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Contra a concepção monista das relações que imputou a Leibniz, Russell defendeu a realidade, externalidade e irredutibilidade das relações. Para Russell relações são entidades objetivas e não mentais; elas não são sempre essenciais para a individuação de uma entidade; e proposições relacionais não podem ser reduzidas a proposições da forma sujeito-predicado. Meu objetivo principal neste artigo é a análise dos argumentos de Russell para esta tripla tese. De modo geral, constata-se que devido à sua concentração em questões da lógica, Russell não faz jus à perspectiva metafísica de Leibniz.
Against the monistic conception of relations that he imputed to Leibniz, Russell defended the reality, externality and irreducibility of relations. For Russell, relations are objective and not merely mental entities; they are not always essential to the individuation of an entity; and propositions of the relational form cannot be reduced to subjectpredicate propositions. My primary aim in this article is the analysis of Russell’s arguments for this triple thesis. We can say that Russell was primarily concerned with issues of logic, and because of this misunderstood Leibniz’ metaphysical perspective.
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