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Introducing sense
v. 26 n. 2 (2003), Artigos
v. 26 n. 2 (2003)

Introducing sense

Artigos
Publicado 2016-03-21
Maite Ezcurdia
Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México
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Palavras-chave

Frege. Millikan. Sense. Reference. Content. Cognitive value

Como Citar

EZCURDIA, Maite. Introducing sense. Manuscrito: Revista Internacional de Filosofia, Campinas, SP, v. 26, n. 2, p. 279–312, 2016. Disponível em: https://periodicos.sbu.unicamp.br/ojs/index.php/manuscrito/article/view/8644366. Acesso em: 30 jun. 2024.
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Resumo

In this paper I present what I take to be the best argument for the introduction of the semantic category of sense. This argument, or a version of it, can be extracted from Frege’s renowned ‘On Sense and Reference’, but has not been properly understood or appreciated. I begin by discussing the Russellian objections to other versions of the argument attributed to Frege, in order to expound the argument which fends off such objections.
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Referências

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