Acceptance without belief

Autores

  • Jesús Mosterín

Palavras-chave:

Acceptance, belief, rationality, epistemology, decision

Resumo

We often use the same word “belief” to refer to two different cognitive attitudes. Both of them are dispositions to behave in the same way, but one of these dispositions is involuntary and context independent (and will continue to be called belief here), while the other one is voluntary and context dependent (and will be called acceptance). Belief, like perception, is the result of the automatic workings of our biological cognitive apparatus. Acceptance is the result of a decision, which can be guided by a variety of goals. Acceptance can be accompanied by belief, but need not, and very often is not. Acceptance, not belief, is the fundamental disposition in such varied fields as therapy, the law and science. And acceptance, not belief, is the proper object of a theory of rationality.

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Biografia do Autor

Jesús Mosterín

Instituto de Filosofía CSIC Calle Pinar, MADRID SPAIN

Referências

BARROW, J. & TIPLER, F. (1986). The Anthropic Cosmological Principle.(Oxford, Clarendon Press).

BRATMAN, M. (1992). “Practical Reasoning and Acceptance in a Context”. Mind, vol. 101, pp. 1-15.

COHEN, J. (1994). Acceptance and Belief. (Oxford University Press).

FOLEY, R. (1991). “Rationality, Belief and Commitment”. Synthese, vol. 89, pp. 365-392.

HORWICH, P. (1991). “On the Nature and Norms of Theoretical Commitment”. Philosophy of Science, 58, pp. 1-14.

LIGHTMAN, A. & BRAWER, R. (1990). Origins. (Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University Press).

MOSTERÍN, J. (1987). Racionalidad y Acción Humana, 2nd ed. (Madrid, Alianza Editorial).

ORNSTEIN, R. & SOBEL, D. (1987). The Healing Brain. (New York, Simon and Schuster).

PRICE, H. (1934). “Some Considerations about Belief”. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, vol. 35.

VAN FRAASSEN (1980). The Scientific Image. (Oxford, Clarendon Press).

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Publicado

2016-03-29

Como Citar

Mosterín, J. (2016). Acceptance without belief. Manuscrito: Revista Internacional De Filosofia, 25(2), 313-335. Recuperado de https://periodicos.sbu.unicamp.br/ojs/index.php/manuscrito/article/view/8644540

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