation of reference of natural language’s expressions. Second, I suggest an alternative explanation of the determination of reference in terms of radical interpretation; besides, the interpretative approach is conceived here as a variant of realism which accepts conceptual relativity while rejecting ontological relativity.
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