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The question that I discuss in this paper is whether Frege has a criterion of identity for the objects the True and the False that he introduces as denotation of sentences. My answer is that he does not, either in general or within the system of Basic Laws.Referências
CHATEAUBRIAND, O. Logical Forms: Part I - Truth and Description. Campinas: CLE/Unicamp, 2001. (Coleção CLE, v. 34.)
FREGE, G. The Foundations of Arithmetic: A Logico-Mathematical Enquiry into the Concept of Number. Oxford: Blackwell, 1950.
———. “Function and Concept”. In: GEACH, P.; BLACK, M. (eds.). Translations from the Philosophical Writings of Gottlob Frege. Oxford:
Blackwell, 1960.
———. “On Sense and Reference”. In: GEACH, P.; BLACK, M. (eds.). Translations from the Philosophical Writings of Gottlob Frege. Oxford: Blackwell, 1960.
FREGE, G. The Basic Laws of Arithmetic: Exposition of the System.
Translated and edited by M. FURTH. Berkeley/Los Angeles: University of California, 1964.
QUINE, W.V. “Whither Physical Objects?” Boston Studies in the Philosophy of Science, 39. Dordrecht: Reidel, 1976.
RUFFINO, M. “Logical Objects in Frege’s Grundgesetze, section 10”.
In: RECK, E.H. (ed.). From Frege to Wittgenstein. New York: Oxford, 2002.
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